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Why are the rents so high? Who is responsible for homelessness, for urban and rural 
displacement? How can these problems be combatted?  
Recent literature addressing these questions has pointed to gentrification and the 
financialization of land and housing, faulted financialized landlords, hedge funds, and the 
irredeemable logic of finance, and pointed to the importance of land and housing regulation to 
prevent displacement. 
However, theories of displacement—in both land and housing, on both urban and rural 
terrain—suffer from a lack of an underlying theory of the logic, tendencies, and limits of ground 
rent extraction in capitalism.  
This dissertation develops a theory of capitalist ground rent that is applicable across the 
rural/urban divide. I outline the necessary social forms which arise from capitalist private 
property in land, and point to essential tendencies and limits to ground rent extraction. In so 




My arguments involve an explication and advancement of Marxian ground rent theory, 
and draw extensively on Marx’s own writings as well as classical economists on ground rent. I 
analyze mainstream economic research on real estate markets and critical literature on the 
financialization of land and housing. I mobilize data from the Bureau of Economic Research, the 
Federal Reserve, and the United States Department of Agriculture, as well as some private 
companies aggregating data on land, rent, and housing. I draw from personal and published 
accounts of struggles by working and poor people for land control. 
I situate my arguments in a position on capitalism developed, but not exhausted, by 
Value-Form Theorists and Marxian critiques of political economy–which view capitalism as a 
system governed in part by specific abstract logics such as that of value production—and by 
theorists of racial capitalism, primarily within the Black Radical Tradition, who suggest an 
endogenous account of race within the capitalist mode of production and emphasize the 
importance of refusal. 
Chapter 1, The Landowning Class, presents a defense of the concept of the landowning 
class as third class of the capitalist mode of production—a theory which has been widely 
abandoned over the last century. 
Chapter 2, Ground Rent, revisits Marx’s theory of ground rent by contrasting it with 
interest (in opposition to contemporary scholarship which often collapses rent and interest) and 
argues that the categories of absolute rent and differential rent each reveal an essential aspect of 
the capitalist mode of production: absolute rent highlights the power of the landowner to 
withdraw land from the market, and differential rent reveals the fact that land (or space) is the 
singular value-less, monopolizable resource. 
Chapter 3, Land and “Finance,” defines and categorizes the different forms of speculative 
and securitized ground rent, including mortgages, sale price of land, and land-based securities 
such as REIT stock and Mortgage-backed securities. I analyze mainstream economic approaches 
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to land-based revenue streams and investment vehicles, and suggest that land-based markets 
and land-based securities diverge from other financial investments because they remain 
tethered to actual ground rent extraction. 
Chapter 4, Landed Class Struggle, analyzes the strategies available to the landowning 
class which they may use to increase their power to extract ground rent. These include 
withholding land from the market, soliciting favorable government policy, and inducing a rise in 
the price of what I call “high-rent commodities.” I advance a novel theory of urban residential 
ground rent, locating capitalist production in the reproduction of “home” for monthly sale. I also 
suggest a different answer to the question “Why are the rents so damn high?” in urban 
residential rentals by applying the same methods Marx used in analyzing agricultural rents.  
Chapter 5, Financialization, criticizes what I call the epochal theory of the 
“financialization of land and housing,” on the basis that the rise in “finance” and its imbrication 
with ground rent is not new, and that the quantitative shifts over the last half century do not 
indicate a qualitative, epochal break. Also, while this literature argues that finance is taking over 
land and housing, I argue the opposite: a larger and larger portion of global “financial” revenue 
is being extracted in the form of ground rent, indicating a process of the “housingification of 
finance.” 
Through this dissertation I attempt to systematize a theory of ground rent and private 
landownership that builds from Marx’s preliminary drafts on the topic. I intervene in several 
long-standing debates in Marxian political economy, critical geography, and social theory 
around urban ground rent, the status of the landowning class in capitalism, and the stakes of 
land-based struggles. I suggest that the structural analysis of land relations in capitalism can 
improve the concept of class struggle by including within it a broader range of struggles, and 
also refine our notions of what it means to struggle against capitalism. Further inquiry into 
capitalist landed property along these lines should also advance our understanding of the nature 
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of the capitalist state form. I also suggest that the “housingification of finance” (or, more 
accurate but even less pronounceable, the “ground-rentification of finance”) and the behavior of 
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This project began with a specific concern, arising from my own involvement with urban 
struggles over land and housing: why is gentrification so impossible to combat? Marxist 
literature provided ample resources to make sense of wage and workplace disputes (class 
struggle between proletarians and capitalists at the point of production); feminist scholarship 
offered structures for understanding gender hierarchies and gendered violence inside and 
outside of the workplace. However, struggles over land and space remained tertiary in most 
Marxist and leftist literature—constantly “outside.” Marxist and critical geography offered many 
tools for the study, but I sought a structural account which could treat struggles over land on the 
same level of abstraction as struggles over the wage.  
This dissertation does not offer a deep dive into a particular case study. As much as I 
wanted to analyze the dynamics of ground rent and land struggles in San Francisco and 
California, where I was born and raised, every time I started collecting information about these 
struggles, about land markets and rent struggles, I felt like I did not have a conceptual structure 
with which to parse and analyze these dynamics. This dissertation is my attempt to create that 
structure. I consider it a first step towards outlining the structural dynamics and forces which 
govern landed class struggle in the capitalist mode of production. While it is partial and 
fragmented, I hope my readers will find I have made some modest headway. 
 In what follows, I frequently work with macroeconomic data about the United States. 
This involves using statistics from the fraught institutions of the USDA, US Census, and the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics. In some cases, long-run data they have collected are not digitized, or 
not publicly available, and I use old published papers and reports which contain tables and 
charts that are impossible to find elsewhere; hence my readers will find here reproduced several 
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aged charts from these papers. I have occasionally used data from private sources on real estate 
such as CoreLogic and HousingWire, but I try to avoid these when possible because they are 
usually partial. In some cases where data is not available, I substantiate my claims through 
anecdote.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to systematize a theory of ground rent that builds from 
Marx’s preliminary drafts on the topic. Large parts involve the critique of extant literature on the 
question of land in capital. I found this necessary in order to move toward a structural analysis 
of land relations, and I believe the critiques yield important positive claims about the inherent 
dynamics of landed class struggle. I draw upon data of land markets as well as accounts of land-
based struggles in order to clarify the structure and operative categories of ground rent theory. 
I lean on Marx heavily in this dissertation because I believe he was very good at what he 
did. His word is not gospel; he was often wrong. That he frequently recanted on his most 
egregious errors is evidence of his capacity for critique. However when it comes to land, his 
writings are inchoate enough to serve primarily as sign posts rather than as clear structure. I 
strive to use his work as inspiration, and not to take anything for granted. 
Chapters 1 and 2 treat the categories of a landowning class and of ground rent. The 
dominant trend over the last 50 years has been to dismiss or dilute these categories; I defend 
them and argue that in order to accurately develop our understanding of the capitalist mode of 
production in its totality, we must analyze the landowning class and ground rent both as “pure 
forms” of the CMP and as historically dynamic social relations. Through a critique of the 
literature, I highlight the assumptions that undergird the marginalization of land relations in 
capitalism. I also suggest which elements of ground rent theory are important for the broad 
analysis of land in capital. 
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In Chapter 3 I analyze mainstream economics approaches to land-based revenue streams 
and investment vehicles, using the framework of landownership and ground rent established in 
Chapters 1 and 2. I define and categorize the different forms of speculative and securitized 
ground rent. I show that land-based markets and land-based securities are, as a rule, 
distinguished from financial markets by mainstream economists (if not by leftist theoreticians). 
The divergence of land-based markets from financial markets reflects fundamental differences 
between the imperatives of landowners and those of capitalists.  
In Chapter 4 I offer a provisional schema with which to analyze landed class struggle by 
outlining the strategies and limits of the landowning class. I apply these insights to the question 
of urban residential rents in the United States. Urban Residential Rents have been historically 
misunderstood in terms of ground rent theory, and I clarify by arguing that the structure of 
urban rents is analogous to agricultural land rents. The only true “renter” is a capitalist, and that 
proletarian “renters” in fact purchase the commodity “home” from capitalist producers 
(generally, property management companies) who then pay landowners a rent (when they are 
not the same company). 
Chapter 5 criticizes scholarship on the “Financialization of land and housing,” on the 
basis that it misapprehends and mystifies landed class struggle. I argue for a longue-durée 
account of financialization, and for considering that finance is being gobbled up by the land 
market, rather than the reverse.  
 
Much of this dissertation will analyze the economic dynamics of landed class interests, 
how they conflict or collaborate with capitalist class interests, and how the this plays out in 
space. However, I will begin by reflecting on the conflict between landowners and proletarians, 
as the ultimate goal is to contribute to a “Marxist theory of displacement” (Chatterjee, 2014, p. 
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55).  The landowning class, through pursuing their imperative to extract ground rent from the 
land, attempts to gain control over increasing amounts of the globe. In this pursuit, they 
constantly divorce more and more people from the land, creating more free laborers. In doing 
this, the landowning class plays the essential role of preventing the people from getting too 
much land, too much freedom, too much power.  
Marx called it original accumulation; others have called the enclosure movement, 
ongoing accumulation by dispossession, colonization. Here I call it gentrification. It attacks and 
severs the relation between land and people. It destroys community ties and social fabric. 
Gentrification is a tool of social control, a counterinsurgency measure against the strength of 
landed communities to resist and to attack. Displacement is not just a travesty, it is a 
suppression of resistance.  
 
Displacement as Counterrevolution 
Every resistance movement, every insurrection, every revolutionary struggle, starts and 
subsists in shared space—flourishes and grows through control over mobility. So, displacement 
is one of the most effective counterinsurgency tactics—intentional or no. 
Gentrification is what we call the current wave of urban displacement, in which primarily 
Black and Brown people are pushed out of their homes and neighborhoods. Generally the push 
comes from big money looking for profitable rent gaps, but the white bourgeoisie also plays an 
essential role in this displacement. Anti-gentrification activists have had very few success stories 
at the neighborhood or city level, because we are standing up against a powerful flood of global 
real estate capital into warm, moist rent gaps, where moneys grow out of all proportion. The 
power that accompanies this flood of capital is so massive that community groups can do little to 
even touch it.  
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This mismatched fight between global real estate capital and urban communities of color 
is preceded by decades of attack on the social fabric of those communities, generally by the state; 
through incarceration, policing, the “war on drugs,” government redevelopment, infrastructure 
projects, redlining, reverse-redlining, disinvestment,  affordable housing scams; through the 
irresistible logic of private property in land. The state smooths the way for capital and landed 
property. 
Gentrification as we know it encounters a social fabric already torn and singed by 
generations of direct and indirect attack. The people who still live and work there are still 
fighting, and often angrier than ever, but with fewer material resources and collective power due 
to very real and material violence and dispossessions over the years. 
In rural and agricultural settings, we see much the same thing. Generations of attack on 
rural communities—of forced privatization on previously collective land, of coercive credit 
schemes and manipulative patents, and of direct violence under many guises—leave rural and 
agricultural communities weakened. Moneyed interests enter the stage, pushing out residents to 
make space for agribusiness, mining, windfarms, whatever turns a profit.  
Even the tactics can be radically similar across urban and rural areas: policing and 
militarization (from  urban policing to rural paramilitaries, displacement for infrastructure 
projects (from city subway tracks to rural railroads), privatization of land so that moneyed 
interests can buy up property rights (from privatization of public housing units in the UK to the 
privatization of Mexican ejido system), and so on. 
Clyde Woods (1998) described this process as “spatial fragmentation” in the context of 
the counterrevolution of the plantation block against the powerful force of Black 
Reconstruction: Even after Black farmers were coerced into returning to the fields, the planters 
6 
 
dismantled centralized housing “for the primary purpose of crushing the Union Leagues 
movement in the south.” 
Sometimes spatial fragmentation is an open tool of social repression; other times it 
comes under the guise of self-professed do-gooders. Saidiya Hartman (2018) describes how, in 
Golden Era New York City, “sociologists and reformers” enacted spatial fragmentation for the 
purposes of destroying “the modes of intimacy and affiliation being fashioned in the ghetto, the 
refusal to labor, the forms of gathering and assembly, the practices of subsistence and getting 
over” (p. 469). Hartman continues: “Harlem was swarming with vice-investigators and 
undercover detectives and do-gooders who were all intent on keeping young black women off 
the streets, even if it meant arresting every last one of them” (p. 473). Here, free mobility and 
taking-up space was named a disorder, a danger, a threat, and so the resources of the state and 
shadow states were directed towards spatial fragmentation of that “threat.”      
Today, in Central America, spatial stratification of landed Indigenous communities is 
part and parcel – and potentially the ultimate goal – of the so-called “drug war.” Dawn Paley 
writes: “States and transnational capital [take recourse] in repression through terror in attempt 
to dispossess people from their communal lands and territories throughout the Americas and 
the world.” (Paley, 2014, p. 18). The “drug war”; the “war on terrorism”; “ethnic conflict” –all 
these are masks for landed class struggle.  
These types of overt violence and repression raze the ground for subsequent stages of 
impersonal, profit-motivated displacement. When so-called “financialized landlords” buy up 
San Francisco properties and squeeze low income residents until they move, those tenants have 
already lost two thirds of their community—why not move to Vallejo? 
It is even difficult for working class people to refuse turning their own properties into 
profit. Just five years after the powerful protests following the murders of Michael Brown and 
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Eric Garner in Oakland, CA, dozens of the young Black organizers of those protests have been 
pushed to the outskirts of the Bay Area, others have been arrested and are still in jail or prison, 
and at least one has been killed. Many homeowners – Black, white, and otherwise – that may 
have harbored political organizing in the 70s, 80s, or 90s have chosen to sell their properties in 
Oakland, cashing out on rising home values. This weakens communities, prevents the passing 
down of political knowledge, and reduces the square footage available for meetings and crash 
pads. It is not an individual failure, but evidence of a structural compulsion. 
Though displacement is never the end. Displacement leads to new spatial 
concentrations. One of the most earth-shaking uprising in the US in the last decade was in 
Ferguson, Mo.. The people who organized and executed the uprising were poor Black people 
recently pushed into Ferguson after being displaced from elsewhere. In such places, resistance, 
rebellion, and revolution can spread quickly.      
  
Land as Invitation Masterlessness 
“Colonial authorities were ever mindful of the many invitations to masterlessness which 
the cities held out.” – Julius Scott (2018) 
“Down where we are, food is used as a political weapon. But if you have a pig in your 
backyard, if you have some vegetables in your garden, you can feed yourself and your 
family, and nobody can push you around.” – Fannie Lou Hamer (White & Redmond, 
2019)       
  
Julius Scott (2018) describes cities in the Caribbean as places of potential power and 
refusal for ex-slaves and free Black people in the 19th Century. Authorities could not so easily 
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stratify and dismantle social networks and infrastructure in the space of the city (since then, 
capital and state have found increasingly effective ways to control cities, though never entirely). 
Fannie Lou Hamer describes how autonomy over food, which is concomitant to control over 
land and space, leads to strength vis a vis would-be oppressors. Cedric Robinson (2000) 
describes the Black Radical Tradition as aimed not toward the goal of gaining strength within 
the capitalist mode of production, but toward wrenching autonomy and freedom from it. In this 
tradition land, space, and mobility are highly valued; they can enable people to refuse, rather 
than struggle forever within.  
This is important when considering the role of land struggle in capitalism. Struggles over 
the wage relation are always, to some extent, struggles for status and quality of life within the 
system. Struggles over land, space, mobility have the potential to encourage refusal, rejection, 
an impulse towards the “total abolition” of the capitalist mode of production.  
Conversely, it is exceedingly difficult to develop any autonomy when there is not 
defensible access to land. In gentrifying capitalist metropoles, it is neither easy, efficient, nor 
particularly effective to pursue the “necessities” of life – food, living space, water – through 
collective struggle, in large part because we have no secure access to land or space. Squatted 
houses get busted, squatted community gardens get bulldozed, and as gentrification progresses, 
the busting and bulldozing happens faster and faster. It is less arduous and more reliable to go 
to a food pantry, to borrow money for McDonalds, to sign your children up for free lunches at 
school and throughout the summer, than to maintain a collective urban farm and communal 
neighborhood kitchen, especially when you know it could get squashed at any moment. It is less 
dangerous and onerous to rent an apartment from a private landlord, even if it is a moldy one, a 
broken down or overcrowded one, than to occupy and defend a collective squat in a 
neighborhood that’s on the radar of the real estate industry.  
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Struggles over the wage can also have the potential to pass over into collective social 
reproduction, but they have been cauterized by centuries of counterattacks. Where once, a strike 
might have implied the collectivization of “reproductive” activities like cooking and child 
tending, this is rarely any longer the case in hyper developed cities. Now, fighting for a better 
wage or working conditions in capitalist metropoles rarely bleeds out beyond the workplace. 
(Such was the strange draw of the occupy movement – a sense of collective reproduction so alien 
to most urbanites, and so immediately transformative.) 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore stresses that abolition geographies, which  go “back in time-space” 
to find alternatives above and beyond the “displacement and redistribution of human sacrifice,” 
these abolition geographies “start from the homely premise that freedom is a place”  (Gilmore, 
2017, pp. 227, 228, emphasis added). Cedric Robinson emphasizes removal of self from the 
system, of “flight,” “marronage,” “total rejection,” and “preservation of the collective being,” as 
elements of the Black Radical Tradition (Robinson, 2000, pp. 130, 190, 169, 171). Unlike 
demands for a higher wage or for reduction in violence from forces on high, revolutionary 
movements towards masterlessness necessitate – without possible compromise – land, space, 
territory, mobility.  
 
Endogenous Racialization and Landed Class Struggle 
 
Contrary to the popular Marxist and communist belief that capitalism produces an 
increasingly homogenized working class, capitalism in fact produces a radically stratified and 
hierarchized proletariat. The labor relation ranges from the most unfree, violently enforced 
slavery, to the six-figure salaries of CEOs, university chancellors, or leaders of non-profit 
corporations. The amount you are paid, brutalities of the job, and freedom of your person vary 
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wildly, to make the different experiences of work basically incomparable. These labor 
hierarchies have been called out repeatedly as an anomaly by labor organizers and theorists, but 
it is, on the contrary, the norm. 
Cedric Robinson suggests in his history of pre-colonial European societies that the very 
existence of clan differentiation combined with hierarchized access to resources became the 
process of racialization. This seed grew into the capitalist mode of production. If we consider 
Gilmore’s “group-differentiation” as the form taken in capitalism of Robinson’s clan 
distinctions, then we might consider group-differentiated access to resources to be capitalist 
race-formation. This could be a vulgar economistic version of Gilmore’s definition of race as 
“group-based vulnerability to premature death;” insofar as vulnerability to premature death can 
be determined by access to resources. 
If we accept that capitalism inherently hierarchizes the proletariat, and that hierarchized 
groups in capitalism are always racial groups, then not only can we say that capitalism 
inherently reproduces race, but we can also say that the differentiation of access to land and 
housing is an inherently racializing process.  
While all struggles over the wage somehow demand inclusion (on better terms) within 
the capitalist system, many land-based struggles are pointed consciously away from the system 
altogether. The people who wage land struggles for autonomy are usually those people who are 
marginalized and pushed out of the wage relation. They are those groups who are more 
vulnerable to premature death, have fewer rights and securities vis a vis the wage, and less 
power in general as defined by the capitalist mode of production – they are closer to the “edge” 
of capitalism, are more intensely suppressed while having the least amount of rights. Hence, 
there is a connection between racialization (which produces some groups as closer to or farther 
from that “edge”) and land-based struggles. 
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 Robinson suggests that the goal of many enslaved Africans in the south was to live 
outside and reject capitalist social relations in their totality. In his focus on this intent to escape 
and refuse, Robinson offers something diametrically opposed to what most Marxists emphasize 
in discussion of “surplus populations.” In the Marxist theory of surplus population, the working 
class tends towards becoming “excluded from work” (Endnotes, 2010, p. 33). Marx himself only 
defines proletarian once in capital, in a footnote in Chapter 25 which reads  
“Proletarian” must be understood to mean, economically speaking, nothing other than 
“wage-laborer,” the man who produces and valorizes “capital,” and is thrown into the 
street as soon as he becomes superfluous to the need for valorization. (Marx, 1992) 
However, to take Robinson’s point seriously is to believe that not everyone is “thrown into the 
street” or “excluded from work”; some people run away from the factory or the field, hurling 
themselves from work. And if a person runs away from work, they need land to run into. 
Similar to the Marxist position, Wacquant writes that detainees in jails and prisons are 
“essentially drawn from the most marginalized…. Incarceration serves above all to regulate, if 
not to perpetuate, poverty and to warehouse the human rejects of the market”(Wacquant, 2009, 
p. 70). But did the market reject them, or did they reject the market?  
In any case, to reject the market, or be rejected by it, means to have a particularly urgent 
relationship to land control. The movement toward freedom, toward “open rebellion,” 
necessarily involves the capture of land and the wrenching open of paths of mobility. In this, we 














 : The Landowning Class 
 
Introduction 
Here, then, we have all three classes—wage-laborers, industrial capitalists, and 
landowners constituting together, and in their mutual opposition, the framework of 
modern society. (Marx, 1967, p. 618) 
 
We are accustomed to thinking about capitalism as being composed of two classes: the 
working class and the capitalist class. However, Marx, as a progenitor of anti-capitalist critique, 
explicitly argues that there are not two classes, but three—the third being the class of landlords. 
Appearing late in Capital Vol 1, and elaborated in Capital Vol 3 and in Theories of Surplus Value 
Vol 2, Marx’s landowning class is grounded in the social relation of private property in land, 
and draws its wealth in the form of ground rent, a revenue stream categorically distinct from 
profits, wages, and even interest. The landowning class as such is irreducible to and distinct 
from the other classes, while remaining necessary to the capitalist mode of production (CMP) 
due to the necessity of the material social relations which give rise to it (private property in 
land). Marx often uses the term “class” to casually refer to groups like merchant capital, but he 
elevates landowners to one of the three great classes of modern society alongside capitalists and 
the proletariat.  
While enjoying some significance in Kautsky’s 1899 text The Agrarian Question (1988), 
the landowning class is absent in Lenin. This is surprising considering Lenin’s sensitivity to land 
issues which are epitomized in his 1917 Decree on Land which declared landed proprietorship to 
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be abolished and all land “and everything pertaining thereto” placed at the disposal of peasants’ 
(volost) land committees and uyezd Soviets of Peasants’ Deputies (Lenin, 2017). The idea of the 
landowning class—a fundamental analytical category for many classical economists—evaporated 
almost completely in Marxist and anti-capitalist scholarship over the next century, especially 
among those explicitly discussing issues of land, space, and place. Marxian critics of space from 
Henri Lefebvre to Doreen Massey, all abandoned the theory of landowners-as-class, often 
without fanfare. The prominent Marxist theorists who have paved the road for critical 
scholarship on land and space since the seventies, such as David Harvey, Ben Fine, Michael Ball, 
Anne Haila, and Michael Neocosmos, have carried forward the assumption that landowners are 
not capitalism’s “third class,” in some cases arguing that they are not even necessary to the 
capitalist mode of production. The growing consensus is that landowners are, at most, a subset 
or class fraction of the capitalist class, usually a branch of finance capital. This position has 
influenced contemporary studies of the current housing crisis, in which predatory and 
“financialized” landownership is analyzed in terms of the logic of finance, speculation, and 
predatory debt relationships, but not in terms of the extraction of ground rent. However, not 
only do the market dynamics of ground rent extraction diverge from those of “financial” capital 
accumulation (see Chapter 3), the ontological structure of the landowning class is unique and 
incommensurable with any type of capitalist—financial or otherwise.  
In this Chapter we will track the abandonment of the theory of the landowning class as 
third class and then offer a preliminary sketch of the logics of landownership elaborated 
throughout this dissertation. These logics include, but are not limited to: (1) the willingness of 
the landowning class to withdraw land from the market and hold it; (2) the emergence of direct 
conflict between landowning interests and productive capital over shares of surplus value; and 
(3) the unique and unparalleled use-value represented by land which, if left to the masses, 
encourages the rejection of the wage system, capitalist exploitation, and all its accoutrements. 
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Because of this, the perpetuation of capitalism requires the preservation of landed property as a 
social form. 
The emphasis on the “financialized” nature of landownership in recent years leads 
scholars to posit a rupture rather than a continuity between contemporary land relations and 
land relations of the past. However, as Marx warns us, a quantitative shift (in this case, the 
increase of financial profits over profits of production) does not necessarily mean a qualitative 
break has taken place. For example, quantitative increases in the size of landowning companies 
over the last half century does not make them qualitatively distinct from capitalist land 
consolidation in the 18th and 19th centuries.  
Over the last 50 years many scholars of land and capital have argued for the importance 
of ground rent while rejecting the class-status of landowners. Recent authors such as Deepankar 
Basu and Jorgen Sandemose join Fine, Harvey, Massey, and Lefebvre, in this camp (Basu, 2018; 
Sandemose, 2006). Anne Haila and Pradeep Bandyopadhyay derive ground rent from the 
coordinating function it plays for capital rather than seeing it as a distinct revenue stream 
based on private landownership and captured by the class of landowners.(Bandyopadhyay, 
1982; Haila, 1990) However, to disconnect ground rent from a theory of the landowning class is 
to abandon its historical-material basis (the social relation of private landownership). Many 
studies of rent today avoid a direct treatment of land qua land as a result of this abandonment of 
a theory of the landowning class. Marx himself found it necessary to “deal with landed property 
ex professo” before giving a “detailed exposition of rent” (Marx, 1968, p. 26; see also pp. 30,37, 103-4). 
Theorizing ground rent without a theory of the landowning class warps the theory of ground 
rent almost beyond recognition.  
A few theorists have taken up the category of the landowning class positively in the post-
war period—notably Martha Campbell, a contemporary Marxist affiliated with Value Form 
Theory, and Roman Rosdolsky, a Ukranian socialist expelled from the CP in the late 20s who is 
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warmly cited by contemporary Value Form Theorists (Campbell & Reuten, 2001; Rosdolsky, 
1989). Both offer careful exegesis of Marx’s theory of the landowning class but are generally 
uncited by critical theorists of space. 1 
The dismissal of the landowning class as third class complements the prioritization of 
the wage labor relation as ground zero of class struggle. Such a theory of revolution treats 
struggles which occur elsewhere than the “point of production” as having less historical and 
strategic significance. On this account, workers organizing their workplace represent a more 
fundamental moment of class struggle than tenants organizing their buildings; wildcat strikes in 
automobile factories are more immediate forms of class struggle than actions of landless 
peasant movements to occupy land; mistreated restaurant workers are more immediate 
evidence of the inner logic of capital than homeless encampments. 
There has been robust critique of this privileging of struggles at the “point of 
production,” not least by thinkers like Harvey, Lefebvre, and Massey. However, it remains taboo 
to suggest there is a class struggle between proletarians and landowners, or between 
landowners and capitalists, of the same level of abstraction as the class struggle between 
proletarians and capitalists. The theory of the landowning class as third class requires us to 
consider struggles around land, space, and housing as forms of immediate and direct class 
struggle. What’s more, struggles around land, space, and housing are frequently waged (and 
most militantly) by indigenous people, Black people, and other racialized people around the 
world—and often by women and LGBTQ people within communities. The tendency to elevate 
the movements and revolutions of industrialized European men, and those global movements 
and revolutions which match them in form, is critiqued immanently by the theory of the 
landowning class. Racialization (the production of violent racial hierarchy) and patriarchy (the 
 
1 Campbell and Rosdolsky are not, however, representative of the opinions of Value Form Theorists in general about 
landowners as third class; CJ Arthur and Marco Guidi, for example, both assert the inessentiality of landowners 
(Arthur, 2006; Guidi, 1998). 
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production of violent gender hierarchy) as social relations both involve land in essential ways, 
and so developing a structural theory of landownership also offers insight into a structural 
analysis of these social relations.  
 
Marx’s Theory of the Landowning Class 
What is a “class”? 
Marx uses the term “class” in two ways. First, he refers casually to groups like merchant 
capitalists or the intelligentsia as “classes.” This coincides with Bertell Ollman’s observation, in 
his seminal study on Marx’s concept of class (1968), that Marx’s loose use of “class” functions as 
“a synonym for ‘group,’ ‘faction,’ or ‘layer.’” Secondly, Marx describes three classes which 
together constitute the “framework of modern society”: capitalists, proletarians, and 
landowners. Ollman suggests that this use of the term class is “most in keeping with his other 
theories,” and the tripartite division should be considered the “Marxist system of classes” (1968, 
p. 576). 
Each class arises from material conditions that differ absolutely from those of the other 
two classes. Proletarians own naught but their labor power; capitalists own the means of 
production; landowners own land. These classes are all functionally necessary for the 
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production in its most basic, unadorned form. Capitalist 
production requires labor from the worker, the dominance of the capitalist in the production 
process, and it requires that land be owned. Classes divided along these lines will have, as 
Ollman argues, “distinct economic interests… based on these relations which place them in 
conflict with… the other two groups”(1968, p. 576). 
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Ollman states, however, that landowners-as-a-class are soon to vanish.2 Ollman makes 
no argument for this position, even though it represents—on his own reading—a significant 
departure from Marx’s thought. However, because Ollman designates the first criterion for class 
as having “a direct operating relationship to the mode of production” (Ollman, 1968, p. 576), we 
might reasonably infer that he believes the landowning class to lack this “direct operating 
relationship”—at least in the long term.  
The superfluous and necessary landowner. 
And Ollman would be correct to argue that landowners do not have a direct operating 
relationship to the immediate process of production. Marx also argues this, regularly describing 
the landowning class as ‘superfluous’ and ‘useless’ vis a vis production: 
Assuming the capitalist mode of production, then the capitalist is not only a necessary 
functionary, but the dominating functionary in production. The landowner, on the other 
hand, is quite superfluous in this mode of production. Its only requirement is that land 
should not be common property, that it should confront the working class as a condition 
of production, not belonging to it... The landowner, such an important functionary in 
production in the ancient world and in the Middle Ages, is a useless superfetation in the 
industrial world. (Marx 1968 p. 44, italic emphasis mine) 
Many scholars have interpreted this ‘superfluity’ to mean that landowners are 
unnecessary to the capitalist mode of production. Marx encourages this interpretation by calling 
landowners a “useless excrescence” that “have not grown out of the capitalist mode of 
 
2 “[Marx] believes that developments in capitalist society are speedily reducing all such [middle and intermediate] 




production but have been passed on to it,” who are “not a necessary agent for capitalist 
production” (Marx, 1968, pp. 44, 152, 153). 
While it may be the case that from “the standpoint of capitalist production,” only the 
capitalist and the wage laborer are necessary (Marx, 1968, p. 152), from the standpoint of the 
totality of capitalist social relations, landowners are also necessary. Marx’s comments 
sometimes lean toward ejecting the landowner from the logical core of the capitalist mode of 
production, but the fact remains that land “should belong to someone, so long as it is not the 
worker.” Insofar as this is true, the landowner is a necessary agent for the capitalist mode of 
production, if not for capitalist production.  
In sum: landowners are superfluous vis a vis the concrete process of value production, 
while being necessary to the reproduction of the totality of capitalist social relations. Their role 
is not to instigate or direct the production process, but to prevent land from being used as 
common property.  
Moreover, this superfluity of landowners vis a vis the production process marks the 
“characteristic peculiarity” of the landowner of the CMP: 
The capitalist still performs an active function... but the landowner need only 
appropriate the growing share in the surplus product and the surplus-value, without 
having contributed anything to this growth. This is the characteristic peculiarity of his 
position. (Marx, 1967, p. 638, emphasis mine). 
Compared to feudal landowners who directed production—for example, dictating what is to be 
planted and when to till— capitalist landowners are distinguished by their detachment from 
production. The capitalist landowning class exerts no influence on the concrete aspects of 
producing value—what is produced, in what quantity, and at what quality. Capitalist landowners 
may not even know what is being produced on their land—they are only concerned with 
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collecting rent (Marx, 1968, p. 152). This is the strange form of landed property that emerges as 
a necessary element of capitalism. 
This analysis of the landowning class also reveals the differentia specifica of the 
capitalist mode of production; that differentia specifica is that while there are three classes, the 
capitalist class dominates the others in production (Marx, 1968, p. 153). This dominance is also 
a dependency: the capitalist class still needs the working class and landowning class to 
reproduce the system. It is the capitalist who “performs an active function”; the capitalist is “the 
dominating functionary in production” (Marx, 1967, p. 638, 1993, p. 276), but workers and 
landowners are still necessary subordinate functionaries. Capital is the “active middle” in the 
process which can be written either ground rent - capital - wage labor or wage labor - capital - 
ground rent, and which is “the inner construction of modern society, or, capital in the totality of 
its relations” (Marx, 1993, p. 276). 
Hence, private landownership—and the function it plays in divorcing workers from the 
land— is “the basis of the capitalist mode of production,” according to Marx (1967, p. 812). It is 
the basis of the capitalist mode of production historically—because the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism required enclosures of land to create free laborers—and it is also the 
basis logically—because the ongoing self-reproduction of the CMP production requires the 
constant cleavage of people from land. Land must be owned, unavailable to free use. By owning 
land, landowners reproduce wage laborers qua form (Marx, 1993).   
Landowners appear in heterogeneous forms across the capitalist world—and in some 
places and times appear to be absent altogether.3 In both respects, they are like the capitalists 
and working classes. But for capitalism to reproduce itself, there must always some force which 
 
3 Marx suggests as much in his Letter to Engels of August 2, 1862, when he declares that absolute rent “is not paid 
when landed property does not exist, either factually or legally.” In Marx (1967) he erroneously suggests that one such 
place was the United States. 
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ensures that land only confronts the working class “as a condition of production, not belonging 
to it.” Even the state can play this role (Capps, 2012, pp. 317–318).The absence of an obvious 
class of landowners in a given time and place no more threatens the class-status of landowners 
than would a city of worker-owned co-operatives threaten the class-status of capitalists. 
Sometimes, a person or company is both “landlord” and “capitalist” at once. This can 
also be the case of capitalist and wage worker—for example, a capitalist who owns a majority 
share in a series of shoe factories, may also be employed as CEO of the shoe company, thereby 
receiving a wage as a highly paid laborer, in addition to receiving profits as a capitalist. That he 
receives the wage does not mean that the capitalist class has no representative in him. Similarly, 
as Marx argues, a capitalist farmer may own the land he works, but this does not mean the 
landowning class does not have a representative in him; that farmer obtains both the profits of 
the farm as a capitalist, and the ground rent of the land as a landowner.  
Some special dynamics come into play when landlord and capitalist are one. They might 
collect both an imputed rent and the capitalist profits, or they may charge themselves no rent, 
and only collect average profits. In the latter case, they can afford either to produce at a higher 
production price than average while still selling their commodity for the average price, or they 
can lower the price of their commodity, squeezing competitors out of the market and increasing 
the number of commodities they sell..  
Marx himself anticipated that class lines would be blurred—in particular that the line 
between investment capital and landownership could easily be confused by the investor-
landowner: 
the money expended in purchasing land, like that in purchasing government bonds, … 
figures in [the investor’s] accounts as interest-bearing capital, because he considers the 
income, received as rent from the land or as interest on state indebtedness, as interest on 
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the money which the purchase of the claim to this revenue has cost him. (Marx, 1967, p. 
809) 
But the fact that an investor might see the ground rent he gains from investment in land as an 
interest on capital  
does not in the least alter the economic nature of the land factor, any more than the 
circumstance that someone has paid L1,000 for 3% consols [government bonds] has 
anything to do with the capital out of whose revenue the interest on the national debt is 
paid. (Marx, 1967, p. 809) 
Rent “appears” to a landowner as interest; the landowner “reckons” the rent obtained on 
land is interest on capital, that the money used to purchase land “functions in [the buyer of 
land's] accounts as interest-bearing capital” but, integrally, this “does not change the economic 
nature of the land factor in the slightest” (Marx, 1967, pp. 945–946). 
In fact, how the landowner acquired a plot of land and how it appears on his books is 
irrelevant to his deeper role as a member of the landowning class; all this “alters nothing in the 
capital invested by the farmer in his establishment, and changes nothing in the rent, but merely 
alters the question whether it appears to him as interest or not, or as higher or lower interest 
respectively” (Marx, 1967, p. 808). The appearances change; the fundamental relation of private 
landownership stays the same. 
What is going on in the mind of a person does not tell us the truth of their material 
practices. As Martha Campbell puts it in her excellent explication of Marx’s theories on land: 
“…this view of land by its owners [that it is no different from other investments] does not 
obliterate the difference between the determination of interest by the supply and demand for 
money capital and the determination of rent by the monopoly over land” (Campbell & Reuten, 
2001, p. 230 fn.3).  
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Campbell also argues that even in the most extreme case where a landowner regards 
themselves exclusively as a capitalist, therefore abandoning the possibility of acting as a 
landowning class for-itself, that nonetheless “their perception does not abolish the difference 
between land and the other means of production or between land and interest-bearing capital 
(any more than the idea of human capital makes workers into capitalists)” (2001, p. 230). 
Landowership as “barrier” to capitalist production. 
While it is common for people and companies to embody two and even three class roles, 
the classes are defined by distinct and antagonistic social relations. The central antagonism 
between landowners and capitalists is the level of rent. Landowner’s power in imposing rents 
and withholding land from market can erect a barrier to capitalist production and technological 
development. 
As landownership becomes increasingly abstract and generalized, it expropriates and 
absorbs more and more land, faster and faster. As the “economic realization of private 
property,” ground-rent marches over the globe in lockstep with the growing privatization of land 
(Marx, 1967, pp. 618, 634). Rent cannot always be drawn from the land, but land always gives 
the landowner “the power to withdraw his land from exploitation until economic conditions 
permit him to utilize it in such a manner as to yield him a surplus” (Marx, 1967, p. 757). While 
differential rents depend on the relative advantages one plot of land may have compared to 
another, and so arise from the qualities—inherent or produced—of that land, absolute rent is 
created by landed property itself. Absolute rent emerges from the landlord’s perpetual threat to 
withdraw their land from the market. (I will discuss absolute and differential rent at length 
below in Chapter 2.) 
The landlord’s threat of withdrawal poses a barrier to capitalist production. Land which 
could be profitably farmed if no rent were charged goes uncultivated, thereby dampening 
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capitalist “progress” in agriculture. And if we look at global landownership, we can observe a 
strong tendency for landowners to hold unused land even when there is demand for it; vacant 
apartments plague the high-rent cities of the world; up to 40% of farmland taken through recent 
waves of global land grabs sits fallow, sometimes with prior tillers and residents looking on in 
sorrow (Peel, 2016). 
Land will only yield rent if the production occurring there turns profits in excess of the 
price of production (price of production = cost of production + average profit), or if the 
capitalist producer accepts less than an average profit. While this would seem to encourage the 
development of technological advances in agriculture, the extra profits gained through 
technological advance can be captured by the landowner by increasing the rent (this is 
differential rent 2). Many extant “technological advances” in agriculture, especially in 
agrochemicals, only increase productivity for a few years, after which they decrease, and this 
rhythm could arguably be the result (at least in part) of landlord-tenant class conflict.  
Marx suggests that the capturing of excess profits by landowners can lead to the slowing 
down of technological development in agriculture, functioning again as a barrier to capitalist 
development. Importantly, we have to extend this analysis to include all rent-paying industries—
for example, a bakery in a popular urban neighborhood may not want to install expensive new 
ovens that are not easily moved if they fear their rent will be raised or they may be evicted.    
 
Marxists' Disavowal of 3rd Class 
While Marx affords primacy of place to the landowning class in the totality of the 
capitalist mode of production, alongside capitalists and proletarians, most Marxian thinkers of 
land and space since the post-war period have dismissed the landowning class. These dismissals 
follow four lines of argumentation: (1) Landowners are a leftover from pre-capitalist social 
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forms; (2) Landowners are a subset or fraction of the capitalist class; (3) landowners-as-class 
wither away with the development of capitalism; and (4) the landowning class is replaced, in 
‘late’ or ‘financialized’ capitalism, by a rentier class fraction. 
 
1: Landowners as feudal residuals 
 Most Marxian theorists of land consider contemporary appearances of a landowning 
class to be leftovers from a “pre-capitalist landlord class;” a residual from the feudal era (Edel, 
1975, p. 114). Landowners were fundamental to pre-capitalist class formations such as European 
feudalism (the canonical foil for many theories of capitalism) but today they are an 
anachronism—the echo of a dying age—their power subverted and dismantled by capitalism. 
Ward and Aalbers describe the consensus of Marxian geography in the 1970s that “landlords 
were a feudalistic hangover acting as a drain on capitalist productivity” (Ward & Aalbers, 2016, 
p. 1770). What power landed property retains today is a result of the sheer strength of the pre-
capitalist landlord class, or occasionally of the unique savviness of specific landowners. 
But the capitalist landowning class reproduces free labor through separating workers 
from the land, absolutely. It is no more a residual than money is a residual medium of exchange 
because we can point to a proliferation of coinage in pre-capitalist societies. Far from being 
leftovers, capitalist landed property is an entirely new form of landownership with a distinct 
logic. Feudal landed property becomes capitalist landed property by shedding all its “former 
political and social embellishments and associations” to gain its “purely economic form” 
divorced “from the relations of domination and servitude” (Marx, 1967, pp. 618, 617). 
Marx himself criticizes the “pre-capitalist leftovers” or “feudal residuals” strain of 
thought, already in vogue during his time:  
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An erroneous conception of the nature of rent is based upon the fact that rent in 
kind, partly as tithes to the church and partly as a curiosity perpetuated by long-
established contracts, has been dragged over into modern times from the natural 
economy of the Middle Ages, completely in contradiction to the conditions of the 
capitalist mode of production. (Marx, 1967, p. 787) 
The feudal residuals position falls into the trap of “articulationism” criticized by Michael 
Neocosmos (1986), in which scholars tend to treat major differences of form within social 
formations—such as the existence of a landowning class in capitalism—as things that “can only 
be accounted for with reference to the articulation of different (usually pre-capitalist) modes of 
production with an ideal capitalist mode.” Neocosmos contends that this “articulationism” 
has had the effect of indefensibly restricting investigations a priori, making it 
impossible to discover what may be different and important capitalist forms, by 
relegating these a priori to the status of ‘pre-capitalist leftovers,’ which are then 
said to be ‘reproduced’ for various reasons and in various ways by capital. 
(Neocosmos, 1986, p. 11) 
 Even scholars who place grave importance on the theory of ground rent, such as Utsa 
Pantaik, whose important work on ground rent we will reference in Chapter 2, implicitly adopt 
this positions that landowners are “feudal residuals.” However, when we erroneously attribute 
the landowning class to a bygone mode of production, we impoverish our capacity to understand 
capital’s relationship to land and space in the here and now. 
 
2: Landowners as class fraction 
In the 70s and 80s, Marxists popularized the term “class fraction” to describe groups within the 
capitalist class such as merchant capital and finance capital (groups which Marx describes as having 
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“separate forms of existence” of the same capital) (Poulantzas, 1978, p. 239). In the late 70s, many 
Marxists began to refer to landowners as a class fraction (Ward & Aalbers, 2016, p. 1770). Today, the 
class fraction argument frequently coincides with the idea that landowners are subsumed by finance 
capital. For example, Clarke and Ginsburg write: “During the century the landowner as a separate 
interest has declined and finance capital has increasingly penetrated landownership” (1975, p. 6). As 
such, landowners become a subset of the class fraction finance capital—a subset of a subset of the 
capitalist class, far from a class on their own  
While it is possible to consider specific class fractions as necessary to capitalism, it is 
more common to consider class fractions as temporary, because the existence and the strength 
of class fractions depend on the balance of political and economic forces at any given moment.  
The authors who designate landowners as a fraction tend to emphasize the contingency of 
landownership. For example, Ball (1980) mobilizes Massey and Catalano’s classification of 
landowners as a class fraction to argue explicitly that “capitalism does not need private landed 
property for its existence” (p. 304).  
The “Class Fraction” position, like the “Feudal Residuals” position, ignores the essential 
role of the landowning class in reproducing free labor, but it also disregards the fact that the 
landowning class and the capitalist class arise from two distinct and incommensurable social 
relations: on the one side, private landownership, on the other, ownership of the means of 
production. To be a class fraction, a group must share the basic presuppositions of the larger 
class of which it is part. Landowners, therefore, cannot be a subset of the capitalist class, for they 
do not own the means of production; they own only land. Landowners cannot be accurately 
described as a “separate form of existence” of the capitalist class (as per the common definition 
of class fraction) for their existence is based not on ownership of the means of production or 
mobilization of capital in the process of production, but on ownership of land and the collection 
of ground rent. To believe the class fraction argument, therefore, one must collapse ground rent 
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with interest and profits, conflating the reproduction of landownership with the reproduction of 
capital. 
Massey and Catalano’s seminal book Capital and Land (1978), which remains one the 
most focused studies on capitalism and land relations, explicitly designates landowners as a 
“class fraction.” Ignoring Marx's own work on the question of landowners, Massey and Catalano 
turn instead to Marx's discussion of merchants in their efforts to explain the “fractional” 
relationship of landowners to capital (1978, p. 37). While Marx would agree with Massey and 
Catalano that categories like “commercial capital” and “loan capital” cannot give rise to a 
distinct class (and so can only be thought of as constituting some subset of the capitalist class), 
Marx argues that ground rent differs from these forms (not least because it acts as a barrier to 
capital—something which commercial capital does not categorically do). When Massey and 
Catalano designate landowners as a fraction, they skirt the deeper ontological features of 
landownership—its role in reproducing free labor, its antagonism with capitalist production—
and produces an analysis of “Land in Capital” that necessarily stays on the surface.  
Poulantzas also dismisses the possibility that landowners represent “a class of the pure 
CMP” and argues instead that they are a class fraction (Poulantzas, 1978). Unlike Massey and 
Catalano who simply ignore Marx’s theory of the landowning class, Poulantzas explicitly 
distinguishes his position from Marx. He argues that landowners occupy an integral role in the 
transition to capitalism, and after this period remain a formidable economic force in the form of 
a politically significant fraction allied under the hegemonic fraction.4 He opposes Marx's idea of 
landlords as a “distinct” and “separate class belonging to the pure CMP,” calling this position 
 
4 Poulantzas can conceive of this diminished version of class distinction, which could be called a sub-class distinction, 
as a result of his theory of the power bloc and the way it works within the structures of the capitalist state. The power 
blocs “allow a characteristic ‘participation’ in power, either by the dominant classes of the dominated modes of 
production or by those fraction of the bourgeoisie whose autonomy depends on their relation to these modes” 
(Poulantzas, 1978, p. 232). The power block, for Poulantzas, is unique to capitalist social formations. See also 
Bonefeld, 1992; Hirsch, 1978. 
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“inexact” and “incorrect.” Instead Poulantzas sides with what he sees as Lenin's contribution, 
that “landed property, private ownership of land, does not belong to the relations of 
combination of the 'pure' CMP” (Poulantzas, 1978, pp. 231–232). 
Poulantzas believes that Marx's incorrect assessment of landowners was a result of “(i) 
the fact that the necessary transition from feudalism to capitalism was effected under the 
politico-ideological leadership of the nobility or the bourgeoisie, and (ii) the fact that they 
[landowners] maintained their autonomy even after absorption into the bourgeoisie” (p. 232). 
Poulantzas attributes Marx’s mistake to the residual strength of the pre-capitalist landowning 
class that persisted in Marx’s time.  
Poulantzas also fuses the “feudal residuals” argument with the “class fraction” argument; 
he argues that the politico-ideological strength of the landowning class pre-capitalism led to the 
landowning class forming an “autonomous fraction” throughout the transition period (p. 231-
232).5 He also notes that the landowning class was able to maintain some of its power due to the 
particularity of ground-rent as a “mode of transfer of the social product and distribution of 
surplus value” (p. 232). He shares this position with more recent writers Haila and 
Bandyopadhyay, who also argue for the particularity and independence of ground rent, at the 
expense of a demoted landowning class. 
For Marx, ground rent is the basis for a distinct class of landowners, while other forms 
of surplus value distribution like mercantile exchange could only give rise to a special breed of 
capitalist. Poulantzas, like Massey and Catalano, does not investigate this important distinction 
 
5 Milios also argues that the landowning class only exists under certain historical contexts, as the result of a specific 
balance of forces. His argument is similar to the class fraction argument: landowners are only a “historical variation” 
of capitalist social relations that can or cannot exist at any given moment. He writes that “the class of landowners... 
does not constitute a component element of the capitalist mode of production, that is, an inevitable result of its 




between ground rent and other types of “economic rent” or interest. Ground rent arises from the 
private ownership of land, a unique and unparalleled resource, and it presents a barrier to 
capitalist investment that interest and merchant capital do not.6 
 
 
3: The withering away of the landlord class 
 To dismiss the class status of landowners is to believe that within the “permanent, 
'unaltered' nucleus of the capitalist system of class domination, independent… from the 
particular evolution of each specifically studied (capitalist) society” (Milios, 2000, p. 291), 
landowners are nowhere to be found. Landowners play a role in the transition to capitalism, but 
then they “wither away,” often dissolving into the capitalist class. Above, we reviewed 
Poulantzas’ argument that landowners are not a class of the “pure” capitalist mode of 
production. Edel (1977) also writes that “In the long run, and as capitalists (who decrease in 
numbers and increase in size) buy up land, landlords may even disappear as a class and rent 
cease to exist as a distinct part of surplus value” (p. 103). Bryan (1990) likewise states: “In this 
era, capitalists invest actively in both land and industry, and capital moves freely between the 
two. In other words, in the epoch of capitalism, the very concept of a distinct landlord class must 
be questioned” (p. 80; see also Neocosmos, 1986, pp. 30–32). 
Poulantzas, Edel, Bryan, Massey and Catalano, all reject the existence of a third class of 
landowners. Some theorists argue, alternatively, that the landowning class is essential for the 
beginning period of capitalism, but that the landowning class then essentially “withers away” as 
capitalism progresses.  
 
6 See also Neocosmos (1986, p. 6). Neocosmos also makes note of the fact that Poulantzas succeeds where Massey and 
Catalano fail at presenting a concerted argument against Marx’s position of landowners as third class. 
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For example, Neocosmos aims to “take seriously Marx's references to landowners under 
capitalism as forming a class” (1986, p. 8). Neocosmos acknowledges that the creation of wage 
laborers depended on “the creation of a new capitalist form of landed property” (p. 12). For him, 
landowners are not mere leftovers, because “developing capitalism... necessarily transforms the 
old form of landed property into a specially capitalist form of landed property” (p. 13).7 
Neocosmos argues that a specifically capitalist landowning class is necessary for the first 
stages of the capitalist mode of production, and to create wage laborers, but he believes that 
eventually the landowning class is abolished. While capital needed to establish private landed 
property in order to effectively initiate capitalist production historically, capital does not need 
landed property and/or a separate class of landed proprietors, in order to continue to exist. In 
other words, land rent and landlords are forms that are not necessary to capitalist mode of 
production in general, only to its genesis: “the continued existence of landed property is not a 
necessary condition of capitalist production. Capital can exist without landed property” (p. 27). 
Murray (1978) similarly writes that landed property and rent will remain significant only “Until 
land has been ‘really’ subordinated” (p. 29). 
This epitomizes what I call “the withering away of the landlord class” thesis, an analog to 
Lenin’s idea of the withering away of the state. In both cases, a specific social form (a 
landowning class on one hand, and a state on the other) is fundamental and necessary for the 
transformation of one mode of production to the next. However, in both cases, that fundamental 
social form renders itself obsolete through that transition, and then fades away. 
Neocosmos justifies his position on the grounds that landed property, because of the 
obstacle it constitutes, is positively harmful to capitalism. In this it “differs from other kinds of 
 
7 Poulantzas also believes that landownership was integral to the transition to capitalism, arguing that “This 
establishment of the dominance of the CMP is in fact executed (for mainly political and ideological reasons) by the 
private ownership of land” (1978, p. 231). 
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property” (p. 27). Because of the barrier it poses to production, Capitalism will not tolerate it in 
the long term.  
This position fails in both historical and theoretical terms. Historically, landowners 
appear increasingly powerful within the global economy (see Chapter 5), and regularly come 
into conflict with capitalist class interests (see Chapter 4). Theoretically, the fact that landed 
property presents an obstacle to capitalist development does not mean that landed property 
stands outside the CMP. Marx unequivocally argued that landownership impeded capitalist 
development and believed this was one of the features of the class-status of landowners. Labor 
also presents obstacles to capitalist development and occupies a permanently antagonistic role 
vis a vis capitalists. But labor is also the life blood of capital.  
In fact, all classes potentially destabilize the capitalist mode of production—competition 
among capitalists can lead, after all, to a falling rate of profit, which tends towards throwing the 
entire system into crisis. Neocosmos denies that landowners could possibly be a third class of 
the CMP due to the supposed barrier landowners pose, but he fails to contend with Marx's 
claims that the very same relations which erect landownership as a barrier to capitalist 
development also establish the landowning class as the third class of the capitalist mode of 
production  
Guidi (1998) also takes up a “withering away of the landlord class” position, arguing that 
the initial necessity of the landowning class is reversed as capitalism progresses. Guidi agrees 
with Marx that labor must be divorced from the land as a precondition of wage labor, and so of 
capital. He emphasizes accurately that: 
On the one hand rent, as a necessary condition of the “double freedom” of labor power, 
appears as a presupposition of capital. On the other hand, the nature of rent in modern 
landed property can be understood only after discussing the concept of capital and 
33 
 
analyzing the processes of production, circulation and distribution that arise from it. 
This is the logical circularity that concerns the concept of rent, and this circularity is 
grounded on capital and its determinations. (Guidi, 1998, p. 76) 
Guidi notes that the term “presupposition” is more complicated than it appears at face 
value. He argues that for Marx, as for Hegel, presupposition is more than something that 
precedes and relates to another thing—rather, a “presupposition” articulates an intimate 
interrelation of the totality to itself-as-other. Ground rent, according to Guidi, is capital's other 
which capital requires to ground itself. 
But, for Guidi, rent ceases to serve as the presupposition of capital. In late capitalism, the 
“reproduction of labor power” takes its place. But although Hegel's concept of precondition has 
no specific content, Marx argues that ground rent specifically is a precondition of capitalism. 
Guidi over-Hegelianizes Marx, focusing on the form self-as-other at the expense of the specific 
content of private property in land. Ground rent is a presupposition of the CMP because it bars 
the subsistence activity of proletarians, forcing them into waged labor. The “reproduction of 
labor power” cannot serve this function. 
 
4: The rise of the rentier 
David Harvey (2007) writes that “Both rent and private property in land are socially 
necessary to the perpetuation of capitalism” (p. 371). Rather than disappear, Harvey suggests 
that rent and landed property are transformed. He argues that financialized landownership is 
the properly capitalist form of landownership, and that all economic agents increasingly tend to 
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treat land as a “pure financial asset” (p. 347). In many of his texts, these arguments fall broadly 
in line with the “class fraction” argument.8  
However, in his more recent work, Harvey advances a theory of the rentier class. The 
rentier has become a favored analytic framework, especially since the turn of the 20th century 
(Andreucci et al., 2017; Gunnoe, 2014; Hudson, 2014; Jayadev & Epstein, 2007; for a summary 
of post-Keynesian theories of the "rentier," see Lapavitsas, 2013). The rentier class fraction 
makes money from collecting rents on monopolized resources. Sometimes Harvey characterizes 
the rentier class as another addition to the list of class factions which includes financiers, 
landowners, merchants, and others. In these texts, he distinguishes the landlords from rentiers 
as follows: “Landlords collect rent because the land and properties they own are scarce 
resources. Rentiers make money from royalties and intellectual property rights” (Harvey, 2010, 
p. 40). However, more recently, Harvey’s uses “rentier” to refer to rent-seekers in “property and 
asset markets of all sorts,” and he uses the terms rentier and landlord interchangeably (Harvey, 
2017). 
Harvey’s rentier is not a financier. While a financier collects any type of economic rent 
(interest, dividends, bond yields) the rentier collects a rent for the use of a monopolized 
resource. The rentier’s power derives from monopoly power. Marx does not discuss “monopoly 
rents” as a distinct form of rent alongside Differential Rent 1 and 2 and Absolute Rent, but 
Harvey takes the comments Marx makes about monopoly prices and rents and argues for 
monopoly rents as a category in their own right (2007). He has also argued that monopoly rent 
is the fundamental rent relation in urban areas. In his later work he draws the concept of rent 
even closer to the concept of monopoly writing, for example, in Rebel Cities: “All rent, recall, is a 
return to the monopoly power of private ownership of some crucial asset, such as land or a 
 
8 “But there is no question that the balance of forces between these two class factions [of finance capital v. Industrial 
capital] (as well as between them and the other major class factions, such as landlords and merchants) has never been 
stable, and that shifting hegemonies have certainly occurred” (Harvey, 2013). However, Harvey also criticises the 
notion of the “power bloc,” which is, at least for Poulantzas, the foundation of class fractions. 
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patent” (Harvey, 2013, pp. 92–93). Harvey reminds us that the fundamental social relation of 
private property in land is essentially a monopolistic relation.9 
However, Harvey’s theory of the rentier class erroneously conflates ground rent with 
certain forms of interest, profits, and fictitious capital. He argues that rent paid for the use of 
privately owned land has the same character as “rent” paid for intellectual property. Fees 
charged for the use of, for example, Monsanto’s patented “Fontanelle Hybrid” GMO seeds, or 
Ray Charles’ “Georgia on my mind” are put in the same category as quarterly ground rent paid 
by a capitalist farmer to a landowner.  
This conflation obliterates all that is specific about the form of ground rent—especially 
the finitude of land (key to its monopolizability). Generally speaking, one can only rent space to 
one rent-paying entity at a time. On the other hand, intellectual property and patents can 
theoretically be “rented” to infinitely many people simultaneously. There is no inherent physical 
or temporal limit to the exploitation of intellectual property (although renting intellectual 
property to many people simultaneously may reduce its market value, and some forms of 
patented commodities require physical production), whereas the extraction of ground rent is 
based upon the finitude of its specific use-value, on the fundamental monopolistic character of 
landownership. 
Land is a commodity like no other, as Harvey has argued. Land is a “prerequisite of 
competitive production in all lines of business activity, even those which are not agricultural” 
(Marx, 1967, p. 637). Land ownership erects a barrier between labor and land that is “socially 
necessary to the perpetuation of capitalism” (Harvey, 2007, p. 359). As Harvey writes, “Capital 
in effect makes a side payment to landlords for excluding labor from the land and smoothing the 
path to perfect competition across the uneven spaces of a national and even the world market” 
(Harvey, 2017).  
 
9 (Patnaik, 2007, Chapter Introduction)n. 
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The ownership of intellectual property, on the other hand, does not serve an integral 
function for capital. Capitalist landownership controls poor and working people’s relationship to 
subsistence activities, extinguishing it to create free labor forced to go work, or allowing it when 
it supports existing patterns of accumulation (Goffe, 2017). In lumping together these two 
categories in the figure of the rentier, Harvey disavows the specificity of capitalist land relations 
that he elsewhere emphasizes. 
 
Persisting Divisions Between Landowner and Capitalist 
Several thinkers above assume that landowners as distinct entities are a dying breed. However, 
there is evidence of the contrary. A substantial 40% of farmland is owned by landowners who merely 
charge rent and are not involved in production (Figure 1). There has also been a slight increase in 







Ownership of U. S. Farmland: Owner-Operated or Rented/Leased, 1964-2012 
During last 40 years of supposed dissolution of landowners’ power, there has actually been a 
minor increase in the amount of farmland that landowners control. Rent as the percentage of operating 
expenses for farming companies has also increased (Figure 1-2). This means that landowners have both 
managed to increase the acreage they control and capture a higher percentage of profits over the last 





Rent as Percentage of Farm Operating Expenses 
There is also some evidence that where rent increases, tenancy increases (Figure 1-3). In other 
words, there is evidence of a relationship between higher rates of ground rent extraction and an 
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Figure 1-3:  
Rent Per Acre vs. Percent of Farmland Rented 
Source: USDA TOTAL Survey 
 
We can see in Figure 1-3 that in high-rent corn and soy belt states such as Iowa, Illinois, 
Nebraska, Indiana, Minnesota, along with leading high-rent “breadbasket” state California, 
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tenancy exceeds 50%, peaking around 60%. States with lower rents per acre tend to have rates 
of tenancy at or below the US average—for example, Kentucky, Missouri, Missisipi, and Florida. 
There are some outliers in Figure 1-3—for example, Kansas, North Dakota, Texas, and 
Oklahoma all have a lower rent/tenancy ratio than might be expected. This variation leads us to further 
questions: Is there something about the particular histories of class struggle in these places which 
affects the rents and/or tenancy? Alternatively, seeing Texas and Kansas have high amounts of 
farmland dedicated to livestock, which generally draws lower rents than agricultural land, how do we 
understand the effects of differential land use in terms of predicted rents and tenancy rates? 
 
Figure 1-4 
Percent of U. S. Farmland Rented by County and Cash Crop 




The majority of land specializing in cash-grain crops is rented (Figure 1-4) (Bigelow et al., 2016, 
p. iii). Cotton and rice in particular are usually farmed on rented land; 70% of cotton acreage and 80% 
of rice acreage are rented, compared to an average of 55% for other cash crops.  
In figure 5, I have calculated the organic composition of the 5 major cash crops and compared 
them to the average rent per acre in 2010. According to ground rent theory, low organic composition in 
agriculture should correlate with high rents. As we can see, he only crop which follows this formula is 
rice.  
Rents for rice-producing land follows the predictions of ground rent theory because rice requires 
very specific types of land and weather available in only a few states, with little land available for 
expansion beyond what is already being farmed. In other words, landowners of rice-growing land have 
a clear monopoly. Cotton, in contrast, can be grown in a wide array of regions. Also, the USDA has 
invested heavily in pushing the green revolution in cotton production, raising its growability and 
productivity substantially (in part as an attack on African American farmers at the behest of the 
Southern Plantation Bloc – see Woods 1998), and also subsidizing cotton farmers to destroy their crops. 
Consequently, there is no shortage of farmable cotton land. This can explain the discrepancy between 
cotton and rice in Figure 5. It also offers some cursory evidence for the persistence of ground rent 







Organic Composition vs. Average Rent Per Acre, U. S. Cash Crops 
 
Constant lease renewal ensures that landowners can raise rents as farm income rises. 
57% of farmland acres rented in the US renew their lease annually, even though 75% of acres 
have been rented to the same tenant for over 3 years, and 34% for over 10 years (Bigelow et al., 
2016, p. iv).  
Evidence from US farmland tenancy shows that while there is a substantial amount of 
small owner-operated farms, the majority of high-yield farmland—especially cash crops—are 
owned by non-farmers and rented to capitalist farmers. Rents have been increasing as a 
percentage of costs for farmers, as well. Regional differences in rent and tenancy persist, but the 
overall trend suggests that landowners matching the Marxian definition I have defended above 
are broadly active, wield substantial power, and collect substantial ground rents within the US 
market for farmland. In Chapter 4 I will discuss the significance of agricultural subsidies also for 









Rice Cotton Wheat Soybeans Corn
Organic Composition vs. 
Average Rent Per Acre
Source: USDA 2010 Data sets in Bigelow et al. 2016
Organic composition = operating costs/labor costs
Organic Composition (c/v) Average Rent per Acre
43 
 
We can find similar trends in commercial rentals, even though we do not have the luxury 
of comprehensive data as in agriculture. Urban businesses large and small tend to rent 
storefronts and office space instead of buying, especially in hot real estate markets. For example, 
in San Francisco—one of the most expensive commercial property markets—even big businesses 
rarely own their own buildings. The Salesforce tower is the newest iconic skyscraper in the city 
and has reshaped the San Francisco skyline. The building is named for the tech services 
company Salesforce. However, Salesforce does not own the building, but rather holds a 15-year 
lease, valued at over $560 million, on much of the building. Boston Properties, a commercial 
real estate company, owns over 95% of the building and collects rent from Salesforce and others. 
Similarly, LinkedIn has a 10-year lease on a skyscraper at 222 Second Street from the real estate 
company Tishman Speyer, and Twitter rents several floors of an impressive edifice owned by 
Shorenstein Properties.  
Boston Properties, Tishman Speyer, and Shorenstein are all long-standing real estate 
companies, and provide long-term leases to companies. Boston Properties is a Real Estate Investment 
Trust (REIT) founded in 1970 (a very early REIT). Tishman Speyer began as Tishman Realty & 
Construction over a century ago in 1898, transforming into a privately held limited partnership in 1978. 
Shorenstein is a real estate investment company, previously called Milton Meyer & Co, dating back to at 
least before 1941 when Walter Shorenstein joined the company (Shorenstein was also the villain behind 
the I-Hotel struggle and controversy in San Francisco in 1968). Although aggregate data on urban office 
and retail property is hard to come by, a cursory survey of major properties shows that much of the 
urban ground rent goes to long-established landowning firms. In these we can again glimpse the 
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Many essays have rehashed Marx’s theories of ground rent, defining again absolute and 
differential rents, arguing for additional rental categories, and trying to ascertain the types of 
rents involved in specific concrete circumstances. In this chapter I will outline Marx’s theory of 
ground rent, but I do so by contrasting it to Marx’s theory of interest. Juxtaposing ground rent 
theory to interest—which Marx did in his Manuscripts that became Capital vol 3—emphasizes 
different aspects of ground rent than are usually highlighted in existing literature on ground 
rent. I also use the recently published unedited manuscripts that became Capital Volume 3, 
which emphasize a more holistic perspective on ground rent that is less concerned with the 
types of rent and more concerned with the meaning and implications of ground rent extraction 
and private landownership. 
One important exception to much theory on ground rent is Utsa Patnaik’s (2007) 
Introduction to her selection of Marxian texts on ground rent, in which she specifically 
emphasizes the political and “subversive” significance of Marx’s category of absolute rent. She 
argues that Ricardo’s move to emphasize differential rent was a way to cauterize the theory of 
ground rent.  
Indeed, Marx intends to show in his writings on rent that Ricardo’s differential rent—the 
most popular theory of rent in his time—was not the most fundamental type of rent in 
capitalism, and was not unique to capitalism. Given center stage, the theory of differential rent 
obscures essential dynamics arising from capitalist private property in land. Genuine absolute 




 Ground rent is the form in which private property in land can be realized economically. 
The section on ground rent in Marx’s Manuscripts/Capital Volume 3 outlines the role taken by 
the landed property in the capitalist mode of production. Marx describes how landed property 
can yield revenue for its owner. The social relation of capitalist landed property—embodied by 
the landowner—is immanent to a rigorous theory of ground rent. Marx describes at length the 
development of private property in land, landownership, and ground rent in capitalism, and 
how these forms differ absolutely from pre-capitalist forms of land tenure and ground rent.  
Marx highlights the inevitable antagonism between landowners and capitalists, as well as 
that between landowners and proletarians. These class struggles—over land rather than wages—
arise from the particular class interests of landowners and how those conflict with the interests 
and needs of the working and capitalist classes. Part of Marx’s task in analyzing ground rent is to 
clarify the distinction between the three classes and their competing claims upon the surplus. 
 The section on ground rent immediately follows the section on Interest Bearing Capital 
(IBC), which details the division of capitalist class revenue into profits from production, on the 
one hand, and interest, on the other. The positioning of these two sections beside one another 
emphasizes the radical differences between ground rent and interest. It even appears as if they 
were placed at this point in Capital in order to emphasize and clarify their categorical 
distinction. Read in sequence, interest and ground rent are shown to originate in two completely 
distinct and irreducible social relations; interest arises from the bifurcation and confrontation 
between productive capitalists and money-lending capitalists, while ground rent emerges from 
the private ownership of land. 
Marx often mentions that many landowners view the ground rent they collect as interest 
on their original investment (purchase of land), but he is clear to note that this is a 
mystification; any conflation of ground rent with interest is a powerful appearance which 
obfuscates concrete material relations around land. 
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Contemporary Scholarship on Ground Rent 
 
The view of property as a pure financial asset would seem to deny a specific role for rent 
in theorizing property (which seems essential), for it is difficult simultaneously to 
reconcile the conflicting dictates of rent and finance theory. (Coakley, 1994, p. 701)  
 Many critical scholars of land and space have called in recent years for a reconsideration 
of rent, to “bring rent back in” (Andreucci et al., 2017, p. 7); that “rent has to be brought forward 
into the forefront of analysis” (Harvey, 2010, p. 183), that “land has unique features as a factor 
of production that set it apart from capital in general and requires a theory of rent,” (Ward & 
Aalbers, 2016, p. 1778) and so on (see also Gunnoe 2015; Harvey 2007, 2015, Knuth 2015). 
However, these scholars simultaneously insist that “rent” should pertain to an array of 
situations beyond those concerning land relations. They advocate a theory of rent which attends 
to the special qualities of land, while often in the same breath collapsing “ground rent” with 
theories of “economic rent” or interest in general. This collapse of ground rent with interest 
bolsters the dismissal of the landowning class discussed in Chapter 1, for in place of a theory of 
the landowner who draws ground rent, we are left with a theory of the rentier or financier who 
collects economic rent in general, also known as interest. 
Ward and Aalbers, for example, criticize those who have ignored the concept of 
differential rents, developed by Ricardo and Marx, and particularly the factor of location in rent 
determination, thereby  
rendering their account of landlords as a class functionalist and disconnected from an 
understanding of the wider land market… so instead of connecting their research to 
macro-level analyses and theories of the land market, researchers in this tradition have 
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tended to adopt… the rent categories as a political heuristic to expose extractive power 
relations within an institutional analysis… or obfuscated the issue of rent altogether. 
(2016, p. 1779) 
Here, Ward and Aalbers criticize those who disconnect a theory of rent from the 
vicissitudes of land. However, later in the same text they advocate doing exactly that: they 
suggest that we “extend the theory [of rent] beyond land to other situations where the existence 
of a class of rentiers itself creates rents—for instance, in the case of immaterial commodities 
where profit is reliant on the imposition of intellectual property rights, and the process of 
financialization across the economy generally” (2016, p. 1779, emphasis mine). Ward and 
Aalbers demand that we attend to the unique status of land in the capitalist economy through 
the special category of rent, while simultaneously insisting that we take rent and extend its 
reach beyond that of land.  
Ward and Aalbers conclude this text with the statement that the challenge of this century 
is “to take the categories of rent beyond land in the analysis of a capitalism increasingly reliant 
on flows of rentier income through financial instruments… immaterial commodities enforced by 
property… and so- called ‘sharing economies’” (2016, p. 1780, emphasis mine). They assert that 
the contemporary economy is “rife with rentiers” and firmly shift their critique from the 
landlord as extractor of ground rent to the rentier as extractor of economic rent in general. In 
doing so, they combine accurate insights about the centrality of land to capitalist accumulation 
with a conceptual confusion induced by the popular theory of financialization.  
 Marx warned that interest created such a powerful appearance of value begetting value 
(M-M’), that it tended to seep outwards, cloaking all types of accumulation in its illusory form. 
All wealth then seems to be born of interest—even wages appear as interest paid on value (labor) 
invested. Most financialization theory involves a contemporary version of this mystification, in 
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which finance devours and digests all sorts of social relations—especially, for our purposes, 
ground rent. 
Marx, for his part, argues that conflating ground rent with interest is erroneous and 
mystifying. Marx refers to many early economic thinkers when he writes:  
Some writers, partly as spokesmen for landed property against the attacks of the 
bourgeois economists and partly in an effort to transform the capitalist system of 
production into a system of 'harmonies' instead of antitheses, as for example Carey, have 
sought to present ground-rent, the specific economic expression of landed property, as 
identical with interest. In this way, the opposition between landowners and capitalists 
would be abolished. (Marx, 1967, p. 79) 
In conflating ground rent with interest, any understanding of the opposition between the 
landowning class and the capitalist class is lost. Below I argue for a strong and undiluted theory 
of ground rent—specifically, one which is distinct from interest. 
While it may be easy for the buyers of land to “confuse[e] ground rent itself with the 
interest form,” leading “necessarily… to the most absurd conclusions” (Marx, 1967, p. 624), it is 
less likely for working class renters, squatters, small home owners, landless peasants, landed 
peasants, homeless people, and so on, to forget how important and powerful is the control over 
land, space, and mobility. For someone struggling to find or keep a place to rest, to cook, to 
soothe children, to grow food, to get high, and so on, the question of land and space is special. 
When working and poor people gain, maintain, and defend access to land and mobility, 
they have removed some portion of land from potential ground rent extraction. However, they 
have also achieved some autonomy from subordination of waged labor and begun to create a 
material basis for association between people that can strengthen resistance movements. Such is 
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not the case for struggles over credit, intellectual property rights, and the like. Nor are these 
land-based struggles analogous to struggles over the wage.  
Marx criticises the vulgar economists’ “Trinity Formula” for giving the false impression 
that the three sources of revenue—capital, land, and labor—are somehow parallel and analogous 
to one another, each yielding their own natural rate of return. Marx argues to the contrary that 
capital, land, and labor have “about the same relation to each other as lawyer's fees, red beets, 
and music” (Marx, 1967, p. 814).  
However, as Rosdolsky points out, the trinity formula “does contain a certain germ of 
truth.” Marx recognized that value does in fact become divided into “three different kinds of 
revenue, and form the annual income of the three social classes—the capitalists, landowners, 
and the workers” (Rosdolsky, 1989, p. 29). Part of the trick is to analyze the three classes while 
remembering their respective bases (land, labor, capital) are each radically unique. 
Before proceeding to Marx’s analysis of interest and ground rent, it is useful to note 
briefly how this debate played among his predecessors and interlocutors. This shaped Marx’s 
own approach and understanding of ground rent as well as interest. 
 
Classical Economists and Ground Rent vs. Interest 
While the category of ground rent has fallen decisively out of fashion over the last 
century, it was a very important mode of analysis for the early classical economists, particularly 
Adam Smith and David Ricardo. Their approaches to ground rent, if inchoate, highlight 
important aspects of Marx’s own theory and draw attention to important features of land that 
we should attend to, today. 
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Before Adam Smith, it was common, as it is today, for economic rent and land rent to be 
conflated. As Sir Dudley North proclaimed,  
But as the Landed Man letts his Land, so these still lett their Stock; this latter is 
call'd Interest, but is only Rent for Stock, as the other is for Land. And in several 
Languages, hiring of Money, and Lands, are Terms of common use; and it is so 
also in some Countries in England.  
Thus to be a Landlord, or a Stock-lord is the same thing; the Landlord 
hath the advantage only in this: That his Tenant cannot carry away the Land, as 
the Tenant of the other may the Stock; and therefore Land ought to yield less 
profit than Stock, which is let out at the greater hazard. (North, 1907) 
Locke also treats “land as a capital asset” rather than considering it as a unique 
investment, and Turgot argues at length for the economic identity between land and “the general 
class of capital assets” (Keiper, 1961, p. 8). Turgot writes:  
Since landed property yielding a given revenue is simply the equivalent of a sum 
of value equal to a certain multiple of this revenue, it follows that any sum of 
value is the equivalent of a property yielding a revenue equal to a definite fraction 
of the sum: it makes absolutely no difference whether this sum of capital consists 
of a mass of metal or of anything else, since money represents every kind of value, 
just as every kind of value represents money. (Keiper, 1961, p. 12) 
However, Turgot did develop one of the first analyses of diminishing returns in 
agriculture, arguing that there is a limit to how much a farmer can increase the fertility of the 
land, that there is a point after which investment in the land will yield less and less produce 
because the fertility of the earth will be “exhausted,” husbandry “unable to add anything 
further,” and additional investment will “add nothing whatever to the produce” (Keiper, 1961, 
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pp. 12–13). So, even while arguing for the economic identity between land rent and economic 
rent, Turgot notes certain factors which pertain to land rent alone. Specifically, the fact that land 
is both finite and inescapably corporeal—there are limits to its extent and its inherent capacities.  
Adam Smith differed from his mercantilist predecessors by arguing that land rent was 
distinct from returns on other invested capital, arguing that it is “naturally a monopoly price. It 
is not at all proportioned to what the landlord may have laid out upon the improvement of the 
land, or to what he can afford to take, but to what the farmer can afford to give” (Keiper, 1961, p. 
14). In this, Smith developed a watershed theory of rent in the Wealth of Nations to which 
subsequent thinkers had to respond. Importantly, Smith emphasized even more thoroughly 
than Turgot the finite limits of land through the theory of “monopoly” price, and anticipated 
Marx’s theory of absolute rent in his emphasis on the level of rent being limited by what the 
tenant (in this case the farmer) “can afford to give.” 
Ricardo, expanded and systematised Smith's initial formulation of ground rent, 
continuing to focus primarily on the relative fertility of land as the key factor in differential 
rents. For Ricardo, because of the prominence of land and agriculture to social life, agricultural 
profits and rent were a central (if not the central) determining force in average profit rates and 
wages, and the overall wealth of society. The centrality of land and agriculture for social life was 
justified, for Ricardo, through the Malthusian argument which emphasises the direct 
relationship between food production and population levels. Land rent and agricultural profits 
thus had their own peculiar nature and logic based upon their centrality to the most 
fundamental product: food.  
In his chapter “On Rent,” Ricardo insists that “...the laws which regulate the progress of 
rent, are widely different from those which regulate the progress of profits, and seldom operate 
in the same direction” (Ricardo, 1996, p. 46). For Ricardo, the particularity of ground rent rests 
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on the particularity of the agricultural sector of capitalism. The agricultural sector, because it 
produced food, the most basic necessity, determines profits in all other sectors.  
From these early thinkers, we find three insights into why land rent might be 
categorically distinct from economic rent: (1) Investment in land results in diminishing returns 
in terms of increases in productivity on the land (Turgot); (2) Land has a monopoly price 
unrelated to what the landowner has spent on that land (Smith); (3) Land is qualitatively 
special, in that it produces the most essential and basic human commodity, food (Ricardo) (we 
would extend the latter to include other necessities immanent to land and space such as 
accommodation and transportation). Marx’s theory of rent is built on an appraisal of these 
thinkers, so it is not surprising that these arguments approximate many of Marx’s own, albeit 
with important inversions and improvements.  
The birth of the marginalist school put to rest such notions of the special quality of land 
rents. The fact that contemporary dominant marginalist theories of prices and profits were in 
large part based on Ricardo’s theory of land rent does not seem to elevate the popularity of land-
rent theory within the discipline. Modern marginalist economics does not consider land rent to 
be a specific or unique form of profits. However, some contemporary economists have analysed 
the relationship between land sectors and other investments, and there does appear to be 
relevant distinctions in their behaviours over time (see Chapter 3). 
Fine (1982) faults the marginalist revolution in economic theory for the lack of attention 
to issues of ground rent and landed social struggles today. For the marginalists, the distinction 
between wages, profits, and rents “is purely semantic… since all are simultaneously determined 
by the same principles according to the more or less free flow of resources through the market to 
equate supply and demand” (Fine, 1982, pp. 347–348). Patnaik (2007) goes even further, 
writing that modern economic theory has suppressed any real theory of rent in order to avoid an 





For Marx, interest as a social relation arises (in the capitalist mode of production) 
directly from the production process as a “part of the profit which the functioning capitalist hast 
to pay to the owner of capital instead of pocketing it himself” (Marx, 2015, p. 445). The demand 
for credit expands along with the expansion of the system of production, and with it grows 
reserves of cash held by productive capitalists as well as moneyed capitalists and landowners. 
This surplus liquidity is aggregated in banks or in institutions like hedge funds and loaned out at 
a cost to productive capitalists as well as other investors. The part of the profit paid in interest 
by the productive capitalist then becomes distinguished from the part they keep—the latter Marx 
denotes as “profit of enterprise.”  
Marx asks and re-asks the question, why does this purely “quantitative” distinction 
between interest and profit of enterprise take on a “qualitative” distinction, such that even when 
a capitalist uses his own money for investment, he still calculates it in terms of a rate of interest 
which he, in this case, pockets himself?10 Because the starting point of interest formation is the 
face-to-face confrontation between the moneyed capitalist and productive capitalist, “Not just as 
legally separate persons but as persons who play quite different roles in the reproduction 
process, or in whose hands the same capital really does go through a double and completely 
different movement. The one simply lends the capital, the other applies it productively”11 (Marx, 
2015, p. 475). Importantly, this highlights “the significance of the legal status of ownership of 
 
10 And Marx makes sure to tell us, not all quantitative distinctions become qualitative! 
11 It is not entirely clear why this face-to-face confrontation between money-lending capitalist and productive 
capitalist is so salient as to yield a qualitative break. Merchant capital and productive capital, for example, meet face-
to-face all the time without giving rise to new forms. However, it seems that the appearance of self-valorizing value 




property” (Harvey, 2013, p. 193). This division, and the competition which arises between them, 
also determine the rate of interest (Marx 2015, p. 473). 
For the lender, money appears to directly valorise itself. Everything that happens 
between doling out the loan and the receiving the original sum back, plus interest, “is 
obliterated” in the process (Marx, 2015, p. 454). This is the other side of commodity fetishism: 
for the money-dealing capitalist, the production process is obliterated and forgotten. As Harvey 
(2013) notes, “Here, in Volume III, the circulation of interest-bearing capital reappears as the 
consummate fetish form of capital’s circulation” (p.173). 
This illusory structure of self-valorising value then infects its neighbours. The productive 
capitalist, too, believes his capital to be self-valorising, and views his investment as interest-
bearing. The movement of interest has no governing structure or tendency other than the supply 
and demand of money capital, and the fallacy of supply and demand is also generalized across 
sectors. 
The money lending capitalist deals specifically in interest-bearing capital (IBC). In 
modern terms, this would be direct money lending from, e.g., banks. However, when we think of 
“finance” today, we usually also think of stocks, bonds, and derivatives. Marx called such 
vehicles “fictitious capital.” Fictitious capital is created by securitizing any flow of money; to 
purchase fictitious capital is to purchase the legal right to collect a future flow of money (profits 
of a company, taxes collected by a state). Marx calls this “fictitious capital” because while they 
are often treated as capital, they are merely legal rights to claims on future income. As legal 
rights, they depend on private property relations being secured by the state (Best, 2017, p. 85).  
The circulation of interest-bearing capital and fictitious capital is essential for capitalist 
production and the reproduction of the system as a whole; financial capitalists (in the form of 
banks, hedge funds, pension funds, and so on) agglomerate liquid capital from around the 
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system and make it available as loans or in the purchase of stocks to productive capitalists who 
are enabled, on the basis of this access to liquid capital, to initiate production on scales 
otherwise impossible. It is as disingenuous to decry finance in favor of production as it is to 
decry the cherry blossom in favor of the cherry, although many continue to do so.  
 
Ground Rent 
Landed property presupposes that certain persons enjoy the monopoly of disposing of 
particular portions of the globe as exclusive spheres of their private will to the exclusion 
of all others. Once this is given, it is a question of developing the economic value of this 
monopoly, in other words valorizing it on the basis of the capitalist mode of production. 
(Marx, 2015, p. 715) 
Marx’s lengthy section on ground rent begins with bracketing off pre-capitalist forms of 
landownership and rent, emphasizing instead ground rent as “the autonomous, specific 
economic form of landed property on the basis of the Capitalist mode of production” (2015, pp. 
722–723). Here, Marx triumphantly introduces capitalist landowners as the third element 
constituting the “economic framework” of modern society (2015, p. 717). 
Marx precedes his discussion of absolute and differential rent by introducing a different 
and apparently more fundamental distinction: he tells us that there is “genuine” ground rent on 
the one hand, and ground rent “in practice”/ “economically speaking” on the other. The former, 
we will find, is embodied in the theory of absolute rent, and is characterised by that rent for 
which the landowner is the “creative basis” (the true genesis).  
Non-genuine rent (not a term used by Marx), on the other hand, includes any other 
economic valorisation of the landowner’s monopoly over land, from whatever source it comes, 
which can include “a hidden deduction from average profit, normal wages, or both together” (p. 
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723; see also pp. 725, 727). When a landowner draws non-genuine rents from a hidden 
deduction from wages of (in this case agricultural) workers, this means that the capitalist 
operating on the land pays workers below the value of their labor power. This creates a surplus 
that may be paid to the landowner, which can, over time, depress the value of the workers’ labor 
power. Non-genuine ground rent can also come out of the capitalist’s average profits, resulting 
in the capitalist taking home less than the average profit at the end of the day.  
 Rent as deduction from average wages and/or average profits is of prime importance for 
our present day considerations, but Marx brackets off these forms of rent at the beginning of his 
discussion because he wishes to show the core structural features of capitalist ground rent which 
in turn enable other derivative (non-genuine) types of ground rent extraction. 
 Marx brings up the division of the surplus between landowners (via ground rent), 
capitalists (via profit and interest), and workers (via wages) at the forefront of his discussion of 
ground rent, describing it as in important tension within which the ground rent relation is 
located. He also calls attention to some large-scale trends that are imbricated with ground rent 
dynamics—the ever-increasing demand for land (2015, p. 734); a relative decline in agricultural 
population relative to the industrial population (2015, p. 734); the growing portion of surplus 
value captured by landed property in the course of capitalist development, as a result of their 
“monopoly of the earth,” which enables landowners to raise the rent and the price of land (2015 
p735-6). (I will return to some of these dynamics in the conclusion to Chapter 5, below.) 
 The monopoly character of landed property features prominently from the beginning of 
Marx’s analysis on ground rent. Erroneous conceptions of rent suggest it still arises, as in feudal 
modes, “not from the price of the agricultural product, but from its quantity, i.e., not from social 
relations but form the earth itself” (2015, p. 775). On the contrary, when the legally sanctioned 
and protected monopoly over land triumphs as the fundamental social relation regarding land, 
land monopolists (landowners) are rewarded with ground rents.  
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This, more than almost any other aspect of the capitalist mode of production, invites a 
theory of law and state into the logical core of what capital is and needs. The legal defense of 
monopoly over land—and its corollary, state-military defense—is implied in the concept of 
private property itself. 
 This monopoly over pieces of the earth gives landowners the power to extract ground 
rent, and from here Marx offers us two central forms of ground rent—absolute and differential. 
In his original draft, he discusses absolute rent first, followed by differential rent (a much longer 
section) but includes a note that differential rent should be moved before absolute, which Engels 
follows in his edit. It is likely that Marx wanted to start with differential rent because this was 
the prevailing theory held by economists of his time. One of Marx’s strategies throughout the 
volumes of Capital is to begin with the most ready-to-hand or commonplace understanding of a 
given issue and unfold from there (paying homage to Hegel’s method in the Phenomenology).  
However, it is absolute rent that truly embodies Marx’s intervention into the theory of 
rent. Absolute rent tethers the specific form of contemporary landownership to the capitalist 
mode of production, and no other mode. Differential rent is merely a transfer of a portion of the 
commodity price from the capitalist to the landowner and involves no effort or creation on the 
part of landed property. Absolute rent, on the other hand, has capitalist landed property as its 
“creative basis.” “Landed property has created this rent in itself” (Marx, 2015, p. 743, fn. 26). 
Our goal here is to look at the conceptual stakes of Marx’s conversation of ground rent, 
rather than the typology for typology’s sake. All ground rent (that is not a siphon from average 
wages or profits) depends on selling commodities at a price which enables the capitalist to make 
a profit greater than the average profit, so they can pay the landowner and still keep an average 
profit. In other words, the market price must be greater than the production price of the product 
(where the production price = the cost of production + average profits) thereby yielding a 
“surplus profit” over and above the average profit which can then be gathered as ground rent by 
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the landowner (Marx, 2015, p. 737). In other terms, the rate of profit must be higher than the 
average.  
Differential rent explains the many reasons why market price can exceed the production 
price by radically different magnitudes for different commodities, thereby yielding very 
different rents on different plots of land. Absolute rent, on the other hand, considers the case 
where market price in excess of production price is the result of the landlord withdrawing or 
threatening to withdraw land from the market—or in other words, absolute rent results from the 
fact that landowners generally refuse to rent land for free (or at exceedingly cheap prices). 
Absolute rent is the rent which results from the landowning class wielding their special power of 
land monopoly over capitalists.  
 
Absolute Rent: The power of the landowner to withdraw land from the 
market. 
The willingness to hold land out of the market is a characteristic feature of capitalist 
landed property, and its main means of wielding power. This reaffirms landowners’ reliance on 
law or state formation, as it takes legal or militaristic defense to prevent people from using 
unused but “privately owned” land. This also comprises one of the ways in which landed 
property is “a barrier to the investment of capital and its unrestricted valorization on the land” 
(Marx, 2015, p. 739). Capitalist rent necessarily must “restrict the land as a field of employment 
for capital to be invested.” As such, absolute rent arises from a pitched battle between 
landowner and capitalist about land use and the cost thereof. 
Marx begins his discussion of absolute rent by noting that the theory of differential rent 
is independent of it. In other words, the theory of differential rent functions whether or not one 
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has a theory of absolute rent. This explains the possibility of Ricardo maintain a strong theory of 
differential rent while dismissing the existence of absolute rent.  
Marx’s theory of Absolute Rent emerges from the fact that landlords will not lease their 
land for free or too cheaply. The notion that the land of the least fertility currently under 
cultivation—“Type I” land, for ease—will yield a rent of zero, is the fundamental limit case upon 
which Ricardo bases his theory of differential rent. However, Marx reminds us that, as 
landowners are not philanthropists, there is no reason for them to allow use of their land with 
no remuneration (Marx, 2015, p. 739). Even though “the condition for the valorization of capital 
as capital” is present on this Type I land—if a capitalist were to farm it without paying rent, they 
could reap average profits on their invested capital—this gives no reason to the private 
landowner to let their land for this use for free.  
Anywhere that we find land cultivated without rental payments, we find a “factual—if 
not also legal—abolition of landed property” (Marx, 2015, p. 739). This can happen, for 
instance, when the landowner and capitalist are one and the same (and so they can farm land 
which yields only average profits). 
For new plots of so-called “Type I” land to be rented and come under cultivation 
(bracketing off the potential extraction of rent from average wages or average profits, which in 
fact “constantly happens in practice” Marx, 2015, p. 743), the market price of the commodities 
there produced—say, corn—must rise enough to yield price of production plus an extra amount 
that can be transformed into rent. If the price of corn does indeed rise, bringing Type 1 land into 
cultivation, insofar as the price rise is a result of needing more corn, landed property is the 
genesis of this rise in price—and so, of the absolute rent then drawn. The rise in the market price 
of corn is not the cause of rent—the rent is the cause of the price rise (Marx, 2015, p. 43). 
The corn laws of Marx’s time provided an excellent example of the activity of the 
landowning class—abetted by law and state—leading to higher market prices; the corn laws 
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enabled the price of grains to stay high, maintain a surplus profit above average profit and 
thereby maintaining the grounds for high levels of rent extraction. The contemporary pro-tariffs, 
anti-free-trade approach of not only the Trump administration but various democrats and 
“leftists” must also be analyzed within the context of the growing strength of landowning class 
interests (see Chapters 4 and 5).  
This absolute rent of which landed property is the creative origin depends on two 
important dynamics: (1) the fact that agricultural products have a higher value composition 
than the average, and (2) that landed property functions as a barrier preventing the equalization 
of this higher value and profits across spheres (Marx, 2015, p. 746-748). 
 Marx goes to some length to emphasize that absolute rent is not simply the result of 
agricultural products having a higher value above their price of production, as this can be the 
case in for “a whole number of manufacturing products” that do not necessarily yield absolute 
rent (2015, p. 748). Agricultural products must have a higher value composition and the 
equalization of this value imbalance must be barred; the general tendency toward equalization 
of surplus-value across spheres of production is blocked by landowners collecting this extra 
profit before it can be equalized. Agricultural products thus “have a monopoly because their 
value is not levelled down to their price of production as it is with other industrial products 
whose values stand above the general price of production” (Marx, 2015, p. 750). 
In the capitalist economy at large, the equalization of surplus-value only faces relatively 
few and always accidental and temporary barriers (Marx, 2015, p. 749), but landownership 
confronts this equalization process with a structural barrier: 
capital comes up against an alien power which it can overcome only partly or not at all, a 
power which restricts its investment in particular spheres of production, allowing this 
only under conditions that completely or partially exclude the above-mentioned general 
equalization of surplus-value to give an average profit, it is clear that in these spheres of 
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production a surplus profit will arise, from the excess of commodity value above its price 
of production, which is transformed into rent and as such can become autonomous vis-à-
vis profit. And it is as an alien power and a barrier of this kind that landed property 
confronts capital over its investment in the land, or that the landowner confronts the 
capitalist. (Marx, 2015, p. 749) 
 
 The effects of landed property come to bear on the economy as a whole insofar as the 
collection of rent interferes with the equalization of surplus value across spheres (Marx, 2015, p. 
750). However, the active role of landed property is this field is restricted to pushing of the price 
of “products of the soil” above their price of production to yield some rent, which in some cases 
is very small (Marx, 2015, p. 751). There is no guarantee, for example, that landowners will be 
able to capture all the excess profits, or even the majority of them. The general state of the 
market, and not landed property, determines “how far the market price rises above the price of 
production and towards the value, and to what extent, therefore, the surplus-value produced 
over and above the given average profit in agriculture is either transformed into rent or goes into 
the general equalization of surplus-value that settles the average profit” (Marx, 2015, p. 751).12 
 
12 “The essence of absolute rent consists in this: equally large capitals produce different amounts of surplus-value in 
different spheres of production according to their differing average composition, given an equal rate of surplus-value 
or equal exploitation of labor. In industry these different amounts of surplus-value are equalized to give the average 
profit or are divided uniformly between the individual capitals as aliquot parts of the total social capital. Whenever 
industry needs land, whether for agriculture or for the extraction of raw materials, landed property blocks this 
equalization process for the capitals invested on the land and captures a portion of the surplus-value which would 
otherwise go into the equalization process, giving a general rate of profit. Rent then forms a part of the value of 
commodities, in particular of their surplus-value, which simply accrues to the landowners, who 
extract it from the capitalists, instead of to the capitalist class, who have extracted it from the 
workers. It is assumed in this connection that agricultural capital sets more labor in motion than an equally large 
portion of non-agricultural capital. The extent of this gap, or whether it exists at all, depends on the relative 
development of agriculture and industry. By the nature of the case, this difference must decline with the progress of 
agriculture, unless the ratio in which the variable part of the capital declines vis-à-vis the constant part is still greater 
in industrial capital than in agricultural. This absolute rent plays a still more important role in extractive industry 
proper, where one element of constant capital, raw material, completely disappears, and where, with the exception of 
branches for which the portion consisting of machinery and other fixed capital is very significant, the lowest 
composition of capital invariably prevails. Precisely here, where rent seems to derive from a monopoly price alone, 
extraordinarily favorable market conditions are required for the commodities to be sold at their value or for rent to 
equal the entire excess of surplus-value in a commodity over and above its price of production. This is the case for 




 There is no reason to confine this phenomenon to the production of agricultural goods 
and rent on agricultural land. The recent spike in home rents, for example, should be considered 
in relation to the ability of a landowner to raise sale price over costs of production (see Chapter 
4). However, while every industry must pay some kind of rent, not every industry is rent-
burdened. Absolute rent can only apply in situations where there is a functional monopoly on 
land; where there is some restriction as to where that industry can be located, and a limit on the 
amount of land available to it. I discuss such sectors as those which produce “High-Rent 
Commodities” in Chapter 4. 
 In the end, Marx asserts that absolute rent can easily disappear, and even in “normal 
conditions” it can only be relatively small (Marx, 2015, p. 758). However, even as it is 
overstepped by other forms of non-genuine rent, absolute rent represents the fundamental 
power of the landowner to withdraw land from the market, and the potential of its existence is 
fundamental to other forms of rent extraction.  
Sandemose (2006) has clarified an important point about absolute rent:  
The point of the “monopoly of landownership” is not that it prevents “excess surplus 
value… from going into a general equalization of the rate of profit.” This reasoning is 
tautological. The amount in question is an “excess” amount precisely because it is not 
taking part in the equalization. It shares this characteristic with all other parts of the 
product value from agriculture. It is the whole agricultural sphere that is exempt from 
inter-sectoral competition. That goes for any part of its product value, be it c (constant 
capital), v (variable capital), or s (surplus value). 
… For absolute rent to exist the value composition has to be lower in agriculture than in 
industry. In the latter, property relations create an average rate of profits, p’, in the 
former, other property relations create conditions that—to a significant degree—secure 
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exemption from the regime of p’… Agricultural tenants do not compete with other 
sectors, but they compete with each other. (Sandemose, 2006, p. 361) 
If we consider other sectors as subject to the barrier of landed property, it is important to 
consider the effects of a lack of competition with external sectors. 
 
Differential Rent: Land as monopolizable and un-produced (value-less). 
 Most commentators on Marx’s theory of differential rent (DR) have rightly focused on 
his improvement on Ricardo’s theory. Marx expands Ricardo’s theory of differential rent beyond 
difference based on fertility or location/situation, to differential taxes, level of development, and 
differential concentration of capital between farmers (Marx, 2015, p. 807; see Harvey, 2007, pp. 
353-358). 
The beginning of Marx’s section on Differential rent centers on why rent payments are 
not a part of production price, not a part of the constant capital—why they are not the c in c+v+s 
(Marx, 2015, pp. 799-800). Fundamentally, this is because land is not a commodity, it is not 
produced. “But!”—we might argue—“other natural resources are considered to be a part of 
constant capital, for example, wood used to make paper pulp, or natural fertilizer to fertilize 
crops.” The difference here between land and things like wood or manure are that wood and 
manure have been gathered and brought to production through labor, so they have, in fact, been 
“mixed” with labor, thereby bearing a value in addition to a price. 
Slightly more complicated is the distinction Marx makes is between land and other non-
commodity, value-less natural resources for which capitalists pay nothing. His example is a 
fascinating one: he compares a waterfall—which, as an element fixed in space, can be subjected 
to the ground rent relation, is a “monopolizable and monopolized natural force” (Marx, 2015, p. 
803-804)—to steam power, in which “the manufacturer pays for the coal, but not for the ability 
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of water to change its aggregate state and transfer itself into steam” (Marx, 2015, p. 801). The 
latter process of water changing its aggregate state is just as un-produced and hence value-less 
as land and the waterfall that sits on it, but the water changing its state is not monopolizable. 
Are there monopolizable, value-less resources other than land and its accoutrements? As far as 
the ground rent argument stands, no. We must understand that land (and to some degree, it is 
more accurate to say “space”) is the basic context by which any non-produced resource enters 
the production process (e.g. mining).  
The surplus profit arising from the use of a waterfall does not arise from the investment 
of capital but from the monopolization of the natural force of the waterfall (Marx, 2015, pp. 
803–804). This increased profit and ground rent from the waterfall does not affect the general 
production price of the commodity, because it derives from relative returns, not an absolute rise 
in productivity (Marx, 2015, pp. 804). The natural force of the waterfall is not the “source” of 
surplus profit here, but simply a “natural basis” for it, because it is “the natural basis of the 
exceptionally increased productivity of social labor” (Marx, 2015, p. 804). 
Marx puts much stake in this distinction between basis and source, which, while being 
somewhat semantically weak, we should understand in its strength as the difference between, 
essentially, the preconditions of a given social relation such as rent, and the generative actor in 
said relation. It mirrors the difference between private property in land (basis of capitalist 
production) and capitalist who initiates production/ worker who produces value (the sources of 
capitalist production).  
Marx continues to elucidate why landed property is not the creator of differential rent: if 
no one owned property with a waterfall, a manufacturer could use it as “unclaimed land”—hence 
landed property “does not create the portion of value that is transformed into surplus profit; 
rather it simply enables the landowner… to entice this surplus profit out of the manufacturer’s 
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pocket and into his own” (Marx 2015 p805). This distinguishes differential rent from absolute 




 : Land and “Finance” 
 
A Note on Data 
 The study of landownership on a large scale is impeded by the fact that most major 
landowning companies are private, do not disclose their dealings, and are often not known by 
name to the international community of analysts and scholars (either critical or mainstream). 
Much contemporary critical scholarship on landownership focuses on Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs). These landowning entities happen to be one of the easiest to analyze, as they are 
usually publicly traded and so their accounts are available to the public. REITs are effectively 
investment vehicles for the masses—they allow “anyone” to invest in real estate. The study of 
REITs, then, is the study of a sort of mass market version of landownership and cannot be 
mistaken for representing landownership in general.  REITs are public in order to seek a wide 
basis for raising liquid capital. Studies that focus exclusively on landowning companies that are 
publicly traded, as well as a few privately traded but highly leveraged landowning companies, 
are therefore restricted to less powerful landowning companies: those that are in need of 
investment. 
And public investment companies do not own the bulk of the nation’s land. Ninety-seven 
of the USA’s top 100 largest landowners are individuals, families, or heirs (Land Report 100, 
2019). Although we cannot know for sure, it is entirely possible that these legacy landowners 
have a worse effect on the world’s arable land, urban poor, and so on, than publicly traded 
REITS, even though they are less “financialized” in their ownership structure. 
 I emphasize this at the outset of this chapter, which focuses on fictitious, leveraged, 
securitized, and speculative forms of ground rent extraction, to remind us that while these forms 
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have been increasingly significant to global economic life, they comprise only a portion of the 
revenue of the landowning class in general—likely, a small portion. 
 
Introduction 
So far, we have considered ground rent primarily in terms of direct, periodic ground rent 
payments to a landowner by a tenant. We must also address mortgage, land-based security, and 
the purchase and sale of land. These are the forms that bring land into the world of “finance.” 
Financial profits derive from money lending, stocks, bonds, and securities that yield a 
combination of interest payments, dividends, and profits from their purchase and sale. In this 
chapter, I explore the ways that speculation in land and land-based securities differ from these 
purely financial—and often fictitious—investments. 
The 2007 subprime crisis heightened the visibility of land-based investment vehicles 
such as the mortgage-backed security. Many critical and leftist analysts have assumed that the 
increase in speculative investment markets in land are evidence of a process of financialization 
that detaches land-based investments further and further from ground rent and the 
particularities of land.  
Although critical scholars of land and housing argue that speculation in land is identical 
to speculation in financial assets (see Chapter 5), several critical scholars of finance disaggregate 
rent and real estate from their study of financial assets, putting aside rent and real estate so as 
not to muddy their data. Krippner, for example, questions whether real estate markets should be 
lumped together with financial markets (Krippner, 2005, pp. 179, fn7); Norfield excises real 
estate from his analysis of profit rates in the investment sector (Norfield, 2012); Phillipon (2011) 
excludes real estate from all calculations, noting that the inclusion of real estate is the main 
cause of misleading and inconsistent classifications of financial activities (p. 3). Land and real 
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estate are pushed out of broader analyses of finance, but they have no other place to go. The lack 
of a field of study based in ground rent theory means that the only way to study rent is to 
collapse it into finance (see Chapter 5).  
For mainstream economists, the relationship between real estate markets and financial 
markets is an open question. Preoccupied with diversifying investment portfolios, economists 
seek investment opportunities that will hedge against plunges in the stock market; real estate is 
(potentially) a good candidate if it can be proven to behave differently than other markets. Thus, 
there is a wealth of mainstream scholarship comparing land-based markets to stocks and bonds. 
Building on a review of this scholarship, I argue that speculative markets for land are still 
tethered to ground rent and the logic of landownership. The sale and purchase of land, the 
mortgaging of land, and the production of land-based securities all involve predictions about 
future ground rents, and so are all speculative. As such they mirror other speculative practices: 
Land is bought and sold much the same as financial assets are bought and sold; mortgages are 
structured like loans; land-based securities are traded in the same manner as other financial 
securities. However, their returns are based on ground rents rather than company profits or 
other purely fictitious revenue streams, which means that land-based investments follow 
different trends than other financial markets.  
The sale price of land is calculated by capitalizing future rental payments. Mortgages are 
based on this capitalized price, with additional speculation on the ability of the landowner to 
pay. Land-based securities are either directly securitized ground rents (in the case of most 
Equity REIT stock as well as the recently developed rent-backed security), securitized mortgages 
(in the case of Mortgage REIT stock or mortgage-backed securities), securitized cash flow from 
the purchase and sale of properties (some Equity REIT stock), or derivatives based upon these 
securities. Each of these investments is tethered to ground rents. 
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In their search for diversification options, economists generally analyze two different 
categories of real estate investment: direct and securitized. Studies analyzing securitized real 
estate often use data from REITs, which are relatively easy to obtain as they are often publicly 
traded and their data is aggregated by entities such as Nareit (National Association of Real 
Estate Investment Trusts). Direct real estate investment is more difficult to calculate accurately, 
for economists as well as for theorists of ground rent. 
Economists calculate direct returns on real estate in three ways: cash rents (ground 
rent), actual land sales, and assessed land value. Rents are difficult to assess because most 
metrics of rent include “imputed rent” of owner-occupied housing and owner-operated 
farmland. House and land price assessment varies widely—for example, the USDA’s valuation of 
agricultural land is calculated by assessed value combined with cash rents, while private listing 
companies like Zillow calculate home value and predict the housing market based on a 
combination of assessed, list, and sale price.  
Generally speaking, assessed price (or “capital gains”) is an inferior metric to actual sale 
price, as the former is a guess and the latter based on actual transactions. The Case-Shiller 
housing index is based exclusively on actual sales, and I use this for housing when possible. 
However, the Case-Shiller index is less useful for granular analysis, and so economists 
frequently use a proxy for direct real estate returns, such as dividends from the ownership of 
stock in a direct real estate company.  
 
Sale Price of Land—Cap Rates v. Interest Rates 
While some buildings can be costly, in any competitive land market, variations in sale 
price depend far more upon the land—the ground rent—than on the building or structures built 
upon it. Buildings and structures fall further in contribution to price during booming rental 
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markets in growing cities.13 The volatility and geographic differentials in home and building 
prices are broadly due to land (Davis & Heathcote, 2007). Buildings are capital investments in 
land, similar to building a well or windmill on agricultural land. They (can) increase the 
potential ground rent for the landowner, realized as differential rent 2. Knoll et al. (2017) find 
that “Land prices, not construction costs, hold the key to understanding the trajectory of house 
prices in the long-run.” (2017, p. 1). 
What determines the sale price of land? Land itself has no value because it is not 
produced, so its sale price does not reflect even its adjusted value. The sale price of land is 
generally tethered the ground rent it will realize in the future. Marx described this as capitalized 
ground rent. To capitalize ground rent, one takes the presumed rental income over a period of 
time—generally a year—and calculates the price of the land as if the ground rent were interest 
payments on a capital outlay. For instance, if a plot of land is expected to draw $10,000 in rent 
over the relevant time period, and interest rates are at 4%, that means the land will be thought 
of as worth $250,000 (because $10,000 is 4% of $250,000). 
Sale price = (yearly rental income / interest rate) 
We can see from this equation that the price of land falls as interest rates rise, and the 
price of land rises when interest rates fall. For example, if interest rates were to rise to 5%, the 
same plot of land would be valued at $200,000 because rental revenue of $10,000 would 
represent 5% (rather than 4%) of the “value” of the land. If interest rates fall to 2%, the price of 
the plot of land in question rises to $500,000. Because the price of land is based upon future 
 
13 “In cities that are experiencing rapid growth, particularly where building is carried on with industrial methods, as 
in London, it is the ground-rent and not the house that forms the real object of speculation” (Marx, 2015, p. 761). : 
“It’s not the structure that has a volatile price; it’s the land. Where there is plenty of buildable land, the response to an 
increase in demand for homes is mostly to build more, not to increase prices. Where there is little buildable land, the 
response to an increase in demand for homes is mostly a price increase, sufficient to discourage buyers enough to 




potential ground rent collection (as well as gambling on interest rates), the “price of land” is 
always an irrational form, inherently speculative. 
The contemporary valuation of homes for sale to and by homeowners is often based 
upon looking at what other properties of similar quality and geography are selling for—hence, 
this is how assessment tends to be described to laypeople. However, the sale of rental properties 
always involves calculation of the capitalization rate or “cap rate” on that property.  
The cap rate fulfills the function the interest rate in Marx’s original equation. The sale 
price of land for multifamily rental properties (residential or commercial) is calculated as net 
operating income (gross profits minus all expenses except property tax) divided by the cap rate: 
 
Sale price of land = net operating income / “cap rate” 
 
Cap rate can be calculated as: 
 
Cap rate = Net Operating Income / sale price (market value) 
 
The sale price of financial assets, on the other hand, is measured by interest rates.  
 
Price of asset = yearly yield / interest rate 
 
The key difference is between the cap rate and the interest rates. Cap rates tend to be 
higher than interest rates, meaning investment in real estate yields higher returns than other 
financial investment. The mainstream explanation for this is that real estate is more “risky” than 
investing in other financial assets. Whether or not this is actually true, real estate lobbyists have 
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long convinced the US government to guarantee real estate investments and to subsidize 
housing since the wartime period (see Chapter 4) on the basis that it is “too risky.” 
Chervachidze et al. (2009) show that cap rates are affected by risk-free Treasury rates, 
general corporate risk premium operating in the economy, and the net amount of liquid debt 
issued in the economy. Furthermore, in determining cap rates, past growth in rental income is 
extrapolated forward, resulting in overvalued properties whenever an increase in rents is 
followed by a downturn (Sivitanides et al., 2001, p. 3). 
Cap rates are the analytic tool used to assess the reasonable price of a property; however, 
the profitability of real estate investment also depends on how highly leveraged the purchase. A 
common cap rate expectation on rental multifamily property in recent years is 6% (North 
America Cap Rate Survey H2 2019, 2019). This means a property producing 60,000 in rentals 
per year will be valued at 1,000,000. After making back the principal (which in this case would 
take about 16 years), all rental income is pure profit. If the rental market tanks in year 5 and 
rental income drops from 60,000 to 30,000, you still get $30,000 profit (3% of your original 
investment). 
However, if you borrowed $900,000 at 4% interest and only put down $100,000 of your 
own money, that $60,000 minus $36,000 interest payments gives you a 20% profit rate. But if 
you’re unlucky and that rental income drops to $30,000, your profit rate is -6%. You owe an 
interest payment of $36,000 but only have income to pay $30,000 (Kliman, 2011, pp. 32–33). 
Highly leveraged properties produce unusually high profits during good times but end up 
costing money during a downturn. 
Because there is no underlying value to land, speculative calculations are the only way to 
assess land’s value. Some scholars have defined financialization in part as the growing 
pervasiveness of calculative financial practices (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014). However, calculative 
financial practices are the only method for assessing the price of land. Nor have the methods of 
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calculation changed dramatically since the recent increase in financial activity in the 1970s; 
Crosby and Henneberry (2015) have shown, in the case of UK commercial property, that the 
techniques of evaluative calculations on property have not transformed substantially throughout 
the last century.  
Rent-Price Ratio 
Cap rates have a gestural quality—they 
involve a sort of mystic sensing (as in witching for 
water – see Figure 3-1). As such, the “price” of real 
estate is variable. While land values should, in 
theory, be dependent on rent, the relationship 
between rent and price is inconsistent. Sale price 
can rise and fall regardless of the rise and fall of 
ground rent (Marx, 2015, p. 768). This 
inconsistency is expressed in the variability of the 
rent-price ratio.  
Analysts use this ratio to determine 
whether house prices are overvalued (if they 
exceed a given ratio with prevailing rents, they are 
considered overvalued). Many economists have 
shown that the ratio is unstable and unpredictable (André et al., 2014; Gregoriou et al., 2014; 
Mikhed & Zemčík, 2009). However, others have argued that, while  the ratio between them is 
not stable, house prices and rents are cointegrated or mean-reverting. (Black et al., 2006; Gallin, 
2008; Osterrieder & Schotman, 2011) 
Figure 3-1 
Using Dowsing Rod to Find Water 
Source: Baird, 2015 
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Gallin and Gysels finds that rent-price ratio predicts changes in prices, but not rents. 
(Gallin, 2008; Ghysels et al., 2013). Clarke, on the other hand, finds that where the rent-price 
ratio is high (where prices are low and/or rents are high), there will be low rent growth. This 
makes intuitive sense—in cities where rents are high relative to the price of housing, it will be 
difficult to raise rents, as it may induce people to purchase homes. 
In the long term in the US, the rent-price ratio of both residential property and 
agricultural property has declined (Figures 3-2 and 3-3). Rents have declined relative to land 
prices and land price has increased relative to the rents that it yields. This could be the result of 
an increase in speculative land assessment—assessors, buyers, and sellers assuming that rents 
will be going up (which has only been happening since the 1980s). The decline of the rent-price 



























































































































































Data Source for housing: Case-Shiller Index
Data source for Rent: Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figure 3-2 
Rent-Price Ratio, U.S. 1914-2019 
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However, there are other structural factors that can lead to a divergence between sale 
price and rents. In the case of home ownership versus home rentals, the price and the rent apply 
to two different populations - renters and homebuyers. Even though some renters become 
homebuyers, and vice-versa, there is evidence that a large part of the renting population are 
lifelong renters. A stable rent/price ratio assumes that investment can flow unburdened between 
renting and purchasing homes. However, if different populations rent and buy, and if these two 
populations are in significantly different income brackets, then the ratio would not be stable. 
Given increasing income inequality within the working class, the numerator and denominator in 
the rent/price ratio would be governed by different forces.  
Figure 3-3 
Cropland Rent-to-Value  
Source: Nickerson et al., 2012 
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This bears itself out in the housing market’s dramatic revival post-COVID-19. Many are 
asking, how can the housing market fare so well during double-digit unemployment? As Logan 
Mohtashomi, a mainstream housing market analyst, argued recently: 
a lot of these [job losses] are tied to what I call renter households and people that are 
future renters… it doesn’t impact homeowners as much… there’s 138 million people 
working and the key is the housing market just needs 4 million mortgage buyers per year 
to keep things stable. (Mohtashomi, 2020) 
The hierarchy between homeowner and renter is a racialized and racializing one; low 
income Black and Latinx people are produced as a “semi-permanent rental class” (Desmond, 
2020), while white people are produced as probable homeowners. Homeownership is one of 
many metrics that make visible the inherent racialization which motivates US state policy and 
its enforcement. The effects of racist GI bill loan disbursement was one step in a long history of 
producing white people as homeowners and people of color—Black people especially—as renters 
(Taylor, 2019). Homeownership has long been recognized as a way to quell dissent—with a 
home and a mortgage people are less willing to rise up. So, a 75% white homeownership rate 
ensures that the majority of whites in the USA will act as collaborators and apologists for capital 
and the state—including and especially by supporting the racial hierarchy in which they are the 
winners. 
Economists and politicians constantly imply that renters are people who just haven’t 
bought a home yet; they do not like to refer to the semi-permanent renter class. They act as if 
the actual goal in the USA was 100% homeownership, but clearly it is not—there is too much 
money to be made from renting. 
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 There is more public visibility and 
analysis of homeownership markets than 
rental markets. The “housing market” is 
generally calculated as the value of all owner- 
occupied property plus mortgage debt—a 
striking 33.1 Trillion. This dwarfs the 2.9 
trillion of multifamily rental property, or even 
the 16 Trillion of all commercial non-farm 
rental properties (Figure 3-4). There are is also 
a vast cottage industry of people offering 
advice and training for entering the real estate 
business, which erupted since the turn of the 21sts century. 
Public-facing data and market advice, however, is not meant for large scale investors. 
This data is for small entrepreneurs and small companies—real estate agents, assessors, and 
other people who facilitate sale and purchase of properties. These individuals and companies are 
most interested in purchase and sale—flipping. Larger companies will serve as intermediaries in 
sale (real estate firms that handle sales for others; providers of supplies for building 
construction), or they will invest in the enormous and varied mortgage market (see Chapter 4). 
The data that guides large investors on property purchases is private; the techniques they 
employ are clandestine. Popular media discusses the “housing market” in terms of the purchase 
and sale of owner-occupied homes, but residential rentals provide vast revenues for major 
institutional investors, especially since the 1980s (Figure 3-5). 
Figure 3-4 
Estimates of Commercial Property Value 2018 





Personal Expenditure on Tenant-Occupied Nonfarm Housing 
 
Residential rental properties in the U.S. yielded 620 billion dollars in 2019. Rentals 
require relatively little capital outlay (once the property is acquired) compared to manufacture 
or services. This results in a lot of money going directly to passive landowners. 
Despite the visibility of flipping houses, long term gains are in rentals, not flipping—so 
long as one acquires property at a good cap-rate. Equity REITs, for example, (amongst the few 
institutional real estate investors with public data) clearly state that the majority of their profits 
derive from rental payments—not sale. Large institutional investors shunned the single-family 
home market altogether because the cap-rate on purchase price and rent price for single family 
had been too low. However, after the 2007/8 crash, single family homes flooded the market at 
slashed rates, with dramatically increased cap-rates, and institutional investors finally entered 
the market with the intention to buy and rent rather than buy and sell. Several companies that 
started out purchasing these properties in order to flip them quickly found that renting out the 








































































































Personal expenditure on tenant-occupied 
nonfarm housing
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis, GDP, downloaded from FRED 
Federal Reserve bank of St Louis
Residential rents paid by consumers, unadjusted
Residential rents paid adjusted for inflation to 1984 dollars
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properties into rentals, and in many cases were later acquired by large rental companies (e.g. 
Colony, Invitation Homes). 
Institutional investors generally make up a small percentage of home purchases every 
year, and they usually buy to rent, not to sell (D’Lima & Schultz, 2019). In 2018, institutional 
purchase of homes reached a 20 year high of 11% of all home purchases. 5.96 million homes 
were sold that year, representing less than 5% of all owner-occupied property, equal to roughly 
$1.5 Trillion dollars. That means that housing worth 165 billion was purchased by institutional 
investors. 
Large institutional investors (those that purchase more than 101 properties at a time) 
only invest in markets with extremely high cap-rates; for example, less than 0.05% of total large 
investment purchases of multifamily property have been in high cost Metropolitan areas such as 
San Francisco, New York, or Boston for the last twenty years (Mclaughlin, 2019). Even their 
activity in these low-cost cities only makes up about 15% of all investor home purchases (Figure 
3-6).  
Most “institutional investors” in homebuying markets are small investors (buying 10 
properties or less). Small investors especially dominate home purchases in high cost, low cap-
rate MSAs (e.g. Boston, San Francisco). CoreLogic (a major housing data analytics firm) calls 
these small investors “Mom-and-Pop” investors because they are so small, and tend to be small 
entrepreneurs rather than major companies. Often the term “institutional investor” is 
juxtaposed to “Mom-and-Pop” landlords (see Chapter 5) but here, to be an institutional investor 





Investor Homebuying Rates by Investor Size: 1999 – 2018 
Source: CoreLogic 
 
Large moneyed institutional investors generally enter the market of house purchase and 
sale not as buyers and sellers, but as mortgage lenders. Mortgages become a proxy for 
landownership, and the owners of mortgages collect monthly “interest payments” from the 
“homeowners.” 
Mortgages 
In the purchase and sale of property, the seller can realize future ground rents by selling 
land for more than they invested in it, but the mortgage-lender will generally make an even 
greater return on investment than the seller. 
Take for example the 30-year fixed-rate mortgage, adopted by the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) in the mid-50s and becoming the standard in the 60s and 70s. This 
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lowered monthly payments from a 10- or 20-year fixed rate mortgage that were more common 
in the 1920s, 30s, and 40s, but it increased total interest payments substantially. Even at a low 
5% interest rate (found in the 1950s and then not again till post-crisis 2009), with down 
payment of 20% a home buyer ends up paying additional  75% of the sale price in interest 
payments, compared to about 55% for a 20 year FRM. At rates of 7.5%--common in the 90s and 
early 70s— buyers pay more than the actual price of the property in interest with a 30-year 
mortgage, compared to 90% of the full price with a 20 year mortgage. The first handful of years 
pay back the principal to the mortgage lender, and from then on they collect ground rents. Once 
mortgages were paid off, ground rent extraction can begin again with second mortgages, reverse 
mortgages, and home equity loans.  
 
Figure 3-7:  




Throughout most of the last century, purchasers of 1 to 4 family residences have been 
primarily owner-occupiers; people who live in their own unit, some of whom own a few more 
units for rental income. These small working class landowners account for the vast majority of 
mortgages. The mortgage market is therefore a transfer of ground rent from proletarian “home 
owners” to mortgage lenders/holders—who, in the last instance, hold the title to land if the 
ground rent transfer is not completed.  
Mortgage lenders are the de-facto landowners for much of the life of the mortgage. The 
idea that a “buyer” owns their home before the mortgage repaid is a slight of hand—nowhere so 
obvious as when a person having paid off 90% of their mortgage goes into foreclosure and loses 
their home. 
Mortgage-lenders make up an evasive but powerful bloc within the landowning class. 
They have historically had a very powerful lobby (see Chapter 4) and won significant guarantees 
from the US government. During the COVID-19 epidemic, we see mortgage-lenders protected 
from potential default of their working-class borrowers in much the same fashion as residential 
landlords are being protected from the potential default of their working class tenants. Tenants 
who couldn’t pay rent were protected from eviction for the first 5 months of the pandemic, 
mortgage borrowers were generally allowed deferrals for a similar duration.  
However, here the renter/homebuyer hierarchy reinstates itself in COVID-19 policy, for 
at the end of that 5 months, the renter is expected to pay the 5 months of ground rent in full to 
avoid eviction, while the homeowner can defers that 5 months of ground rent into the future. 
The distinction here between the mortgage lender and the residential landowner is innocuous; 
both demand their monthly payment of ground rent. The difference is not one of kind, but one 
of degree; the “homeowner” (often) enjoys more flexibility  in relation to their ground rent 
payments than the renter. It is easier to refinance a mortgage than negotiate your rent lower. 
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But both are ground rent payments, and both the rent’s percentage of household income and 
mortgage as percentage of household income have risen dramatically since 1975. 
Stock Markets v. Real Estate Markets 
Of the numerous studies analyzing the relationship between real estate markets and 
stock markets, many find no relationship, or a relationship so weak as to be useless for 
predictive purposes. However, there are also many that find a close correlation, integration, or 
causal relationship. I have summarized 15 of the most cited of these studies in the Table I and 
Table II below.  
Nine of the ten studies that find segmentation or negligible cointegration have a time 
frame that ends before 2000, and eight begin before 1980. These studies compare stocks (and 
sometimes bonds) to both securitized real estate (usually equity REITs) and “unsecuritized” real 
estate, for which they use appraisals or the NCREIF Property Index (NPI) which measures both 
“capital appreciation” and income.  
All of the 6 studies that find real estate and stock markets to be significantly integrated, 
on the other hand, use data that begins after 1984 and ends after 2002, with the exception of 
Quan et al., which ends in 1996.  
The relationship between real estate markets and stock markets shifts substantially 
between the years 1985 and 2005. Studies beginning before this period (running roughly 
between 1970 and 2000) find the markets to be segmented, while studies beginning during this 
period (running between 1985 and 2010) are integrated. this suggests that at some point 
between 1985 and 2000 something changes in the relationship between the two m between 
roughly 1970 and 2000, real estate was not integrated with stocks, but at some point between 
1985 and 2010, they appear to integrate.  
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Several studies suggest a shift in the relationship between real estate and finance—
Glascock et al. (2000) argue that securitized real estate becomes integrated with stocks after 
1992; Luchtenberg and Seiler (2014) find that they become even more integrated after the 2007 
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I have not included in these tables the sole macro study of this relationship between 
stocks and real estate markets, because it exceeds the scope of all the other studies. Li et al. 
(2015) study data from 1890 to 2012, and find that while the relationship between the direct real 
estate and common stock markets fluctuates over time, they tend to coincide in the periods 
leading up to and following a crisis. This reflects the shift from no integration to cointegration 
observed in the studies above: 1990s begin a period of cointegration between finance and real 
estate, marking the beginning of a long run up to the 2007 crisis. After controlling for economic 
growth, however, Li et al. find the co-movement decreases substantially, suggesting the co-
movement is likely the result of both markets responding to “economic growth fundamentals.”  
In other words, when economic fundamentals are favorable and the economy is 
booming, real estate and stocks boom together; when the economy busts, real estate and stocks 
bust together. When economists attempt to remove the effects of economic fundamentals on the 
two markets, they have little correlation. 
Securitized Real Estate v. Direct Real Estate 
While it would seem that securitized real estate should behave more like other financial 
markets than direct real estate, several scholars note securitized real estate actually behaves 
more like direct real estate than like stocks. Mei and Lei (1994) suggest a “real estate factor 
premium” by which all assets related to real estate are affected.  
Anderson et al. (2016) study private equity investment in real estate (PERE)—an 
industry they describe as being particularly speculative and highly leveraged. They write that 
PERE is “at the other end of the risk-return spectrum” from direct, hold-oriented real estate 
funds—meaning that, if there were to be a divergence between direct and securitized real estate 
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markets, it should be observable in the comparison between Real Estate Private Equity and 
hold-oriented real estate investment.  
On the contrary, Anderson et al. find that REPE is integrated with direct real estate, and 
segmented from other private equity investments(see Figures 3-8 and 3-9): “REPE funds have 
in almost all regards closer ties with real estate than with non-real estate private equity” (2016, 
p. 264). 
 
Figures 3-8  and 3-9  
Index of Development of Real Estate Private Equity v. Real Estate v. Private 
Equity  
 
Why Are Real Estate and Stock Markets Segmented?  
Economists explain the segmentation of real estate and stocks by various means: several 
point to the legal constraints imposed on real estate investment that are not imposed on stock 
purchases, others to the fact that information on real estate prices and cash flow are usually 
proprietary, leading to insufficiently educated investors, and others still to divergent 
expectations (rational or irrational) about future profits and future rents (Quan & Titman, 1999, 
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p. 205). All of these are true to some degree; real estate and stock markets correspond to 
different underlying social relations, with different legal structures and forecasting mechanisms. 
But the most fundamental underlying difference between real estate and stocks is that 
real estate is based on ground rents, which are concrete and have specific limits and tendencies, 
while stocks and bond yields are whimsical—purely fictitious, brought closer down to earth 
periodically through crises. This difference gives rise to the different legalities, forecasting 
strategies, and market opacity between the two markets. Based on the data provided in this 
chapter, I argue that even when loosed onto the trade floors of the NYSE, or traded in the glass 
penthouse offices of international Private Equity, land-based securities remain tethered to 
actual ground rent extraction. 
If land securities are based on rental cash flows, what causes rent to go up and down? We 




 : Landed Class Struggle 
 
The tremendous power this gives landed property when it is combined together with 
industrial capital in the same hands enables capital practically to exclude workers 
engaged in a struggle over wages from the very earth itself as their dwelling-place. (Here 
one section of society demands a tribute from the other for the right to inhabit the earth, 
just as in landed property in general the proprietors demand the right to exploit the 
earth’s surface, its bowels, and air above, and thereby the maintenance and development 
of life.) The rise in population, and the consequent increase in the need for housing, is 
not the only factor that must necessarily increase the rent on buildings. So too does the 
development of fixed capital, which is either incorporated into the earth or strikes root in 
it, like all industrial buildings, railways, factories, storehouses, docks, etc., which rest on 
it. It is impossible, even with Carey’s determination, to confuse house-rent, in as much as 
this is interest on the capital invested in the house, with rent of land pure and simple, 
particularly when, as in England, the landowner and the speculative builder are 
completely different people. Two elements come into consideration here: on the one 
hand the exploitation of the earth for the purpose of reproduction or extraction, on the 
other the space that is required as an element for any production and any human 
activity. On both counts landed property demands its tribute. (Marx, 2015, p. 760) 
 
Landowners and capitalists clash over their share of surplus value. In their interminable 
conflict, landowners have an array of strategies at their disposal: they may (1) raise rents, (2) 
withhold land, (3) vie for favored tax status and subsidies from the government, and (4) force a 
rise in market price of commodities which are produced on high-ground-rent land, thereby 
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directing a larger percentage of wage bill toward ground rent. Below I will address these 
different strategies. 
 
Strategies of Landowning Class 
Raising rents. 
If a capitalist farmer adopts labor-saving technology in the production of, say, soybeans, 
resulting in higher than average profits for their crops, the landowner can raise rents the 
following year. The raised rents capture the profits that exceed the average rate of profit for 
agriculture, bringing the profits of that capitalist farmer back down to average. This can be a 
disincentive to investing in labor-saving technology, leading to a lower than average organic 
composition in agriculture.   
This dynamic is visible in agricultural production and rents in the US over the last 
century. The data is patchy, but we can see from USDA data that there was a gradual increase in 
cash rents per acre of farmland from 1960 to 1980, a decline sometime after that followed by 
stagnation, and a dramatic increase in rents per acre after the 2007 market crash. This is 
apparent in national data from 1960-1980, and from 1998-2019 (Figure 4.1), and it is also 
evidenced by state-level data: Iowa in particular has kept rigorous agricultural statistics which 




Figure 4-1  
Cash Rent Per Acre of Farmland, U.S. 1960-2019 
 
Figure 4-2  
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Cash Rent Per Acre of Farmland, USA
Adjusted for Inflation CPI=1984
Source 1998-2019: USDA NASS
Source 1960-1980 (All states except the West, adjusted for inflation): 
Unpublished USDA Worksheets 
printed in Doll and Widows 1984 
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How do these increases and declines in rents correspond to the income for capitalist 
farmers over the same period?  Generally speaking, the increased rents capture gains in gross 
receipts and government payments (see Figure 4-4). During the period of moderately increasing 
rents between 1950 to 1970 we see slow growth of farm gross income, paired with the stagnation 
of farm net income; based on the simultaneous increase in agricultural rents, we can wager that 
these gross gains are being captured by landowners in rent. When gross farm income decreases 
between 1980 and 1990, we also see declining rents. Gross and net farm income mostly 
stagnates between 1990 and 2005, and rents also stay flat. After the 2007 financial crisis, rents 
and gross income skyrockets, while farm income has a momentary uptick and drops down again. 
Farmers gained a share of the dramatic spike in gross farm income in the 1970s, with net 
income rising along with it, but soon the net income returned to previous levels, while rents and 
gross income stay high until the mid-1980s. This substantiates the thesis that productivity gains 
will initially yield increased profits to farmers, but the gains will rapidly become incorporated in 




Figure 4-3  
Inflation-adjusted U. S. Gross and Net Farm Income, 1910-2016 
Source: Zhang & Beek, 2016 
 
This is evidence that landownership affects the net profits of agricultural capital. We can 
observe a similar pattern when it comes to Mining, Transportation, and Utilities—all sectors 







Figure 4-4:  
Broad Profit Rate: Highly capital intensive industries, Business, and Restricted 
business 
Source: Dumenil and Levy, 2002 
Top Dotted Line: Restricted business (Business minus Highly Capital Intensive 
Industries) 
Middle Solid Line: Business 
Bottom Dashed Line: Highly Capital Intensive Industries 
 
Dumenil and Levy find that while the majority of US industries follow a similar trend of 
plunging profit rates until the 1980s followed by moderately rising rates,14 the sector they call 
“Highly capital intensive industries” (Figure 4-4, the bottom dashed line) follows a different 
trajectory, hovering at a low and constant profit rate of about .08-.09%. This is not unlike the 
net profits on farms (Figure 4-3). The industries they define as Highly capital intensive are 
 
14 Kliman 2011 has argued that in fact profit rates do not rise after the 1980s. 
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Mining—which has the same relationship to the landowner as agriculture—and Transportation 
& Public Utilities. But Dumenil and Levy’s characterization of these industries as “Highly capital 
intensive” is misleading—in truth, they are land intensive; they require vast amounts of space 
compared to manufacture, trade, or services (which are the sectors within “Restricted 
Business”). In other words, they pay a lot of rent. In effect, this graph compares profit rates in 
sectors where landowners do not intervene to capture excess profits, with sectors in which they 
do.  
Landowners do not intervene in industrial production to the degree they do in 
agriculture, because the portion of profits extracted as ground rent is minimal. This is because 
there is not as strict a monopoly on industrial land as there is for agriculture. Manufacture of 
durables, for example, requires very little land per unit of value produced relative to agriculture. 
Also, manufacturers are generally not too picky about the quality of their land—a factory can 
more or less be built anywhere there is flat solid land. Landed property will demand its tribute 
from the factory owner, but the sum for major industry is a very small fraction of profits. 
This is where Harvey’s concept of monopoly rents becomes important. Generally, the 
landowner has significant power within agriculture because it is a sector that requires high 
acreage of a specific quality (agriculture requires soil, good weather, and abundant water) as 
withing mining (mining requires mineral deposits). Monopoly rents, however, bring the power 
of the landowner into a new terrain: the city. In the city it is especially easy for landowners to 
refuse to release the unused land under their control unless paid such a high rent that the 
market prices of commodities produced on that land are forced above value. In this instance, the 
rent charged creates the monopoly price. This form of monopoly rent can be important in all 
urban sectors and affect the cost of food grains as well as the cost of working-class housing 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 350). 
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A small bakery requires only a very small footprint of land, and needs no particular 
terrain or weather—hence, in a non-urban area a bakery generally would not be a high-rent-
paying business, manipulable by landowners. However, in a city with limited commercial 
storefronts, a landowner has significantly more power to raise rents on such an enterprise.  
 
Withholding land from the market. 
“He leases only when a lease-price can be paid.” (Marx, 2015, p. 745) 
The power to withhold land from use is the greatest absolute power of landowners (see 
Chapter 1 and 2). Where productive capitalists must keep high turnover rates, repay loans, and 
realize profits before commodities lose value, landowners are characterized by a longer temporal 
scope and the financial stability to keep their land vacant. If they own their land with no debt or 
low debt, landowners increase their power to manipulate rents through withdrawal of land. This 
distinguishes them also from finance capitalists, who must constantly put their loan capital in 
motion to evade threat of inflation or other drains on hoarded money. While the price of land 
may rise and fall, land itself remains. 
This tendency reveals itself in widespread vacancy rates throughout every real estate 
sector. Moreover, vacancy rates generally increase when housing markets go up. In the United 
States, rents and vacancy rates both climb together from the 80s to 2009 (see Figure 4-11). 





Figure 4-5  
Vacancy Rates for Chinese Cities, 2001-2012 
 
Government policy.  
Landowners have generally benefitted from favorable policies from the US federal 
government.  They have frequently pushed their agenda by holding up the small family farmer 
as the imagined beneficiary of their proposals, and have often come into conflict with 
industrialists.  
Throughout most of the 19th century, debates raged about how to sell the so recently 
stolen U.S. federal lands. On one side, Northern industrialists argued that land should be sold at 
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high prices and heavily taxed in order to subsidize industry and protect it against the labor 
shortages it was soon to experience due to westward expansion. On the other side, politicians 
argued the land should be sold cheaply, making it available to the “actual settler” and protecting 
him from the “monopoly of speculation” (Gates, 1973, p. 9). 
On the surface, the latter position triumphed, and land was made available cheaply for 
sale across the country. However, the minimum amount of acreage required by each individual 
to purchase was large enough to prevent most “small farmers” from being able to afford it, and 
so tenancy swept across the country apace with western expansion. The Democratic party was 
dominated by “Land- and currency-speculators who were undermining “subsistence” agriculture 
in the west” (Post, 2012, p. 100). Even while President Jackson publicly deplored “that feature of 
public land policy which permitted speculators to buy land in unlimited amounts” (Gates, 1942, 
p. 324), his administration  promoted enormous speculative land sales between 1835 and 1837, 
in which at least 29,000,000 of the 38,000,000 acres of “public” land stolen from Native Tribes 
and Peoples went to large landholders (Gates, 1942, p. 321). Almost all of these large land 
disbursals went to cotton plantation owners using hyper-“efficient” and hyper-brutal 
exploitation of slave labor; in Mississippi alone, 8.3 million acres (almost 1/3) went to 
speculators of slave plantations (Baptist, 2016; Woods, 1998, p. 45). 
Jackson clamped down on large land purchases in 1836, aiming to “save the new states 
from a non-resident proprietorship, one of the greatest obstacles to the advancement of a new 
country and the prosperity of an old one” (quoted in Gates, 1942, p. 324). However, large 
landholders would continue to amass land by hook or by crook. Lands given to states for 
internal use such as education and infrastructure—through the Military Bounty Acts (1847, 
1855) The Graduation Act (1854) and the Homestead Act (1862)—created secondary land 
markets (Passel, 1975, p. 84). Vouchers for land proffered by these Acts were bought and sold, 
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and eventually amassed into large landholdings—often at cheaper rates than the government 
had been charging for direct land sales. 
Large public land grants themselves were not eliminated so much as redirected to 
railway companies, who, as Marx put it, became the “greatest landlords” (Colean, 1950, p. 10; 
Marx, 1879). Men who had been dry goods traders were able to amass over 175,000,000 acres of 
land between the 1850s and 1870s (an amount of land larger than Texas), giving birth to a new 
wing of the landowning class in the US. This is another example of how the US government 
favored the emergence of major landowning factions at the expense of small scale settlers, 
despite their rhetoric.  
In the 20th century, Agriculture continued to receive special treatment from the 
government, especially when compared to other sectors. Goldstein (1989) describes a strong 
divergence between agricultural policy and industrial policy, summed up as “trade liberalization 
for industrial products and trade protectionism to maintain farm incomes for agricultural 
products.” While American industry was opened up to global competition, American agriculture 
was sheltered and subsidized.  
Goldstein (1989) notes that the protection of agriculture was in part due to the strength 
of interest groups advocating for agriculture; she fails to mention that these lobby groups were 
by and large wings of what Clyde Woods calls the Southern Plantation Bloc, closely allied with 
Roosevelt. The inauguration of 20th Century agricultural policy was the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act (AAA) of 1933, a “planter-dominated affair” (Woods, 1998, p. 123). The AAA enacted an 
array of subsidies, primarily paying farmers to destroy crops and reduce acreage so as to raise 
prices. These subsidies propped up troubled agricultural firms, and also ensured the continued 
flow of ground rents to agricultural landowners. Moreover, these subsidies “allowed planters… 
to end their responsibility for the survival and reproduction of African American labor” (Woods, 
1998, p. 122). Not only did agricultural subsidies protect the income of planters, farmers, and 
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agricultural landowners, but they enabled the Plantation owners of the south to sever some of 
the last ties between Black farmers and the land of the south. 
The structures set in place by the AAA have persisted throughout the 20th century. It is 
widely acknowledged that support to the agricultural sector protects the rental income of 
agricultural landowners—many have even argued that the primary beneficiaries of agricultural 
subsidies are not the farmers,  but the landowners (Alston, 2007; Kirwan, 2009).  Figure 4-3 
shows that the higher gross farm income during the 80s and 90s (as compared to the 50s and 
early 60s) is primarily due to agricultural subsidy. Without this subsidy, rents would ostensibly 
have had to decrease for farmers to be able to afford them.  
The Anti-Trade nationalism pushed by President Trump panders to racist whites’ fantasy 
of a lost America, and it conveniently also protects the rental income of the landlord class. 
Suppressing imports in high-ground-rent sectors such as agriculture ensures continued income 
which can be directed toward rents. A similar dynamic was present during the famed Corn Law 
debates of the 19th century. The tension between landowners and capitalist producers over tariffs 
was the crux of the conflict over whether to tax corn imports. Landowners were the primary 
lobbyists for corn laws, as the movement of capital to other countries for corn production meant 
the bottom falling out of their rental income. Further, keeping prices of corn high ensured they 
could continue to charge high rents. 
The genetic code of the US government is disposed toward the protection and 
advancement of landowning class power—whether this is particular to all capitalist states, to 






Raising prices of High-Rent Commodities. 
I call “High-Rent Commodities” those commodities whose production requires 
proportionally high rental payments. It is in the interest of landowners that high-rent 
commodities continue to be costly, and rise in price if possible. Every dollar increase in the sale 
price of wheat above the production price is another dollar landowners can charge to wheat 
producers in rent.  
There is also an indirect struggle between landowners and capitalists over wages: 
capitalists want to suppress wages, while landowners want wages as high as possible so that 
workers can pay ever higher prices for High-Rent commodities. When commodities are 
purchased by the working class, they purchase them out of their wages. Wages are paid 
(generally) by capitalists. If high-rent commodities are necessities—such as, for instance, 
housing—then as they rise in price, workers need higher wages to pay for them. If capitalist raise 
workers’ wages, allowing them to pay higher rent, the worker watches the price of their labor 
power rise while their quality of life does not. Capitalists, in the meantime, are footing the bill 
for landlords’ hiking the price of high-rent commodities by paying their workers higher wages. 
For example, while inflation has been negligible in recent decades even given all the 
economic indicators that usually induce inflation15 —the cost of housing has spiked. This is 
largely due to the fact that rental housing (or rather, the land beneath it) is a crop that can’t be 
grown in China or Mexico. Urban and suburban housing, as well as prime rural housing, is 
subject to the monopoly rents discussed above. The landowning class can raise urban residential 
rents without any change in how apartments are produced or consumed. 
This dynamic plays out in areas with extremely high and increasing ground rents and 
rent gaps. In San Francisco, businesses ranging from small local joints to major multinationals, 
 
15 See Saad-Filho (2019) for explanation for our contemporary lack of inflation. 
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have closed or moved operations over the last decade due to their inability to find employees 
who can work for the wages the company is able to pay, and/or because of the increased 
overhead of commercial rental costs. Local establishment Mission Pie closed its doors in 2019, 
citing their inability to pay a living wage in the face of soaring housing costs in San Francisco 
(Eskenazi, 2019). Macy’s announced the firing of over 1000 employees in San Francisco in 
February 2020 (Hanbury, 2020), citing  the unaffordability of local office space and rising wage 
demands due to housing. Macy’s gave some of their fired workers the option to reapply to 
locations in New York and Atlanta, where the company owns commercial properties and is 
headquartered. Employees hired in those places will receive a wage cut commensurate with the 
lower cost of living (housing).  
But as we venture into the territory of residential rents, we face a problem: while the 
classic Landlord-Tenant relationship in ground rent theory is between a landowner and a 
capitalist tenant, here we find working class tenants with an entirely different relationship to 
the space they rent. 
  
Capitalist-As-Tenant 
If you ask a regular person (aka a non-capitalist, non-landowner) about “rent,” they will 
probably talk about residential rents they have paid, couldn’t pay, or managed not to pay. 
Ground rent theory has been unable to account for this type of residential rents because in 
Marxian and classical ground rent theory, the tenant is the capitalist, and ground rent is paid 
out of profits, while in urban residential rents, the “tenant” is generally a proletarian.  Seminal 
texts on ground rent from Marx, Ricardo, and Von Thunen discuss agricultural rents almost 
exclusively. Marx mentions that his analysis of agricultural ground rent can be applied to the 
rent of mines, and potentially for urban rents, but does not elaborate. 
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In classical ground rent theory, the capitalist farmer rents farmland from the landlord, 
and the rent is paid out of their profits made on the land. The “rent” paid by a proletarian 
“tenant,” on the other hand, is drawn out of their wages. The value they produce happens 
elsewhere. In the working class tenant’s relationship to their landlord, the capitalist appears to 
be absent. 
Consequently, ground rent theory has only been loosely applied to residential rents. Neil 
Smith made an essential intervention in his theory of the rent gap, which applied the  theory of 
capitalist competition to an analysis of the rental market; David Harvey has correctly 
emphasized the monopoly character of urban landownership (Harvey, 2007; Harvey et al., 
2009; Smith, 1987, 1996).16 However, it has remained impossible to apply ground rent theory 
directly to residential rentals.  
Here, Engels’ uneven text on The Housing Question has an important insight:  the 
relationship between a residential landlord and working-class tenant is described as a “quite 
ordinary commodity transaction” (Engels, 1887).17 The working class tenant is a consumer of 
the commodity home. 
David Harvey also refers to residents of housing as consumers of that housing – “The 
occupiers of housing consume the various facets of housing according to their desires and 
needs… All occupiers of housing [be they owner-occupiers or renters] have a similar concern – 
to procure use values though laying out exchange value” (Harvey et al., 2009, p. 163). This 
clarifies the difference between the working-class residential tenant and the capitalist tenant: 
 
16 Anna Haila wrote the promisingly titled Urban Land Rent, but the book does not actually offer any insight on how 
to make sense of residential rents vis a vis land rent theory. 
17 Engels falters as he continues, suggesting that the rent is decisively determined by the given relation between 
supply and demand.  
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the former pays rent in order to consume a use-value, the latter pays rent in order to produce 
surplus value.  
Interestingly enough, the Bureau of Economic Analysis treats rent in a similar fashion. 
The housing stock provides a flow of housing services that are consumed by persons who rent 
their housing, and by persons who own the housing they occupy (referred to as “owner-
occupants”). In the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPAs), owner-occupants are 
treated as owning unincorporated enterprises that provide housing services to themselves in the 
form of the rental value of their dwellings. Thus, Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) for 
housing services includes both the monetary rents paid by tenants and an imputed rental value 
for owner-occupied dwellings (measured as the income the homeowner could have received if 
the house had been rented to a tenant). (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2019) 
But if working class tenants are consuming produced use-values, and landlords in 
capitalism are defined by their disengagement from value production (see Chapters 1 and 2), 
who is producing this commodity “home”?  
Like all value production in capitalism, the production of the use value “home” involves 
mixing living with dead labor. In apartment rentals, a capitalist must enlist living labor 
(superintendents, plumbers, carpenters, administrative staff, security personnel, and so on) to 
valorize the dead (the building, materials used for renovation and upkeep, mops and garbage 
bags).  
In many cases, the capitalist firm producing home and selling it to tenants is a distinct 
legal entity from the landowner. Often today these firms are called “property management 
companies.” They supposedly collect “rent” from “tenants” for the landowner, but in terms of 
ground rent theory this is a mere appearance—in reality, the capitalist property management 
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company sells the commodity “home” monthly to people “renting” apartments. After this sale, 
the property management company pays ground rent to the landowner.  
Long-standing landowning companies (those companies over 40 years old, say) often act 
as both the capitalist and the landowner of residential property. For example, Trinity properties 
is one of the biggest high-end luxury apartment rental companies in San Francisco, founded in 
1949, and both owns and manages their properties. 
It is common  for high profile “financialized” residential landowners  to employ a 
subsidiary company to manage their properties; the companies remain legally distinct, but 
profits are mostly kept   in-house. For example, Veritas Investments—San Francisco’s biggest 
residential landowner—purchases high value residential property which is managed by their 
subsidiary Greentree Investment, while another subsidiary handles the leasing process.  
In other cases, small landowners owning one or several multi-family buildings contract 
with large national property management firms. All of these different configurations reveal 
different balances of class interests between landowners, capitalists, and proletarians.  
There are many forces and interests at work in the housing market. The existence of the 
capitalist tenants in the residential rentals market challenges Engels’ (1887) comment that: “In 
the housing question, we have two parties confronting each other: the tenant and the landlord or 
house owner.”  We actually have at least three: the landowner, the capitalist producer of the 
commodity home, and the consumer of that commodity (either working class or bourgeois). 
Sometimes a third party complicates the picture further: the lender, who can be either a 
mortgage-lender, a credit issuer, or an investor.  All of these parties have different interests, 
strengths, and weaknesses. 
Too often different kinds of rentals—agriculture, industrial, apartment rentals—are 
analyzed in isolation from one another leading to an inconsistent theory of rent. But once we 
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conceive of residential rents as involving capitalist production and working class consumption, 
we are able to connect urban residential rent and rent of land for agriculture, mining, and 
timber extraction. This framework allows us to consider absolute and differential rent of 
industry and agriculture as also pertaining to apartment buildings. We are now able to 
understand the conflict between capitalist and landowner imperatives in all of these sectors. 
Just as a soybean farmer rents farmland, an automobile producer rents industrial 
property, and a department store rents retail property, a property management company 
functionally “rents” residential property. In the United States, multifamily rental housing is 
considered one of four types of “commercial real estate.” In practice, residential real estate and 
non-residential commercial real estate are analyzed separately (as advocated by the IMF – see 
International Monetary Fund 2006). A developed ground rent theory should be applicable to all 
instances of landownership and ground rent extraction, while opening up a more rigorous 
analysis of the differences between these particulars.  
In Chapter 1, I analyzed the relationship between rent per acre and levels of tenancy in 
agricultural land in (Figure 1-3). The chart showed that higher rents correlated with higher 
levels of tenancy. We can also analyze the same relationship for urban residential rents, and find 




Figure 4-6  
Median Rent v. Percent of Units in Tenancy by Metropolitan Statistical Area, 
2015 
Today, many of the most recognizable names in residential rental markets are, in fact, 
property management companies which do not own the majority of the properties they manage: 
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property management company and self-proclaimed “Global Leader in Rental Housing,” only 
owns about 1/3 of the 480,000 units under its management. Additionally, many proletarian 
tenants erroneously believe their property management companies are their landlords– for 
example, over the course of many doors knocked during a recent campaign against the big 
speculative landowning company Veritas in San Francisco, I found that the majority of people 
believed their landlord was “Greentree,” which in fact was the property management company 
contracted by Veritas. And in a sense, these tenants are correct: their main interface is with 
Greentree, and most of the pressure points they have are with Greentree, not Veritas. However, 
for a full strategy for these tenants, they had to develop a clear understanding of the difference 
between the two companies and how to effectively struggle against them both. 
  There is a clear distinction between the landowner properly speaking (the owner of the 
title to the land) and the company that manages and runs a residential building   The latter must 
be understood as a capitalist company, one that pays rent to a landowner for the right to 
produce and reproduce the commodity home on the rented land. The property management 
buildings of residential properties are capitalist tenants.   
 
Residential Property Management in 20th Century US 
 Property management companies were neither so common nor so professionalized 
throughout the mid-20th century in the United States (Carucci Goss & Campbell, 2008). If they 
were productive capitalist companies, they were equivalent to at-home weavers, not to industrial 
linen factories. The property manager of the mid-century was closer to a superintendent than to 
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today’s major residential management companies like Greystar or Alliance Residential. This 
may be the reason that Property Management is often overlooked in the study of urban rentals.18  
Carucci Goss and Campbell (2008) argue that the role of the property manager moves 
from a pre-1930s “Owner Manager”, to a “Caretaker Manager” in the 30s, an “Emerging 
Professional Manager” in the 60s, a “Sales and Marketing Manager” in the 80s, and “Income 
Maximization Manager” in the 90s: 
In the early days of property management, caretaker managers would never have 
seen their property budgets. They would have been responsible for collecting the 
rent, making necessary repairs, paying the bills, and turning over the profits to 
the owner. Emerging professional managers would have been given a budget 
from the corporate office and expected to manage the property within the budget. 
The sales and marketing manager may have had some input into the budget, but 
would be expected to adhere to the budget while emphasizing resident retention. 
Today's income maximization managers prepare the budget for their properties 
in consultation with the corporate office so as to maximize the profit for the 
owner or stockholders. (Goss and Campbell, 2008, p. 17) 
Carucci Goss and Campbell (2008) attribute the ascent of the property management to 
the increasing complexity and difficulty of renting residential units. They argue that in the early 
20th century rental housing demand was high, and landlords had a relatively easy time filling 
vacancies and collecting adequate rents. Landlords could employ minimal management and still 
expect decent returns. As renting became more onerous, and especially during the economic 
downturn in the 80s, landowners turned to property management companies to ensure the 
 
18 Property Managers, for instance, are absent from David Harvey’s taxonomy of actors in the urban housing 




maintenance of profits. This timeline follows the narrative of financialization theory as well, in 
which the pre-1970s period in the US was a more pastoral landscape for capitalism, marred by 
increasing extraction at the onset of financialization/neoliberalism. 
However, corporate property management reared its head way before. As early as the 
late 19th century, realtors were already taking on full corporate property management roles 
(Davies, 1958, p. 39; Doucet & Weaver, 1991, p. 368). This coincided with a rise in 
financialization (see Chapter 5 on 19th century financialization). Where there were absentee 
landlords—and they have been common throughout the history of the US—there were often 
robust property management companies (Doucet & Weaver, 1991, p. 372).19  Absentee landlords 
in agriculture also meant widespread tenancy, which we can see from the first eastern colonies 
to the slave-holding south (Post, 2012; Woods, 1998). Large scale property management is not 
new to the 20th century; the fact that it is notably absent in urban residential rents during the 
mid-20th century indicates that 
something happened to reduce the 
market for property management.  
Rent prices went down every 
decade from 1914 to the late 1980s 
(Figure 4-7), even though vacancy 
rates were low for much of this 
period (Figure 4-8). If we understand 
property management as a branch of 
capitalist production, why would the 
residential rental sector be sheltered 
 
19 The correlation between property management and absentee landlords mirrors that between tenant farmers and 
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Figure 4-7  
Rent Cost Index, U. S. 1914-2020 
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from capitalist competition for profit rates during the postwar period? Why did landowners seek 
so little in rent, even given low vacancy rates?  
In fact, the mid-20th century was a backwards period for residential property 
management in the US because tax policy had turned residential buildings into attractive tax 
havens. If one purchases a building in order to shelter other income from taxes, one need not—
and cannot—squeeze too much revenue from that building in rents. Increased income from 
rents would defeat the purpose. There was little need for more income to be generated by 
property management companies through increased rents.     
The bulk of this tax evasion was enabled by increases in depreciation allowances 
(Samwick, 1995). In 1954, Congress published the 1954 Revenue Code which increased 
depreciation deductions for structures by enabling extra depreciation in early years of 
ownership. The government further liberalized depreciation regulations three times over the 
next 30 years, culminating in the early 80s when depreciation time dropped to 15 years with 
rapid depreciation in the first years of ownership. This meant that on a building worth $1 
million, not only could you write off almost $70,000 per year in depreciation (1/15th of $1 
million), you could claim accelerated depreciation for the first years of almost double that value.  
Figure 4-8 
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Rapid Depreciation Techniques:  DDB= double declining balance; DB = declining balance;  
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Reagan’s Tax Reform Act of 1986 closed several tax loopholes for landowners—in 
particular, the TRA1986 barred landowners from claiming accelerated depreciation on their 
properties and writing off “passive” losses.  
In 1991, Donald Trump told Congress the 1986 tax act was an “absolute catastrophe.” As 
a real estate investor at the time, it had deleterious effects on his industry (Eizenstat, 2017). 
Here we can see the landlord and capitalist class competing for government favor: Reagan was 
clearly interested in increasing the power of the capitalist class, and apparently willing to smite a 
blow to the landowning class in order to advance the interests of capitalists. Conversely, Trump 
as president has frequently made decisions that are unpopular for national and international 
capitalist class, but advantageous for a landowning class. 
For example, Trump has favored increased tariffs and nationalist economic policies, 
inciting and emboldening various “trade wars” with countries from which the U.S. generally 
imports. Landowners in the US, will find their ground rent streams secured and enhanced by 
policies which enforce local production, because this means that capitalist companies are forced 
to rent land domestically for production, assembly, and so on.  
Before the TRA 1986, the internal rate of return (IRR) on real estate investment using all 
the tax-sheltering techniques available was a handsome 21.88%. (This was for high income 
investors, who were the most common users of the tax shelter.) The bulk of this profit was the 
result of tax benefits on other investments, not from direct rental payments from the properties. 
After the TRA, this IRR dropped to 13.15%. The new regulations resulted in negative after-tax 
cash flows, requiring actual cash inputs during the years between purchase and sale (Samwick, 
1995, pp. 8, 30). Now, for the first time in decades, rental properties had to turn higher profits. 
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Sure enough, the 80s marked the reversal of rent’s long descent in real price (see Figure 
4-7). Residential rents began a slow increase in the 80s, coinciding with the rise in property 
management companies.  
The growth of REITs in the mid-90s (20 years after the legal form of the REIT was 
established in the US) can also be seen as a partial response to the TRA of 1986, since the reform 
made private real estate ownership via limited partnerships  less financially advantageous. 
“Again, the role of the property manager was elevated in importance because as public entities, 
REITs had to make public their financial information, and REIT stockholders expected a return 
on their investments. All of this required good management” (Carucci Goss & Campbell, 2008, 
p. 16). 
The property manager played a minor role in the years between 1930-1980 because there 
was less incentive to maximize profits in residential buildings. But in 1986 there was a rapid 
introduction of major property management companies into residential rentals alongside a 
growing imperative to extract higher ground rents. Residential landowners began to demand 
higher rents from their capitalist tenants, and small-scale property management was not up to 
the task.  
In effect, ground rent extraction became a lesser priority in residential rentals 
throughout the post-war period. The imperatives both of landowners to extract ground rent, and 
of capitalist to produce and sell monthly doses of “home” for a profit, were tempered 
substantially. 
During this period, however, mortgage lending expanded. In the 1830s, when the 
government tightened restrictions on large scale land purchases by big landowners, “only the 
business of lending money to squatters remained” (Gates 1942, 324). Similarly, here, money 
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flowed rapidly into mortgage lending, spurred by government policy. This time, however, the 
government explicitly invited investment into the mortgage market. 
 
Homeownership, 
Mortgages, Ground Rent 
During the post-war peak 
of residential tax havens, 
homeownership began to spike. 
While rents were declining, 
housing prices rose (Figure 4-
10). Rented housing units 
outnumbered owner-occupied 
homes until the late 1940s. After 
this, rentals continued to grow, 
but owner-occupied homes grew 
faster (Figure 4-9).    
Figure 4-9  
Occupied Housing Units by Tenure in U. S., 1900-
2000 
Source: Suchan et al., 2007, p. 234 
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The government incited much of this boom in homeownership through expanding and 
guaranteeing mortgage-lending for 
homeownership. The specter of 
communism made class 
compromise a necessity—at least 
between capitalists and the upper 
half of the white working class—and 
homeownership was central to this 
compromise. The FHA began 
backing mortgages in the 1930s, the 
VA in the 1940s, and in the 60s 
Johnson began a process resulting 
in the production of the modern 
mortgage-backed security. These securities widened the funding available for mortgages, while 
still insuring all investments with a US Government guarantee of payment (Quinn, 2019).  
Leftist scholarship generally marks the 1970s as a turning point. Both proponents and 
critics of financialization theory view the 60s and 70s as the end of a ‘golden age’ of strong 
working-class mobilizations and gains in the USA. Christophers writes that finance is “truly 
shackled” for the first and only time during the postwar period. Quinn argues that only in the 
1970s did the financial class “mobilize power… by taking advantage of political problems that 
had existed since the start of the nation… [and] through adjustments to a set of partnerships and 
credit supports that had long been active in the housing sector” (Quinn, 2019, p. 197). Wolfgang 
Streek called this period “the revolt of capital against the postwar mixed economy.” John Weeks 
points to the post-war moment as the achievement, by organized labor, of a kinder and gentler 
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Figure 4-10 
Housing Price Index v. Rent Cost Index 
U. S. 1914-2020 
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But why did capital only revolt against labor in the 70s? Why did finance’s shackles not 
loosen in the 50s?  It is wrong to assume that capitalists (and the finance sector in particular) 
were unhappy about the compromise with labor, because they benefited from it as well. 
However, by the 60s profitability had declined significantly, global competition was truly taking 
off, so both productive and finance capital had to maneuver in new ways to ensure their profit 
rates. Capital solicited, lobbied, and bullied the government for tax breaks (as it is wont to do) as 
it sought other ways to counteract falling profit rates (Gilmore, 1999, p. 177). The government 
proved willing to guarantee expanding amounts of mortgages, enabling ground rent extraction 
by another name.  
 
Figure 4-11 
Mortgage Debt Outstanding, U. S., 1949-2019 
 Mortgage lending was shunned by the market after the property market crash of the 
1920s. The US government guaranteed mortgage debt through the 50s and 60s, increasing 



















































































































































































































































Mortgage Debt Outstanding, 1949-2019
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US)
Adjusted to 1984 dollars using CPI
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arguments about the budget deficit forced the US to innovate techniques of unloading debt 
while continuing to unload some of the mortgage debt it was accumulating. This gave birth to 
the modern mortgage-backed security. First through Johnson’s failed Participation Certificate 
program in the 60s, and then through Fannie Mae’s “pass-through certificates,” the form of the 
mortgage-backed security took shape. In the latter, mortgage payments “passed through” Fannie 
Mae directly to holders of the certificates, and titles to the mortgages were placed in a special 
trust rather than continuing to be held by Fannie Mae. Both the return of the mortgage principal 
and the interest payments were guaranteed by the U.S. government, even though the debt was 
no longer on the books. 
The form of the MBS was forged in the government at the demand of private investors, 
but in 1983,  First Boston, Salomon Brothers, and Freddie Mac sorted the mortgages into 
“tranches” and began selling the now familiar type of tiered MBS.  The MBS market surged from 
$20 Billion in 1982 to $265 billion in 1986 (Quinn, 2019, p. 206).  
Mortgage lenders and holders of mortgage-backed securities became recipients of 
enormous flows of ground rent from privileged sectors of the working class. Owner-occupiers 
are the main buyers of 1-4 unit properties, and the main borrowers of mortgages by far (Figure 
4-11). This changed slightly during the subprime crisis – at which point mortgage debt for 1-4 
family homes drops significantly.  
Major landholders tend to be the main purchasers of multifamily and commercial 
property—and as we can see in Figure 4-11, they do not borrow so heavily from the mortgage 
market. Their financing comes either from investors (both public and private), by non-mortgage 
loans, and through saved liquidity.  
Many high-profile companies entering the residential rental market over the last 10 or 
20 years are highly leveraged—borrowing from banks at high interest rates—and/or raise cash 
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through investments to which they are beholden. As recently as 1990, rental housing was not 
particularly highly leveraged, and showed a “typical” debt to asset ratio of about 35%--less than 
the corporate sector’s 40%. (Gravelle, 2001, pp. 520–521). However, In 2000 (the last date for 
which this data is available) the debt to asset ratio for rentals leaped to about 58% (Census, 
Residential Finance Survey) while nonfinancial corporate debt dipped to about 30% (Federal 
Reserve Data).  
  
Residential Vacancies and Landownership 
While the landowning class tends to be tolerant of vacancy and willing to remove land 
from the market if they cannot receive their desired payments, property management 
companies—as capitalist companies—have little such financial flexibility. Large-scale property 
management companies tend to keep vacancies between 2 and 8 percent – a few percentage 
points lower than the average 6 to 10% (Andrews & Sisson, 2018). While landowners are 
beholden only to themselves, property management companies must pay rents to the landlord. 
If they fail, they jeopardize their own profit margin as well as their contract with the landowner. 
Once landowners have recouped their initial investment into land, they make little 
additional outlay in their properties. Property management companies, on the other hand, 
constantly advance capital in order to valorize it, and will always have to turn over a designated 
amount of rent to the landowner. Some institutional landlords, such as REITs, have investors 
who may sell stock if they are not profitable enough, leading to downturns in valuation and the 
inability to raise more capital through selling stock. There are also highly leveraged landowners 
who owe a large proportion of the prices of their properties to lenders. Such highly leveraged 
landowners forfeit the ultimate power of landownership: withholding land from the market.   
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The prevalence of residential vacancies, however, suggests that an ample amount of non-
leveraged landowners still exist. Nearly 10% of residential units nationally stand vacant—far 
more units than would be required to house all houseless people, as many homeless rights 
organizations have pointed out. Office vacancies are even higher at around 12% while industrial 
is somewhat lower, at around 6%.  
In a further substantiation of the theses argued here, Figure 4-12 shows that a rise in 
vacancies does not correspond with decline in rents. This deals a blow to mainstream analysts 
who argue unflinchingly that high rents are due to low inventory—a position popularized by the 
new “Yes in my back yard” (YIMBY) movement that claims that the solution to the homeless 
crisis is an increase any kind of housing, regardless of whether it is affordable to those with low 






Rent Index vs. Vacancy Rate 
1960-2018 
Even within Metropolitan 
areas, higher vacancies persist 
where rents are higher—San 
Francisco has higher vacancy rates 
than the greater Bay area while also 
being home to the highest rents 
(Figure4-13). 
 Vacancy also pervades 
agricultural land—up to 40% of the 
land grabbed in the “21st century land grabs” of the last two decades remains unused, often to 
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Figure 4-13 
Vacancies by Year Built and Unit Size, U. S. 2015 
Source: SF Housing Needs and Trends Report 2018 
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Private landownership in capitalism necessarily produces unused lands, often when and 
where they are most needed. Thus, “in all civilized countries a relatively significant portion of 
land always remains uncultivated” (Marx, 2015, p. 745).  
 
Housing has Volume Cycle not a Price Cycle 
A similar pattern exists in home sales: in housing slumps, rather than lowering prices to sell 
properties, homeowners take properties off the market and wait. Leamer (2007) finds that it is 
more accurate to analyze housing sales volume than housing sale prices, because when sales of 
housing slows down, prices do not tend to decline substantially – rather, sales volume declines, 
the amount of homes available on market declines, and with it, jobs in construction, real estate 
brokerage, etc., decline.(Leamer, 2007, p. 25). This distinguishes land as an asset from stocks 
and bonds; it can be dangerous to hold stocks during a downturn; they could lose value 
completely. Land, on the other hand, does not fold in on itself and descend back into the earth; 
it weathers its own price fluctuations stoically. 
Leamer (2007) finds evidence for the fact that landowners are willing and able to hold 
land if they are not being offered the price they want. This bears itself out in the fact that the 
housing market has “a volume cycle, not a price cycle.” Interestingly, Leamer says that 
compared to other landowners, banks do not sit on their assets, and that is why we saw a huge 
price plummet of land in 2008:  
Many homeowners exercised this attractive option [of getting rid of their negative 
equity] and turned over ownership to their lenders. Unlike traditional owners, banks are 
not reluctant sellers. On the contrary, they dumped properties on the market... What 
kind of sales prices do you think those units experienced? But even with this contrary 
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evidence, I stick with my view that housing experiences a volume cycle not a price cycle, 
and that 2007–09 was a never-to-be repeated exception. (Leamer, 2015, p. 48) 
The past decade has pushed more people into the position of holding titles to land that 
they cannot or will not “sit” on, either because they never wanted the land in the first place 
(banks getting properties through foreclosure) or because they are too highly leveraged. The 
latter case includes dynamics of “predatory equity,” as criticized by numerous NYC nonprofit 
housing organizations: buildings that are purchased with a high debt-to-income ratio such that 
the current rental income from the building could not support the mortgage payments 
(Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009). Such landlords do everything 
imaginable, legal and illegal, to evict tenants so they can impose phenomenal rent increases. 
Interestingly, it doesn’t always work, and tenants from Los Angeles to San Francisco to New 
York have organized effectively to halt or slow evictions, lower rents or fees, sometimes forcing 
the owner to sell because they cannot meet their promised debt payments. 
Capitalist into Landowner 
Is it better to be a capitalist or a landowner? This would seem likely to vary depending on the 
balance of class forces in a given period. However, over the last half century it seems more frequent that 
capitalists become landowners than vice versa.  
Three examples.  
The infamous start-up WeWork has attempted to insert itself in the process of renting 
commercial office space, as well as providing extensive hardware, software and other accoutrements to 
businesses. Effectively WeWork is a capitalist company selling office rental space, for it tends not to 
own any property, but rent in bulk and sublease it to businesses. Nonetheless, Wework is known as the 
biggest “commercial renter” in Manhattan, with 265,000 desks in 287 buildings (Wilhelm, 2018). They 
operate in 111 cities across the globe. WeWork claims their lack of landownership is one of their 
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defenses against a recession – WeWork can “stiff its landlords in an emergency” –  implying  an 
inherent antagonism between the company and landowners from whom they rent (Evans, 2019; 
Thompson, 2019). In this sense, WeWork functions as a capitalist company producing the commodity 
office space, and in class conflict with their landowners over rent.  
But the story continues: WeWork’s founder and CEO, Adam Neumann, has recently been 
excoriated in the business media for having taken out loans from WeWork to purchase properties which 
he then leased back to WeWork – sometimes on the same day he signed the purchase papers (Huet, 
2019). In the wake of this minor scandal, along with the dwindling venture capital available to WeWork 
as it continues to hemorrhage billions of dollars, Neumann has stated he is going to transfer some of 
these properties at cost to ARK, a new real estate investment fund developed by Neumann and others at 
WeWork with the purpose of investing in properties in which WeWork operates. ARK works with 
WeWork, is partially owned by WeWork umbrella group We. Co, but is an independent company.  
Landownership and capitalist enterprise each have different logics, necessities, and 
vulnerabilities. WeWork follows a trend in start-ups of being “asset-lite,” and so holds no real estate. 
This is a strategy for start-ups to grow quickly and outsource any large costs which would affect their 
bookkeeping negatively.  WeWork was lauded for raising large amounts of capital in early rounds of 
funding, partially based on this model. However, WeWork’s valuation has plummeted from $47 billion 
in early 2019, to a tentative $10 billion in September 2019. WeWork has yet to turn a profit, and 
potential investors do not have confidence it will hold its value. They have delayed their IPO 
indefinitely. 
ARK and Neumann, on the other hand, benefited from the liquid capital available to WeWork, 
using it to purchase property at negligible interest rates. If WeWork goes under, those properties 
remain. The tacit suspicion in the business media is that Neumann could be using WeWork investment 
funds as low-interest mortgage capital to build a real estate portfolio which will be insulated from the 
failure of the subleasing company WeWork 
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The McDonalds corporation is another example of profits from a capitalist company being 
channeled into real estate. McDonalds began purchasing the properties on which it operated early in its 
life as a successful fast food company. Over the years McDonalds has transitioned into being primarily 
franchise-run, with now 85% of McDonalds establishments run by independent operators and only 15% 
corporate-run. While most fast food companies profit from franchises through payments for special 
recipes, ingredients, and materials, McDonalds also collects ground rent from their franchises, which 
average about 22% of gross profits (Purdy, 2017).  As we all know, McDonalds franchises are located 
steps away from most major tourist destinations and landmarks across the world—from Times Square 
to Big Ben—and so the ground rents in these locations are extremely high. McDonalds also charges a 
“McDonalds rental premium” over and above the rent. 
 McDonalds shareholders have pressured the company to put its land into a publicly traded 
REIT, particularly in times of slow or negative growth. This would “unlock” at least $20 billion in value 
in US alone. However, the biggest argument against forming a REIT is that a REIT would not legally be 
able to charge the rental premium, losing this extra monopoly income.  
This rental premium is a savvy manipulation of rental contracts, which may best be understood 
through Harvey’s concept of monopoly rent. This is a different logic than the production and sale of 
food. McDonalds has gradually transitioned a significant portion of their company into the role of 
landowner. As such, they are in conflict with their capitalist franchise owners over the rental price. 
Collecting rent from franchises has allowed McDonalds to capture 9 to 15% of sales from their 
franchises, compared to 6 to 10% of other companies like Burger King, Taco Bell, and KFC (K. Taylor, 
2017). While it would be difficult to prove that McDonalds’ real estate holdings are a factor in its 
consistent victory over other fast food chains, it seems likely. 
 This  strategy has also been deployed successfully by more sympathetic business figures: Julian 
Richer, founder of the UK Hi-Fi  and TV Retail chain Richer Sounds, has been lauded in the media for 
giving away 60% of his company in shares to his employees, and also for weathering the incursion of 
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online purchasing platforms via strong business model and good employee benefits. His book Ethical 
Capitalism promotes ethical corporate practices as a route to business success.  
Richer rarely mentions that he began to purchase the properties in which he operated his 
businesses early in the 1970s. His stores are both immune to rent inflation, and have assets to leverage.  
Mr. Richer personally owns the freehold on 46 of his 52 shops, thus shielding the 
business from the rent rises imposed by UK commercial property landlords in recent 
years. “Our overheads are only 12 per cent of sales,” Mr Richer says. “We can’t find out 
Amazon’s costs in detail but we think they are broadly 10 to 12 per cent. But because we 
do such high volumes from such inexpensive stores and we are so efficient, it means that 
I’ve got much deeper pockets than most of my competitors. (Moules, 2013) 
Richer was apparently reticent to admit this in his own book, The Richer Way, in which he 
writes: 
When people ask how I can afford so many benefits for staff, I point out that 
Richer Sounds spends less than 1.5 per cent of its turnover on rent and rates. This 
compares with typically 10–20 per cent spent by the high-street multiples. 
So we can afford good wages and holiday homes because we’re not wasting 
money on property. … 
Keeping our overheads down by saving on property suits us very well. We invest 
in people, not buildings. It also conveys the right message to the customers. Our 
reputation is for selling good hi-fi at cheap prices and when customers see our 




In any case, it may be easier to palate giving away your company to your employees if you still 
collect rent on the store’s properties. Richer’s previous 100% ownership of Richer Sounds only 
accounted for half of his £160 million fortune. 
Many of the largest landowners today in the US made their fortunes first in capitalist enterprise. 
For example, the two largest landholders in the US and the world are Ted Turner, who began his 
ventures into real estate with a small fortune in an advertising company, and John Malone, whose 
family fortune comes from the communications industry. Low-leveraged land ownership provides 
insulation from fluctuations in sales and commodity prices, and requires relatively little investment 
year-on-year while continuing to provide basis for rent extraction. As capitalists transition into 
landownership, they offload the risk of the capitalist enterprise elsewhere (in the case of Neumann, to 
WeWork; of McDonalds, to the franchise owners; of Richer, to his employees).  
For a capitalist to become a landowner, or for a landowner to expand their holdings, they 
require cheap capital. Once they own low-leveraged land, not even economic recessions are troubling. 
Moreover, they need not be troubled in any way by engaging in the process of production. It is no 
wonder that successful capitalists transition into landownership. 
 
Why is the Rent so Damn High? Revisited: The Rent Gap and Beyond 
Above, we discussed the recent attrition of businesses from San Francisco as a result of 
high housing and commercial rents, indicating that rents may be reaching heights that become 
higher than is possible for people to pay. Residential rents in San Francisco are so high (and 
transportation to the city from lower-rent areas so costly) that few people who work for the 
relatively high city minimum wage (currently 15.59 USD per hour) can even afford to even share 
a room at prevailing rents. The average rental cost for a two bedroom apartment in San 
Francisco in 2019 was $4,630, which means that working a 40 hour week at minimum wage, 
130 
 
paying income tax, your total monthly income (roughly $2,195) would still be over a hundred 
dollars short of the average room rental. If you work full time and share a room, you still will be 
paying more than half your wages in rent. This is a generally untenable situation, leading to 
overcrowding of existing apartments on the one hand, and widespread abandonment of the city 
as workplace and living place by low income people on the other.  
The catastrophic rent increases in San Francisco over recent decades have led to a 
renewed surge of public argument about why rents are so high. There are two main camps in 
this debate: On the one hand, the free-market thinkers who argue that rents are too high 
because there is too much demand and not enough supply. These people, epitomized in the 
recent “YIMBY” movement (Yes-in-my-backyard – by which they mean, Yes to market rate 
housing in my backyard), passionately advocates for decreasing regulation on market-rate 
housing construction, arguing that if the free market were given reign to build as much market 
rate housing as they wanted, rents would level out. This camp pushed a bill in the California 
senate, SB50, which would force all municipalities in California to approve high rise market rate 
housing in the area of all major transit lines. The bill was opposed by many (including small 
municipalities who argued that they didn’t even have fire trucks who could reach a 6 story 
building, so they couldn’t approve the building of 6 story condominiums), and has failed 
multiple times in the senate, but is only one of myriad movements for similar initiatives 
throughout the state and country.  
The second camp is made up of social justice non-profits and activist organizations who 
fault improper regulation and enforcement of rent control law as the cause of the rising rents 
and dwindling affordable housing stock in San Francisco. They cite, for example, the explosion 
of “Ellis Act Evictions” that wreaked havoc on San Francisco’s rent controlled housing stock. The 
Ellis Act allows rent-controlled tenants to be evicted if the landowning company declares 
bankruptcy or that it is ceasing to be in the residential rental business—easy to do in the era of 
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endless subsidiaries. This position argues that the construction of market rate housing only 
makes the problem worse, and the solution to the housing crisis in San Francisco is tighter 
regulation, better rent control and the construction of more low-income housing. 
The debates raged with such heat between the two sides that in 2016 a San Franciscan 
tech autodidact named Eric Fischer dedicated some weeks of his life to studying the possible 
correlations between rent control, housing stock, and average rents in San Francisco. His work 
was reviewed and adjusted by Matt Tyler, a trained econometrician, and on a scrappy looking 
set of blogs we can find one of the only serious statistical attempts to understand the causes of 
rising rents in San Francisco (Fischer, 2016; Tyler, 2016).  
Fischer and Tyler found no support for either “side” of the housing debate: no significant 
correlation between low housing stock and rising rents, nor between the curtailing of rent 
control and rising rents. The only strong, significant correlation found was between average 
rents and average income.  
The relationship between average rents and average income has been surprisingly 
understudied in the academy. The lone academic text analyzing similar data is “Household 
expenditures, wages, rents” by Davis and Ortalo-Magné (2011). The authors find that rising 
housing costs are not substantively related to short housing supply or low vacancy. They find in 
general that average rental costs and average household income are correlated, but not 1:1. 
Income and rents increase together and decrease together, but not at the same rate. In fact, as 
income grows, rent grows faster: they find that if the income growth in a specific Metropolitan 
Statistical Area (MSA) outpaces average income growth in MSA by 1 percentage point, the 
average rental costs will outpace the average rental cost growth by 4.2 percentage points (Davis 
& Ortalo-Magné, 2011, p. 249). 
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This means that households of any income that reside in MSAs with high average 
household wages spend a higher percentage of their income on housing than those in low-
income MSAs. They conclude, “wages – not housing supply – determine the relative price of 
housing in San Francisco or any other high-priced area.” Further, “rental prices 
disproportionately reflect income differentials” (2011, p. 261). 
This leads them to suggest, from data drawn in 2009, that San Francisco is surprisingly 
cheap compared to Pittsburgh—meaning that the amount which income rose in San Francisco 
should have yielded higher average rents in San Francisco as compared to Pittsburgh. That was     
in 2009, we can assume from the vantage point of 2020 that San Francisco landowners 
proceeded to correct that error, raising average rents by about 25% since 2009. 
And this, of course, is a story of rent gaps (Smith, 1996). These rent gaps are created by 
rising average wages, rather than, for example, deteriorating housing stock. Rising average 
wages in a city like San Francisco mean that there is a potential to charge increasingly more for 
residential rentals.  
And wages sure did rise. Over the four years between 2013 and 2017 in the census tract I 
grew up in, median household income almost doubled from $64k to $113k. In San Francisco, the 
increase in wages has outstripped all other cities in the US, followed closely by adjacent counties 
such as Santa Clara. 
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The rub, of course, is that while 
some income is going up, other income 
is stagnating, increasing at very slow 
rates, declining, or evaporating 
altogether. Only certain segments of the 
population receive these high rising 
wages – tech workers, business owners 
and CEOs, etc. The rest experiences very 
minor wage growth, or none at all. But 
everyone has to deal with the same 
rising rents. 
 This correlation between 
income and rents coincides with the 
account we have given above of ground 
rent theory. In agriculture, if the profit 
of the capitalist farmers rises (relative to the average profit), the landowner raises rents. So, 
here, in residential properties, the profits of selling the commodity “home” on a monthly basis 
can rise steeply with rising household incomes. 
But here is an upper limit to rent hikes. Landlords cannot raise rent above what their 
tenants can pay. This gives us a slightly different picture of the housing crisis that is more 
politically complicated than a simple story about rent control: rents are rising because some 
people can pay them. That means that for some people, their income is rising to the extent that 
they can afford increasing rents. 
  What becomes important here is the bifurcation of wage earners: while some people’s 
income is increasing at a rate to keep pace with rising rents, a large group of people’s wages are 
Figure 4-14 




stagnating, falling, or rising far too slow to keep 
them housed (Figure 4-15). This is what Davis 
and Ortalo-Magné attempt to highlight by 
saying that households that live in high-income 
MSAs, whether or not they are themselves high 
income, end up paying a higher and higher 
percentage of their wages in rents. 
If your income is $120k (starting salary 
for a software engineer at Twitter), you may be 
annoyed but not devastated about your rent 
rising from $3,000 (30% of your income) to 
$4,000 (40% of your income). You are 
technically debt burdened, but you still have 
$6000/mo left after paying rent.  However, if 
your income is $34k (yearly salary working at 
SF minimum wage of $15.59) and you lose your rent-controlled room that you’ve been paying 
$800/mo for (30% of your income), and the only rentals on the market start at 3,000 (105% of 
your income), you better leave the city or buy a tent.  
If you are one of many old or differently abled people on Social Security and you are 
receiving the state maximum amount of $943.72, and you lose your $600/mo. rent-controlled 
apartment you’ve had since the 80s, you are in even more dire straits. 
For such renters who can afford a maximum of about $650 monthly rent—which 
includes single parents working part time along with elderly and differently abled—there are 
effectively zero options other than homelessness. The homelessness population in San Francisco 
is made up of an enormous amount of people had stable housing in the city up until quite 
Figure 4-15 
Widening Income Gap, Bay Area 
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recently, but lost their low rent apartments. When they were displaced, there was simply 
nowhere for them to rent in San Francisco, but they also cannot easily move because (a) they 
receive all their services in SF, and (b) there is nowhere within 100 – maybe 200 – miles that 




 : Financialization 
 
 Critiques of “gentrification” in the 90s and 2000s have given way in recent years to 
critiques of the “financialization of housing” (Aalbers, 2008, 2016; August & Walks, 2018; Brais, 
2018; Fernandez & Aalbers, 2016; Fields, 2015; Fields & Uffer, 2016; Gotham, 2009; Marcuse & 
Madden, 2016; Pereira, 2017; Rolnik, 2013; Romainville, 2017; Wijburg et al., 2018; Wijburg & 
Aalbers, 2017). Scholarly opposition to “21st Century Land Grabs” in the early 2000s has 
likewise given way to a critique of the “financialization of agricultural land” (Cotula, 2012; 
Daniel, 2012; Fairbairn, 2014; Ferrando, 2017; Gunnoe, 2014; Magnan, 2015; Sippel et al., 
2017).  
The concepts of the “financialization of housing” and the “financialization of land”  are 
intended to mark an epochal shift from previous land relations, resulting from deregulation in 
financial markets as well as the withdrawal of the state from housing provision and subsidies to 
small farmers. This literature of the financialization of land and housing (FLH) leans on the 
general theory of financialization epitomized in the work of Krippner (2005), Lapavitsas (2013), 
and Epstein (2001, 2005). Like the broader financialization literature, FLH literature 
consistently describes financialized landownership as particularly pernicious in comparison to 
non-financialized land-based accumulation (August & Walks, 2018; Fields & Uffer, 2016; 
Gunnoe, 2014), and recommends stronger regulations on financial flows into landownership as 
a solution to these ills. 
There have been some important shifts in capital accumulation through land in the last 
40 years that have been well documented and analyzed by FLH literature. As discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, when ground rent or sale price of land is rising, it becomes possible to make 
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“fast money” from the growing rent gaps. This can involve financing, debt-leveraging, and 
securitizing—not because parasitic financialized imperatives have taken over the economy, but 
because this is the way you make the most fast money from rising land values. 
This fast land money contrasts with the common long-term orientation of landowners. 
Speculative land buyers in a hot housing market may purchase rental property at an extremely 
high debt-to-equity ratio, evict half the low-rent tenants, and triple rents. They often have to 
increase rental income vin order to pay back investors and lenders. 
Long-term landowners, on the other hand, might also buy property—though at a lower 
debt to asset ratio—evict half the low-rent tenants, and triple rents. The difference is, they do not 
have creditors to answer to. The obligations of the speculative land buyer to their lenders can 
lead to increasingly egregious treatment of tenants, or it can lead to weaknesses (exploitable by 
the tenants) that result in eventual sale of the property. 
The ebb and flow of high-debt and low-debt land purchases is nothing new; Debt-
leveraged land purchases, securitized rent flows, and risk-assessing investors have been 
prevalent since at least the 18th century (Frehen et al., 2014; Gates, 1942); displacement and 
land-based violence have been the norm rather than exception throughout capitalism. 
 Many scholars have criticized the epochal theory of financialization on which FLH theory 
is based. However, these criticisms have not been brought to FLH literature. Below, I summarize 
the epochal theory of financialization as well as the most salient criticisms levied against it. 
 I advocate a longue-durée approach to analyzing financial cycles. I provide an overview 
of the ways in which the epochal theory of financialization distorts the analysis of land and 
housing dynamics. Literature critiquing the financialization of land and housing villainizes 
“financial” landowners over more benevolent ones and displaces genuine inquiry into the deeper 
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causes of rising rents, rising homelessness, widespread dispossession of indigenous land across 
the world, and other forms of violent displacement.  
 
The Epochal Theory of Financializaiton 
“Financialization” in the current literature refers to a specific period of capitalism, 
beginning roughly in the 1970s, during which “financial” motives, markets, actors and 
institutions take up an increasingly large role in the economy; patterns of accumulation shift 
away from production and towards the realization of financial profits, and finance often moves 
outside the properly “financial” sector into other economic spheres (Aalbers, 2015, p. 217; G. 
Epstein, 2001, p. 1; G. A. Epstein, 2005, p. 3; Krippner, 2005, pp. 174, 181; Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 
3). On these accounts, financialization consists in a proportional increase of things financial 
over things non-financial, and this quantitative shift leads to a “structural transformation of 
contemporary capitalism” (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 3); a “novel pattern of accumulation” or 
“structural shift” in the US economy (Krippner, 2005, pp. 189, 193); even an “epochal” or 
“systemic” transformation of the global capitalist economy (Gunnoe, 2014; Lapavitsas, 2012, p. 
484). This shift imposes heightened levels of competition upon capital, resulting in, amongst 
other things, a heightened disciplining of labor globally (R. Martin et al., 2008). I will refer to 
these as “epochal” theories of financialization. 
Krippner (2005, 2012) and Lapavitsas (Lapavitsas, 2013) have provided some of the 
most concrete empirical work proving the existence of a period of “financialization,” to which 
many subsequent adherents refer. They “prove” financialization with data showing the growth of 
total financial assets as percentage of GDP (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 205), growth in value added in 
FIRE sector as percentage of total value added (Lapavitsas, 2013, p. 211), or financial profits as 
proportion of total profits (Krippner, 2005, p. 189; Lapavitsas, 2012, pp. 214–216). Lapavitsas 
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and Krippner both also emphasize the increase in proportion of financial profits to non-financial 
profits in non-financial corporations (e.g. Krippner, 2005, p. 185) and regularly remind us that 
“Accumulation is now occurring increasingly through financial channels” (Krippner, 2005, p. 
199). Krippner’s account is limited to the United States; Lapavitsas’ includes US, Western 
Europe, and Japan. 
These epochal theories of financialization have been criticized from several perspectives 
and disciplines, finding three central issues: First, the epochal theory of financialization is 
marred by a temporal and geographical myopia by focusing primarily on the US and UK (and 
sometimes greater Western Europe, Japan, and Australia) from the 1940s to today 
(Christophers, 2015; Poovey, 2015). Data from 5 or 6 countries cannot yield a global theory; data 
beginning in the 1950s cannot accurately assess whether our current period is without 
precedent. 
Second, epochal financialization literature locates the cause of financialization in the 
period of deregulation starting in the 70s, and epitomized in the 80s by Thatcherism and 
Reaganomics. If deregulation is the proximate cause, then the prophylactic for financialization is 
increased financial regulation, and/or popular control over financial institutions (Gotham, 
2009; Lapavitsas, 2013; Norfield, 2014). However, the deregulation of financial markets itself 
was a response to a problem of investors seeking returns that their post-war investments were 
not providing; profits rates were declining substantially starting in the 1960s. If deregulation 
had not occurred to widen investment opportunities domestically, investors would have found 
somewhere else to go—overseas, if necessary, causing the recession in the USA to hit earlier than 
it did (Kliman, 2011, pp. 191–193). 
Third, theories of financialization conflate interest-bearing capital (IBC), fictitious 
capital, and ground rent all as “finance.” These financial forms of accumulation are juxtaposed 
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to productive forms. Financial violence is presented as worse than non-financial violence, and a 
“productive” capitalism is treated as more benevolent and desirable than a financialized one.  
Epochal financialization literature begins its analysis in the 1940s (or later). This is not a 
result of reasoned assessment, but of limits imposed by the data; Poovery (2015) and 
Christophers (2015) have pointed out this coincides with the beginning of comprehensive 
national income accounts in the USA, developed after the depression in 1947. Only after this was 
it possible to analyze, with government data, the percentage of national wealth that financial 
activities represented. In the 1950s finance was disaggregated from adjacent sources of income 
in the calculation of GDP, and not until the 60’s did “flow of funds” accounts become part of the 
national accounting system, which makes it even easier to see the role of finance (Poovey, 2015, 
pp. 220–221). Krippner and Lapavitsas both acknowledge the lack of data before 1940, but they 
do not allow this lack to destabilize their conclusions about financializations’ epochal nature.  
In recent years, researchers have attempted to project economic data about financial 
indicators back beyond the birth of national accounts. Many have found that there is reason to 
believe levels of financialization were spiking in the late 19th into the early 20th century. In 
Figure 5-1 below from Philippon (2011), finance industry as share of US GDP experiences a huge 
spike prior to WWII that reaches levels not seen again till 1990. In Figure 5-2, Jordà et al. (2014, 
p. 115) have analyzed domestic bank lending data from 1870 to 2012, finding significant booms 
in 1910s and 1930s, and hinting that numbers for the 1800s would be significantly higher if it  
the data included mortgage debt held outside banks, which was common especially in the case of 






GDP Share of U. S. Financial Industry, 1860-2010 




Figure 5-2   
Bank Credit to the Domestic Economy, 1870-2013 
Source: Jordà et al., 2014, p. 115 
In both charts, he ascent of “finance” is just as rapid before the two world wars as it is 
afterward The line becomes steeper in the 80s, right at the time financial indicators catch up 
with where they were before the World Wars. Ostensibly what investable liquidity existed during 
the wartime period was either wiped out or found profitable returns in wartime production. 
During the world wars, the capitalist economy experienced extensive destruction of value, which 
sets the stage for increased profit rates in productive industries at the war’s end (Kliman, 2011). 
So began the “golden age” in the US economy, when wages rose. But it didn’t last long – 
by most metrics, the affluent post war era wore itself out by the mid-60s. US began to lose its 
global position of dominance in manufacture, labor productivity declined and the trade surplus 
began to reverse itself. “While it was not entirely clear at the time, the mid- 1960s was the 
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starting point of a painful and protracted transformation of the political economy” (Quinn, 2019, 
p. 182). 
The affluence of the post-war period was hard-won by working class movements, often    
rooted in the radicalizing experience of the great depression. But the depths of the depression in 
the 1930s   brought value destruction that was far more severe than capitalist advocates at the 
time anticipated.  As a crisis loomed again in the 1970s, officials were willing to do what it took 
to avoid a similar downturn and consequent 
massive destruction of value. The weapons of 
choice were then (as they are now during COVID-
19 epidemic) monetary and fiscal policy.  
Profit rates declined in the US from 1947 
to the mid 1970s, threatening a crisis. Declining 
profitability was offset by “capital’s successful tax 
revolts, fought out in federal and state 
legislatures” (Gilmore, 1999, p. 177) (see Figure 5-3).  
All this accompanied the resumption of the steep acceleration in debt/GDP ratios and 
GDP share of the financial industry that preceded the wars (Figures 5-1 and 5-2). We might 
surmise that without the interventions of the great depression and the two world wars, the 
acceleration of financialization would have continued along the path it outlined from 1880 to 
1910.  
All this to say—"financializaiton” is nothing new. In the mid 19th century Marx pointed to 
an array of methods (we might say “financial technologies”) of lending and debt creation as well 
as ”special credit instruments” (Marx, 2015, pp. 504, 508); Arrighi (1994) famously cited four 
major waves of financial expansion over the last 600 years. Bordo (2008) writes that financial 
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innovation is a “centuries old phenomenon,” and points out that the very purpose of new 
financial instruments is to “avoid regulation” (pp. 6-7). Previous waves of financial frenzy, all 
emerging from declining profit rates in the economy at large, have come to a close in a major 
war inciting widespread destruction of value.  
Christophers (2015) writes that “Only from the mid-1930s to the mid-1970s, in the 
leading Western industrialized nations, was finance truly shackled.” But Capital is adept at 
evading any shackles put upon it; the fact that it tolerated financial regulation was evidence that 
profits were being made despite the regulations. 
 This period is also characterized by an unprecedented expansion of public housing to 
which today’s dwindling public housing stock is often compared. From the perspective of 200 
years, the 20th century postwar period appears more anomalous than the period of 
“financialization” which follows it; financialization of the late 20th century appears as a reversion 
to the norm of secular increase in finance. An even longer analysis suggests cyclical patterns of 
peaks and troughs—and other moments of working class strength that become subverted as 
profit rates decline. 
 
Global Financialization in the Longue-Duree: Cycles of Finance, Financial 
Imperialism, and Surplus Liquidity 
A coherent theory of financialization – defined as the increase of profits made through 
IBC and Fictitious capital relative to profits made in production, accompanied by an increase in 
the power of financial and financializing firms and their associated governments – requires 
three elements: (1) a long term perspective, in order to avoid imposing qualitative breaks where 
there are cyclical patterns; (2) a global perspective, in order to avoid modeling a theory of 
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“global” capitalism on the economies of the hegemon(s); (3) an understanding of compound 
growth, surplus liquidity, and the effects of falling profit rates in spurring innovation in finance. 
Giovanni Arrighi’s (1994) analysis of capitalism in the “longue-durée” contrasts 
dramatically with financialization theory. Arrighi outlines the rise and decline of capitalist 
hegemons over almost a millennium. During this time, every major capitalist empire has 
experienced a shift from production-based capital domination to finance-based or 
“financialized” economic dominance. Declining “financialized” empires often lend money to 
assist in the rise of what becomes their successor. The process of financialization – in Italian 
City-States, the Netherlands, England, and now the US – is cyclical, and tied to a specific region 
and national economy. 







Some Early-American Series on Land Values per Acre, 1642-1805  






The Purchase-value and Rent on U. S. Farmland, 1805-1986 






Real Home Price Indexes for the U. S. , Amsterdam, and Norway 
 Source: Shiller, 2006 
 
Tony Norfield (2017) offers a different but complementary account of the financial 
ascendance of the UK and US that he broadly names financial imperialism. On his account, the 
increase in financial profits that is observable in the US and UK is not the result of a global shift 
from production to finance; first world finance is, rather, a means of extracting value from 
productive countries with less political, military, and financial power and resources. This 
implies that while we can track metrics of financialization in dominant countries like the US, 
Western Europe, and Japan, there is not a global decline in production. 
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For example, in the early 2000s average growth rates in “developing countries” reached 
over 7% per year, while “advanced economies” averaged about 2.7% (Ocampo et al, 2010). At the 
same time, foreign investment in these countries from the global north ballooned from an 
average of 200 billion in the 90s to an average of about 700 billion from 2003 to the present. 
Such investment is both financial investment and direct investment, both of which skim profits 
from ostensibly productive industry in the global south (Tyson & McKinley, n.d., pp. 18–20) 
Financialization is cyclical, and ebbs and flows over the history of capitalism. One 
country’s financial profits are often another country’s productive ones. Declining profit rates are 
a siren’s song for financialization. These are the tenets of a non-epochal, longue-duree theory of 
financialization. 
 
Financialization of Land and Housing Literature 
FLH literature emphasizes two key shifts: a shift of the agents of land-based 
accumulation, and a shift in the imperatives and strategies of those agents. In the era of 
financialized land and housing relations, “mom and pop” or “local, independent” landlords and 
“family farms” are bought out by “financial” actors such as publicly traded national or 
multinational investment firms, private equity firms, hedge funds, and Real Estate Investment 
Trusts. While the mom and pop landlords and family farms were supposedly content to draw 
regular (or gradually increasing) rents from the land they owned, the new financialized 
landowners expect either large returns on their investments through the quick resale of land at 
higher prices (“flipping”), or quickly increasing regular returns through constant rise in rents 
and fees. Financialized landlords frequently evict or push out current residents (legally or 
illegally) in order to achieve their expected returns. According to these studies, these 
financialized imperatives result in increasingly violent forms of dispossession and displacement. 
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Our goal must not be a return to “less-financialized” landownership. Landowners who 
precede the supposed epoch of financialization were no angels: “local landowners” in NYC set 
fire to the Bronx in the 1960s; racist FHA lending policy led to the explosion of white “mom and 
pop” ownership of rental property; the massacre of Indigenous American peoples (often at the 
hands of “small family farmers”) cleared land for “small family farms,” while African slavery and 
the refusal to enact reparations was over and again the condition for increases in “local” white 
landownership. 
The emphasis on financialization of land and housing can too easily result in nostalgia 
for productive or small-scale capitalism. But small scale capitalism, by its own logic, always 
increases in scale; the success of local productive industry in a given economy generally gives 
way, over time, to financialized economies. We cannot hope to arrest capitalism at any specific 
stage. 
At the same time as FLH scholarship poses the question of land and housing, it 
simultaneously obscures any analysis of the specific social relations of land by subsuming them 
into larger question of financialization; in this way, any understanding of the specificity of land 
markets and land struggle is lost. For example, FLH theory emphasizes that the economics of 
land relations are subsumed, through the financialization of land and housing, into a larger logic 
of finance capital, and so the concept of “ground rent” is discarded in favor of “economic rent” or 
rent-in-general, and any analysis of the “landowning class” is subsumed by a critique of the 
parasitic “rentier.”   
An acute example of this conflicted position on rents occurs in ““Value Grabbing”: A 
Political Ecology of Rent” by Andreucci, García-Lamarca, Wedekind, and Swyngedouw (2017).In 
this essay, the authors insist that the concept of “rent” should refer to all interest-bearing assets 
(which would then include all credit, bonds and stocks), but every case study they use to 
substantiate their arguments are struggles over land. Their rentier analysis prevents them from 
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looking at struggles around land as struggles around land, and instead abstracts these as 
struggles over “rents” in general. Their conceptual apparatus draws them away from land at the 
same time as their concrete examples pull them back to the land. This pulling away from land 
and ground rent theory while simultaneously pointing toward it is surprisingly common in 
recent critical scholarship on the FLH (See also: Pereira 2017, p607; Ward and Aalbers, 2016, 
p1780; Gunnoe 2014).  
The Big Bad Wolf gobbles Mom and Pop? 
The shape that finance takes in many generic and finance-themed land rush accounts 
alike is that of a big bad wolf who is hungry for farmland. (Ouma, 2014, p. 163) 
 
In the case of urban rental housing, we are told by FLH literature that a “new breed” of 
landlord has come onto the scene in the last 30 years, which “treats” housing as a financial asset. 
These new “financialized landlords” or “global corporate landlords” (Beswick et al., 2016) are 
global investors which may take the form of a real estate investment trust (REIT), a private 
equity fund, financial asset management firm, or other investment vehicle (Abood, 2017, p. 16; 
August & Walks, 2018, p. 124; Wyly et al., 2009) These financialized landlords buy up rental 
properties from the previous generation of landlords who are described as “local real estate 
operators,” “local, independent landlords,” or, most sentimentally, “mom and pop” landlords 
(Aalbers, 2016; Abood, 2017; August & Walks, 2018, p. 124; Fields & Uffer, 2016, pp. 1489, 
1492–1493; Teresa, 2016, p. 2). Substantial media reporting also chronicles the rise of the new 
“Wall Street Landlord” into both housing and farmland (Dezember, 2016; Doering, 2015; Gara, 
2015; Philpott, 2014; Richter, 2017). 
There are four different factors used by scholars to distinguish financialized landowners 
from non-financialized landowners: size (how many units or properties are owned); legal status 
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(a corporation or an individual); behavior (do they flip properties or hold them; do they raise 
rents steeply or moderately); geography (are they local, national, global); and investment 
structure (are they self-financed, do they hold mortgages and if so how big are they; do they 
have investors and if so who are they).   
But these different factors do not always line up the way we might expect. While it is 
generally assumed that a small, individual or family landlord would be the most benevolent, 
these were the types of people who engaged in some of the most vicious “flipping” during the 
subprime crisis (Yelen, 2017); likewise, the “slumlord” of the mid-century inner-city was often a 
locally based and locally-financed entrepreneur. On the other side of the coin, some enormous, 
national, publicly traded LLCs in the US maintain properties in the long-term, raise rents only 
modestly, and do not make a habit of eviction or harassment. 
The mom-and-pop landowner is an important ideological tool in the US, alongside the 
family farmer. In much publicly-produced information on who owns residential rental 
properties in the United States, the data is constructed to emphasize the Individual Owner of 
rental stock.20 We should be wary when they factor so prominently in critiques of the 
financialization of housing and agriculture. 
Most FLH literature focuses on a few case studies, and does not analyze shifts in 
ownership in large data samples. However, there is not good data on who owns residential 
rental properties in the US—a fact bemoaned by the Acting General Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Policy Development and Research at HUD (The US Department for Housing and Urban 
 
20 The 1991 Census Buerau’s Statistical Brief on “Who Owns the Nation’s Rental Properties?” States in the first 
sentence that Individuals own 92% of rental properties. However, those properties could all have 1 or 2 units on them, 
leaving Institutional investors actually owning the majority of units. Still in 2017, Harvard’s Housing Report 
emphasizes that individuals own 74% of rental properties, while including but de-emphasizing the fact that they only 
own 48% of rental units. 
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Development) who commented, for example, that “In an interesting data shortfall, researchers 
don’t know the precise number of landlords in the United States” (Richardson, n.d.).  
We know that business owned units have grown faster than individual owned rental 
units over the last 25 years (Figure 5-7). We know the debt-equity ratio increased across the 
board for residential rental units from the 60s to 2010, after which it began to fall (Figure 5-8). 
We know that some units are purchased by highly-leveraged investment entities (Figure 5-9) but 
that REITS own a small fraction of rentals. 
 What is missing is integral research into who owns residential properties in the US. 
 
Figure 5-7 































Who Owns Residential Rental Units in USA?
Source: US Census Bureau, Rental Housing Finance Survey and American Housing survey





Debt to Equity Ratio % for Rental Properties by Year Purchased 





Anatomy of a Deal: Private Equity Threatens Affordable Housing 
Source: (Association for Neighborhood and Housing Development, 2009) 
 
The many death knells of the Family Farm. 
A slew of papers have recently analyzed the “small but rapidly growing phenomenon” of 
private sector financial investment in agricultural land (High Quest Partners, 2010).  As these 
texts have it, “the financial sector is taking an interest in farmland as never before” (Philpott, 
2014). In a thorough analysis published by the Oakland Institute in 2009, Ross chronicles the 
“speculative mania” that the financial sector has “recently” generated for California farmland (p. 
3). Fairbairn (2014), heavily cited by Ross, marks 2007 as the year in which farmland shifted 
from an “investment back-water” at the turn of the 21st Century, into a “desirable alternative 
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asset class” (p. 777-778). Gunnoe (2014) writes that “we are witnessing an unprecedented 
integration between finance capital and landownership” (p. 478). The victims of this are the 
“family farm” or supposedly small local businesses (Fairbairn, 2014; Gunnoe, 2014; High Quest 
Partners, 2010). 
Both Ross and Fairbairn caution against financialized investment into farmland, arguing 
that it could “put upward pressure on land prices and make it even harder for young and 
beginning farmers to become owners,” thereby creating “long-term trends threatening our 
agricultural heritage” (Ross, 2009, p. 3). The Oakland Institute Report concludes by saying 
If more is not done to protect family farmers and ensure they have reliable access to land, 
then the recent spate of land grabs across the US could literally change who owns the 
country in the decades ahead. The dangers of this trend, in both the short- and long-
term, cannot be overstated. (p. 21) 
This is not the first time the incursion of finance into agricultural land has raised fears. 
In 1983, Colton (1983) warned of the impending “substitution of family farm corporations for 
individual farmer/operators and the aggregation of farm ownership and operation into larger 
corporate conglomerates.” Colton argued that this presented a threat to “The structure of mid-
American's rural ‘way of life’… predicated upon the family farm as a basic social and economic 
unit.”  
A decade earlier, in 1971, The Ralph Nader Task Force published an exhaustive report 
entitled Power and Land in California which also claimed to chronicle a “recent” phenomenon: 
“Entities now pouring vast new resources into California land speculation: professional groups, 
conglomerates with vast political power, and the financial industry” (Fellmeth, 1971). They 
emphasize the important “new” trend in which “The Financial industry (banks, savings and loan 
associations and some insurance firms) is enormously involved in land development” (p. I-32).  
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A century and a half before that, the financializaiton of agricultural land (by another 
name) was denounced by President Jackson (see Chapter 4). 
If the financialization of farmland is denounced in the 1830s, called “new” in 1971, “new” 
in 1983, and “new” again in 2017, we should be wary of the notion.  
Clyde Woods (1998) notes the common phenomenon of “absentee planters” in 
antebellum Mississippi due to “high levels of capitalization and indebtedness” which means that 
it was only the extremely capital-rich landowners, often living abroad, who could afford the land 
(Woods, 1998, p. 47). Financing practices on slave plantations also transformed as land prices 
rose, growing closer to the picture often painted of “financialized landownership”: “Now 
planters were able to finance production by mortgaging the land instead of providing cotton 
merchants with a crop lien” (Woods, 1998, p. 77).  
In the year 1934, a date marking a halfway point between financialized land of slave 
plantations and financialized agriculture today, Woods writes that an estimated 30% of all 
southern cotton land was held by life insurance companies and banks (p. 122) – entities we 
might today call “financialized landowners.” 
The recent uproar about the “financialization” of farmland and timberland in the United 
States emerged to amend and augment the ballooning literature describing “21st century land 
grabs” which were understood to occur generally in “underdeveloped” countries, often countries 
in which agriculture occupied a prime position in the economy. The Financial Times chronicled, 
for example, land grabs in Ethiopia and Myanmar in 2016 as part of a series entitled “The great 
land rush,” the summary of which reads: 
Across continents, big investors are pouring in billions into one of the world’s most 
precious resources – land. They promise progress. But their arrival can upend livelihoods 
and spark life-and-death struggles. (Burgis, 2016) 
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The media reports on the global land grab exploded after the food crisis of 2007/8 
sparked global attention to farmland.21 The studies on the financialization of agriculture and 
timberland in the U.S. were intended to show that here too, in the “developed” United States, 
financialized interests are setting their sights on agricultural land. 
But U.S. land that is being “financialized” is land already used to produce goods for the 
market; the bulk of land “grabbed” in the global south is land used primarily for subsistence 
(farming, hunting, gathering, grazing, etc.).22 These are two categorically distinct moments: on 
the one hand, the integration of new land into the global capitalist system, mirroring original 
accumulation—on the other hand, the transfer of value-producing agricultural land from one set 
of hands to another. These two moments are collapsed in the villainization of the 
“financialization of agricultural land.” 
In the US and Australia, most major land purchases involve the sale of land by one large 
corporation to another larger corporation.  (Fairbairn, 2014; Sippel et al., 2017). In the 
developing world, it is more common for appropriated land to be without title (though not 
unused) and uncultivated by capitalist standards (though not by local standards). In these cases, 
land as yet unmortgaged becomes mortgaged; rent that’s never been securitized becomes 
securitized; land not yet privatized and titled is become privatized and titled (or “enclosed”). 
The critique absorbs the act of enclosure (the new incursion of capital into land) into the 
act of upselling (the buying out of small capitalist farmers and landowners by larger ones). In 
doing so, it emphasizes the conflict between landlord and capitalist farmer (however “Local” and 
family-oriented) over the class conflict between landowner and proletarian (for lack of a better 
word). 
 
21 For an exhaustive review of both media and institutional reports of the “land grab” of last 20 years, see Cotula 
(2012). 
22 Or, land that is not “used” yet, at all, by humans, but for the lighter touch of nomadic peoples. 
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Further, this critique shuts down an analysis of resistant and militant forms of land 
relations which are attacked by new enclosures. 
“Financialization of Land and Housing” and Racial Capitalism 
FLH scholarship can be appreciated for acknowledging and analyzing the way that the 
“financialization of land and housing” intensifies a global color line in which racialized and 
indigenous groups are dispossessed and displaced. In the US, social relations of land in capital 
are always racializing. The racist violence of, for example, the subprime crisis was but a new 
iteration of racializing and particularly anti-Black federally-supported policy and practice 
(Dymski, 2009, p. 152; Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, 2019). This means that even during the post-
war period of relatively low financialized activity, the low ebb of “predatory finance” and the 
supposed reign of “mom and pop” landlords and “family farming,” the beneficiaries were 
disproportionately white people and communities. 
Financialization is not the culprit of racial disparities in homeownership and 
landownership.  Recently the mainstream news issued a flurry of reports arguing that “Black 
Homeownership Drops to an All-Time Low” (Kusisto, 2019) after recent data released from the 
census showing that Black homeownership had dropped from a peak of 50% (in 2004) to less 
than 41% (in 2019). However, this drop actually returns Black homeownership to its levels 
before the Fair Housing legislation of 1968, meaning that both the gains and the losses in 
homeownership occurred during the so-called period of the “financialization of housing.” In 
terms of rural land, the amount of southern farmland owned by Black people declined by 80% 
between 1900 and 1970—all prior to the so-called “financialization of farmland” (McDougall, 
1984).  
The lauded renter protections of rent stabilization and vacancy control currently 
represents the most radical horizon of “progressive” housing activism [COVID19 EDIT: this no 
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longer true, now “CANCEL RENT” is the call, which is an excellent change]. FLH literature 
criticizes financialized landowners for subverting and steamrolling such regulations. However, 
rent regulations have been far less effective in protecting long-term stable housing and 
community continuity for Black and Brown people (Conley, 2018). This is true even though the 
most militant tenant struggles have often been waged by Black and brown people, and women 
and LGBTQ people within those groups. 
FLH literature runs the risk of idealizing all things non-financialized. It is essential to 
recognize that even in the quiet decades of financialization of land, racialized expropriation, 
displacement, and destabilization were still the norm. 
Gunnoe (2014), for example, criticizes the financialization of timberland while valorizing 
a sector that has devastated Indigenous communities and their environs for centuries. He 
describes how the US timber industry has historically dealt with the need for enormous amounts 
of timber required in order to maintain this capital-intensive production  The 19th Century found 
companies “exhausting timber supplies” as they moved west “in search of virgin forest” (p. 490). 
Gunnoe describes as a “hostile takeover” in the 1980s of the major timber firms by high 
finance.23 The companies’ land was liquidated and sold to TIMOs (Timberland Investment 
Management Organizations), which usually manage land for institutional investor clients, and 
REITs specializing in timberland, which both own and manage the land.  
Gunnoe suggests that the slide from “agrarian capitalist” landowners to “institutional 
landowners” is a negative and deleterious one: “Where agrarian capitalists are actively involved 
in the production of commodities, and view the land as a necessary condition of production that 
must be sustained in order to facilitate expanded reproduction (M-C-M’), institutional 
landowners view land primarily as a portfolio asset, and are therefore primarily concerned with 
 




maximizing returns to investors, particularly in the form of asset prices appreciation (M-M’)” 
(2014, p. 496). Financialized landowners are “rentiers” who “contribute little” to the local 
economies in which they are situated; agrarian capitalists are, on the contrary, “actively 
involved” in production and expanded reproduction. 
In  an effort to emphasize the evils of finance and elevate “productive” capitalism, 
Gunnoe goes so far as to valorize big timber, an industry that is responsible for centuries of 
attacks on Indigenous communities and profound destruction of environment through the 
transformation of vast forests to fields of stumps. They are also responsible for the development 
of dozens of hydroelectric dams, which further wreck the environment and disturb Indigenous 
life in myriad ways. 
Gunnoe elevates capitalist white settler ownership and control over timberland so long 
as it’s not “financialized.” Here, “non-financialized” implies a limit on the size of a company, as 
well as on geographical proximity. But capitalist firms necessarily grow and scale up, or they fail. 
The financialization of timber farming does not indicate a shift in the nature of accumulation, it 





Financializaton of Housing, or Housingification of Finance? 
Real Estate, not finance “in general,” is leading much of the boom of “financial activity” 
over recent decades. The increased ratio of bank lending to GDP since the 1970s (Figure 5-2) is 
due almost entirely to increases in mortgage-lending. Studying 17 countries, Jorda et al. (2016) 
go so far as to suggest that “To a large extent, the core business model of banks in advanced 
economies today resembles that of real estate funds: banks are borrowing (short) from the 
public and capital markets to invest (long) into assets linked to real estate” (Jordà et al, 2016: p. 
115). 
Similarly, Hudson and Gunnoe note that “Real estate accounts for approximately 70 
percent of bank lending in Britain and the United States and some 80 percent of capital gains in 
the U.S. economy are land price gains.” (Gunnoe, 2014, p. 485; Hudson, 2014, pp. 145–146). 
Raquel Rolnik points out that “In the US, UK, Denmark, Australia and Japan, residential 
mortgage markets today represent between 50% and 100% of gross domestic product (GDP)” 
(Rolnik, 2013, p. 1059).  
Rognlie (2015) shows that while net capital share of aggregate income has risen in the 
last several decades, this increase comes “entirely from the housing sector: the contribution to 
net capital income from all other sectors has been zero or slightly negative, as the fall and rise 
have offset each other.” He argues that we must revise the story we tell of labor ceding ground to 
capital since the 1970s; the increasing net share of capital “consists of a large long-term increase 
in the net capital income from housing, and a more volatile contribution from the rest of the 
economy” (2015, p. 50). 
Lest we think that the rising housing share in national income accounts is a result of 
speculative housing valuations, Albouy et al. (2009) find that “Rising rents appear to be the 
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primary driver of the rising housing share in the national income accounts, and, to a lesser 
degree, the affordability crisis in rental markets” (p. 28). 
Many of these scholars suggest, based on this data, that housing is being taken over by 
finance. However, what if we are experiencing the opposite: the housingification of finance?  
But of course it is not just housing: Clapp et al. (2017) show that financial vehicles based 
on agriculture and farming has spiked in the last two decades, making farmland one of the 
hottest new investment opportunities worldwide. This is reflected in the literature chronicling 
the financialization of global agricultural land (High Quest Partners, 2010; Holt-Giménez et al., 
2011; S. J. Martin & Clapp, 2015). 
 What we have on our hands is a steep rise in ground rent extraction relative to interest 
and profits—at least within the United States, the EU, Australia, Japan, and China. In the US, 
over the last fifteen years, the “Real Estate, Rental, and Leasing” sector has contributed almost 
double to the GDP as “Finance and Insurance,” and represents nearly double the value added by 
private industries as percentage of GDP (see figures 5-10 and 5-11). Real Estate, Rental, and 
Leasing has been a more stable industry, and reliably contributed positively to GDP (even 
during the subprime crisis is 2007-8) compared to the volatile Finance and Insurance sector 
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Figure 5-11 





Contributions to Percent Change in REAL GDP: Real Estate v. Finance and 
Insurance 
Marginal and neoclassical economics have noticed the trend as well; Alex Tabarrok of the 
blog Marginal Revolution argues that productivity gains in tech, bio-tech, and finance have 
gone “not to producers but to non-productive landowners”(2018). He points to the geographic 
concentration of these industries as proximate cause (for example: San Francisco and Silicon 
Valley). He writes, “High returns to land have meant lower returns to other factors of 
production.” 
 The mainstream marginalists explain these dynamics through supply, demand, and 
overzealous housing and land regulation (Albouy, 2009; Rognlie, 2016, p. 51). These economists 
only manage to call for the same old solutions: to deregulate and encourage growth in private 
market. 
In the void left by the dismissal of ground rent theory and the theory of a landowning 
class, there has been no theoretical apparatus specific to the social relations of land, and so it is 
conceptually difficult to articulate why and how land and housing play such a peculiar role in 
“financialization.” Any account of the “financialization of housing,” then, remains a theory of the 
absorption of yet another arena (housing) into the hungry belly of finance. This bolsters the 
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ongoing villainization of a monolithic finance sector, blaming “financial actors” for recent waves 
of land-based violence and displacement. 
If, however, we revive a theory of the specificity of ground rent in the social relations of 
land, we can consider a different interpretation. We see an increasing amount of what may have 
been interest-bearing capital plunged into land markets of one kind and another. This suggests 
an increase in breadth and power of the landowning class, as the recipients of ground rent, and 
it reveals the urgency of analyzing the specific dynamics, limits, and tendencies of ground rent 






Above, I have investigated the theoretical basis of landed class struggle in the capitalist 
mode of production. I present this as a challenge to those who argue that landed class struggle is 
in any way contingent, accidental, or unnecessary to the CMP. 
I have drawn on, extended, and in some cases questioned theoretical categories 
developed by Karl Marx. I have also drawn heavily on the work of social theorists who have 
examined the role of land and of place in the dynamics of capitalism, and especially of the 
production and reproduction of urban spaces in the context of frameworks rooted at least in part 
in Marxian ideas. Here, I wish to point out several arguments that, as far as I know, are unique 
to my investigation. 
First, in Chapter 2, rather than treating Marx’s typology of ground rent as a method for 
analyzing where rents come from, I show that the theories of absolute rent and differential rent 
each reveal an essential aspect of the capitalist mode of production. The concept of absolute rent 
illustrates the power of the landowner to withdraw land from the market – a power that 
distinguishes landowners from other classes, and that leads to recurrent dynamics within 
capitalism such as high vacancy rates during real estate booms. The concept of differential rent 
reveals the fact that land (or we might say space, in order to include water rights and air rights) 
is the only value-less, monopolizable resource. All other raw materials and potentially value-
less resources either require labor to collect and process them (e. g. minerals, water), and so 
gain a value, or they are not monopolizable (as in basic chemical processes such as the fact that 
hot water evaporates, or that calcium helps strawberries grow). Being located on a specific plot 




In Chapter 3, I make two claims based on my analysis in Chapter 2 of ground rent as 
social form: first, I argue that mortgage-lenders are actually landowners who collect ground rent 
in the form of “interest” on mortgages. Second, I argue that land-based securities – from REIT 
stock to mortgage backed securities – behave differently on the market than non-land-based 
securities because they are based to a degree upon actual flows of ground rent. 
In Chapter 4 I intervene in discussions of urban land rent, arguing that residential 
tenants are not tenants in terms of ground rent theory; they are consumers of the commodity 
home. “Home” is produced by a capitalist company (often today a “property management 
company”), which valorizes labor in the usual ways. This capitalist producer is sometimes a 
tenant paying rent to a landowner, and at other times the capitalist producer is also his own 
landlord (mirroring the phenomena of agricultural landowners who are also farmers of the land 
they own). 
Also in Chapter 4, I suggest a new way of understanding why urban rents rise. 
Explanations for the increasing unaffordability of rents usually range from the right wing 
“there’s not enough housing, build more!” to the left wing “there’s not enough rent regulation; 
pass more!” Applying the same methods Marx used in analyzing agricultural rents, I suggest 
instead that residential rents rise as the income of tenants rise; that landlords will raise rents 
whenever they can, and that the limit to their ability to raise rents is the income of their tenants. 
The income of their tenants is, here, the income of the property management company, whose 
income is based upon their monthly sale of the commodity home, and so is correlated with the 
income of working-class renters. 
In Chapter 5, I criticize what I call the epochal theory of the “financialization of land and 
housing.” While this literature argues that finance is taking over land and housing, I argue the 
opposite: a larger and larger portion of global “financial” revenue is taking the form of ground 
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rent. This “housingification of finance” (or, more accurate but even less pronounceable, the 
“ground-rentification of finance”) is an important avenue for future research. 
Two ideas which I have touched upon in this dissertation demand the most elaboration 
and future research. They are (1) my concept of “High-rent commodities,” and (2) the 
relationship between the state and the landowning class. I describe “High-rent commodities” as 
those commodities whose production process involves paying a large amount of rent 
proportional to the whole capital outlay. The “High-rent sectors” producing “High-rent 
commodities” are sectors in which landowners have the power to increase the price of the 
commodities by threatening withdrawal of their land, thereby creating absolute rent. Future 
research might ask, Which sectors are high rent sectors? How does the landowning class affect 
these sectors? How does this play out in moments of class struggle? 
As for the landowning class and the state, this relationship begs clarification both on the 
highest level of abstract theory, and as an avenue of concrete historical study. Marxian state 
theory has never moved out of its infancy, and I suspect that investigating the landowning class’ 
relationship to the state can take us to a new stage in understanding the particular role and 
nature of the state in capitalism. 
As noted in the introduction to this dissertation, this work was motivated by my own 
engagement with urban struggles in the United States, which led me to want to understand 
more clearly the way in which land and landownership fit into the broader dynamics of 
contemporary capitalism. I have said little about the implications of this largely conceptual 
investigation – aimed at clarifying core concepts and their interrelationships – for people’s 
struggles in urban and rural spaces over the right to land, and I will not resolve this here.  
 I will say only this, although many of my readers will already know it: Nothing will 
permanently fix the housing crisis within capitalism, nor return agricultural and rural land to 
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“the people” so long as the capitalist mode of production persists. Because the ownership of land 
can yield massive riches, the rich will continue to own land.  When necessary, landlords will 
subvert regulation, overturn law, or defend their ground rent illegally.  
 This is no reason to give up pursuing housing and land reform, because control over 
territory and mobility makes further organizing possible – every space carved out can be useful. 
Control over land, territory, and mobility is essential for overturning the capitalist mode of 
production. As we continue to fight for rent regulation, for municipal funding for community 
land trusts, for reparations in the form of land grants, for full public housing, for the freedom to 
cultivate the land for subsistence rather than profit, we can also have one eye on a horizon 
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